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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the interrelationship between dairy aid and trade. After WW-II 
US dairy aid contributed to rises in consumption and sales in the Pacific; US domestic 
politics and Cold War strategy influenced aid programmes. Similarly, when dairy 
surpluses in the EEC (also known as the EC; currently the EU) coincided with shortages 
in India in the 1960s, the EEC sought to: maintain the CAP status quo, dispose of its 
"Butter Mountain", and earn political cachet such as the US enjoyed via PL 480 food 
aid - while assisting India. Proceeds fi^om "monetised" EEC butter oil and milk powder 
donations were to be invested in Indian dairy infi-astructure. 
As the largest Asian country with a "dairy culture", India was a suitable setting for 
Operation Flood (OF), the world's largest dairy development programme ca. 1970-
1996. Because so much debate on aid, trade and development can be illustrated by OF, 
this thesis chose India as its case study. Claims that dairying could benefit women and 
minorities attracted World Bank loans, but subjected OF to virulent charges of immet 
goals. Worse, warned OF detractors, India could become permanently dependent on 
Europe's lactic largess. OF officials countered that they were successfully carrying out 
their original mission to improve the dairy marketing system of India. 
Thesis maps and charts based on the Agrostat-PC database (FAO) show India increased 
dairy production and consumption significantly during OF. As some comparable coim-
tries declined, India moved toward self-sufficiency and status as the world's number 
two milk producer. Proper pricing by Indian authorities ensured that dairy aid was not a 
long-term disincentive to farmers and, in the end, increased dairy autonomy. 
Prospects for "replication" of Operation Flood are limited by a lack of settings suitable 
for such programmes, and by reduced stocks available for aid. But dairy aid will have a 
continued role in emergency aid, and in structural adjustment in those poor countries 
whose food security declines as GATTAVTO liberalises international agricultural trade. 
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This facility in Lynden, Washington, USA can process 2.04 million kilograms of milk 
per day into skim milk powder (SMP). Owned by the farmers' cooperative Darigold, 
the largest single producer of SMP in the US, it is a prime source of milk powder 
exports to Africa, Asia and South America. It is fimdamentally similar to plants in the 
E E C that produced dairy aid for India, where it was "monetised" to fund such plants and 
transport infrastructure, so Indian farmers' cooperatives could process and distribute 
powder, etc. from cow and buffalo milk in the programme called Operation Flood. 
The cow is the foster mother of the human race. From the time of the ancient Hindoo to 
this time have the thoughts of men turned to this kindly and beneficent creature as one 
of the chief sustaining forces of human life. 
W.D. Hoard, founder Hoard's Dairyman, 1885 
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GLOSSARY 
Additionality: use of food aid to "provide additional consumption for people whose 
incomes are too low for them to buy sufficient food". ^  
AI: artificial insemination of dairy cows or other animals. 
BO: butter oil; accompanied SMP as dairy aid fi-om the EEC to India. 
BST: (bovine somatotropin) naturally occurring hormone stimulating milk production; 
synthesised from DNA in 1980s. Also called BGH (bovine growth hormone). 
CAP: Common Agricultural Policy (of the EU aka EC or EEC or Common Market). 
CFA; Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes; oversees WFP. 
DC: developed country. This thesis uses the older acronym IC (industrialised country) 
interchangeably with DC to denote rich countries with advanced service sectors. 
EEC: European Economic Community. As per conraion usage this thesis uses EEC 
interchangeably with (EC) for the European Communities est. in 1957 Treaty of 
Rome; called the European Union (EU) afler 1992 Maastricht Treaty signing. 
Eif: European Union (Maastricht Summit: Dec.9-11,1991; Treaty signed Feb.7,1992).2 
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN. 
FEW: food-for-work, i.e. food aid as partial payment, e.g. in road-building in Turkey. 
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade; begun 1947, superseded by WTO 1994. 
GOI: Government of India. 
IC: industrialised country or developed country (DC). ICs comprise "The North". 
IDC: Indian Dairy Corporation. 
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development (UN). 
IA4F: International Monetary Fund. 
LDC: unless specified, used collectively in this thesis for all poor countries, including 
less developed countries (LDCs), low-income-food-deficit countries (LIFD), 
and what formerly were termed least-developed countries (LLDCs). LDCs are 
sometimes called the Third Worid or the South. (In 1991 the UN changed 
previous nomenclature by defining "least developed countries" or LDCs as 
"those low-income countries that are suffering from long-term handicaps to 
I John Shaw & Edward Clay (1993) World Food Aid: p xi. 
^ Official Publications of the EC (1992) From Single Market to European Union: p 43. 
X 
growth, in particular low levels of human resource development and/or severe 
structural weakness. Previously, LDCs were often defined as "less developed 
countries" and LLDCs as "least developed.") The World Bank Development 
Report (1996) estimates the poverty line (GNP per capita in weighted $US) at 
$380w in low-income countries including China and India, and at $360vi' for 
other low-income countries.'' 
MAFF: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (United Kingdom). 
Metric/US measures: 1.016 metric tonnes/ US long ton. 0.454 kilograms = US lb. 
Metric tonne = 2.2046 US pounds.5 3.785 litres = US gallon. (0.454 kg./US lb.) 
Milk weighs ca. 1.03 kg./litre = 0.975 kg./US quart = 8.6 US pounds per gallon. 
NFU: National Farmers Union (Great Britain). 
NDDB: National Dairy Development Board, in India; later merged with IDC. 
NIB: nontarifFbarriers, e.g. quotas or voluntary export restraints (VERs). 
NGOs: non-govemmental organisations; e.g. Christian Aid or Oxfam. 
OF: Operation Flood, the world's largest dairy development project in India. 
PL 480: Public Law 480, basis for formal US food aid operations since 1954. 
Reciprocity: "symmetric rights and obligations of member states" in Bhagwati.^ 
SAFs: structural adjustment programmes, as mandated on debtor countries by the IMF. 
SMP: skimmed milk powder; called nonfat dry milk powder (NDMP) in the US. 
Tariffication: making explicit hitherto hidden forms of protection against farm imports. 
Third World: generally referring to LDCs or the South, compared to the Western First 
World (aka ICs, DCs, the North) and former socialist Eastbloc or Second World. 
Triangular operations: food bought in one LDC, sent as food aid to another. 
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture. 
VER: volimtary export restraint/restriction. A form of nontarifF barrier. 
WTO: Worid Trade Organisation; superseded most GATT roles after GATT-1994. 
3 Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid: p ix. 
^ World Development Report: From Plan to Market (1996) World Bank: pp 188-189. Similar 
thresholds: low- and middle-income economies/$1090H' GNP per capita; upper-middle income/$4640 and 
high-income economies$23,420 and world average/$4470. 
^ Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985). 
6 Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism, p 35. 
INTRODUCTION TO TfflS THESIS 
International dairy product aid and trade is a relatively recent phenomenon, and an 
examination of both activities reveals an interrelationship so close that at times it can 
be difficult to discern one from the other. 
In its investigation of the intertwined activities of dairy aid and trade, this thesis moves 
from the general background of food aid and trade (which is dominated by cereals) in 
Chapters 1 and 2, to the case study of Indian dairy development in Chapters 3 and 4. 
There happens to be a greater wealth of statistics kept, and more research published in 
international grain trade than in dairy trade and aid, but similarities between the two 
commodity fields are compelling. Therefore, this thesis will sometimes refer to the 
grain trade, in order to illustrate international dairy activities whose patterns often 
follow those of grain. 
Chapter 3 benefits from recent empirical evidence gleaned from the Agrostat-PC (FAO 
Rome, 1990 and 1994) database from the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN. 
Maps, charts and tables in this thesis show a turnaround in India's dairy picture after the 
advent of Operation Flood (OF) - the world's largest and longest-running dairy 
development programme, run ca. 1970-94 by the Government of India (GOI), in concert 
with the European Economic Community (EEC), the World Food Programme (WFP) 
and other institutions. Because so much debate on aid, trade and development can be 
illustrated by Operation Flood, concluding Chapters 4 and 5 review the discordant 
literature on OF and deems the programme a qualified success. 
Food trade goes global 
Just a few centuries ago most of the world's people ate food that was produced locally. 
The repeal of the British Com laws in 1846 was a bellwether for waves of food trade 
that swept the world, allowing the diets of many people to incorporate cereals, and a 
wide range of other foods, from hundreds, i f not thousands, of miles away. Other 
inducements to the international food trade included the laying of the Transatlantic 
cable in 1866, and opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.' The opening of the Panama 
Canal, in August 1914 as the European powers began WW-F, was a portent of the 
extension of US domination of trade in the western hemisphere to both hemispheres 
after WW-II, when the exhausted combatants in Europe and Asia ceded de facto worid 
trade hegemony to the US. Farm production had geared up (along with production of 
arms materiel) in the US during the war, as part of wartime Lend-Lease (1941-1945) to 
the Allies, and helped bring an end to the Great Depression that had dogged the 
economy since 1929. Loath to disappoint US farmers by cutting production, the 
government soon authorised extended aid for European recovery in the Marshall Plan 
(ca. 1947-52), which helped Europe rebuild faster than even some optimists expected.^ 
Post-WW-n food aid shipments were primarily cereals, mostly wheat, but among the 
commodity mix of aid were dairy products. This dairy product aid was comprised 
mostly of milk powder, as well as forms of butter. WW-II era milk powder was a 
valued addition to the diets of those without access to fresh milk, but to the trained 
palette, the taste was "artificial", and the reconstituted product often was marred by 
floating clumps of undissolved milk powder. Improvements in fine-spraying techniques 
in transforming fresh fluid milk into dry milk powder were soon to improve product 
quality, consumer satisfaction, and expand the scope for international dairy product 
trade dramatically. Also of immense use were improvements in refrigeration, and the 
development of better-insulated ship, rail and truck containers to preserve dairy 
products from spoilage. 
'Dan Morgan (1979) Merchants of Grain. 
8 William R. Keylor (1984) The Twentieth-Century World, p 27. 
^ Perhaps the quick results achieved by US aid in the rebuilding of Europe led to unrealistically high 
expectations of what could be achieved by sending aid to countries outside Europe. Although much of the 
infrastructure and urban centres of Europe were damaged, sufiBcient skilled workers and managers 
survived with knowledge of how to rebuild modem systems - a crucial factor that was missing in some less 
developed countries targeted for development aid. 
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Huge yield increases in cereals, fodder and dairy production witnessed in the US during 
the 1950s and the 1960s seemed to presage a future of food bounty, not only for 
Americans, but also for those living in want around the worid. It was thought they 
could benefit first from surplus food shipments, and second from adopting modem 
agricultural techniques mastered in the US and Canada. So food aid (mostly cereals, 
but significant amounts of milk powder until the early-1970s) continued to flow from 
North America to recipients around the globe. Plans to extend technical progress made 
in North America to Green and White Revolutions in poor countries around the world 
were set in motion. 
But within a few decades, initial optimism met scepticism, then derision. Although 
some US clients in the Cold War, led by Japan, prospered under land reform and a 
lingering US influence, other counfries (usually less crucial to Cold War strategy) had 
food aid and trade relationships with the West that seemed counterproductive. Instead 
of bounty, many faced scarcity. Meanwhile, the ideological conflict and military 
tension between the West and Communist countries confused the dialogue about 
poverty and development. In an effort to neutralise the Cold War strategy of the 
competing First and Second Worlds, Jawaharlal Nehru and others called for a non-
aligned Third World movement at the Bandung Conference in 1955. 
The writer of this thesis is encouraged by statistics on rising literacy and other quality-
of-life indicators in developing countries, as well as the much ballyhooed "emerging 
economies". The frends reflect slow but undeniable progress in most countries. 
Nevertheless, it is equally undeniable that much of the world remains in poverty. (This 
has often resulted in calls for import substitution - i f not outright autarky - in developing 
countries.) Whether the portion of people below the World Bank-defined poverty line 
($380 in low-income countries including China and India; $360 in the group of other 
low-income countries'^) is 25%, 15% or 8% is in dispute. But the nutritional 
requirements of too many of the world's people are unmet, and the detractors of food 
aid programmes blame a chronically harmful relationship between aid and trade. 
10 World Develovment Report (1996) World Bank; pp 188-189. GNP per capita in weighted $US. 
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First do no harm 
The practitioners of the international aid and trade regime often exacerbate ailments of 
countries they presume to improve, according to detractors. They metaphorically 
violated the oath of Hippocrates, particularly the injunction to do no harm. According 
to legend, Hippocrates, pledged 
I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my 
judgement and never do harm to anyone.'' 
When formal international food aid programmes were first constructed, after WW-II, it 
seemed so simple. Even children feel the simplicity, intuitively. They ask: If people 
are hungry and we have plenty, why not just give it to them? Yet few transactions, 
which on the surface seem so iimocuous and above-board, have, as the decades pass, 
aroused as much criticism, hostility and deep-seated suspicion among both rich and 
poor countries as the intersticed mechanisms of international food aid and trade. 
Criticism of the post-WW-II international aid and trade network ranges from mild 
scepticism, to calls for liberalising reform, and demands for radical change. 
Scepticism of the status quo 
The milder doubters express puzzlement that despite the hundreds of millions of tonnes 
of cereals, vegetable oils and dairy products sold on concessionary terms - or donated as 
outright grants - to less developed countries (LDCs) since WW-II, many Third Worid 
food aid recipients remain further from nutritional self-sufficiency than before aid 
began. 
Sceptics of the status quo sometimes call for large increases in aid according to the 
Club of Rome prescriptions of the 1970s or, conversely, a cessation of aid in line with 
the dissent on development aid of Peter Bauer.'^ 
" Economist Survey (March 19, 1994) "The fUture of medicine": p 17. Food aid practitioners might 
defend themselves in turn by echoing Hippocrates' defence against critics of his empirical methods: 
'T)esperate diseases require desperate remedies." 
'2 Peter T. Bauer (1971) Dissent on Development: Studies and Debates in Development Economics. 
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Calls for reform 
In the middle position (generally the province of this thesis) critics charge that the 
system was unfairly managed by rich countries (ICs, alternatively DCs^^) in North 
America and Europe, making LDCs serve as outlets for IC farm surpluses. At the same 
time, poor countries suffered economically from US - and especially EEC - protection 
against their food exports. The US occasionally chafed at EEC protection against 
cheaper food imports (e.g. chickens and cereals from the US), but generally accepted 
them because of the stability that EEC farm policy brought to Europe during the Cold 
War confrontation with the USSR. 
As we have already discussed, US farmers (characterised by low-cost production, due to 
a wealth of arable land) benefited from the ready markets cultivated by Washington in 
commercial trade, concessionary sales or outright food aid after WW-II. Unlike US 
agriculture which was sending streams of cereals and lesser amounts of milk powder 
and other commodities around the world, Europe's agriculture had relatively little 
obvious effect upon developing coimtries imtil about the mid-1970s. It was then that 
the newly food-self-sufficient EEC "siuplus disposal" programmes of its own were 
necessary. In Europe, (characterised by high-cost production, due to a scarcity of arable 
land, relative to the US) surpluses were made possible by generous price supports paid 
to farmers.''^ US policy makers accepted EEC farm subsidies and protection until the 
1980s, when EEC-subsidised exports cut into world market share held by the US. 
Eventually, it was EEC-export-subsidisation more than anything else that persuaded the 
US to favour agricultural liberalisation in the international General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade negotiations known as the GATT. 
In Merchants of Grain Dan Morgan explains that, while the US role in post-WW-II 
food trade reverberated (for better or worse) around the world, Europe's international 
presence was not overweening imtil later. Morgan says that, because Europe's post-
1^  ICs: Industrialised Countries with large service sectors becoming Information-technology Countries in 
our so-called post-industrial era. Alternatively, ICs are called DCs. Explanation. When it was recognised 
that many LDCs remained poor after significant industrialisation, some theorists began referring to rich 
countries (formerly ICs) as Developed Countries (DCs). 
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WW-II appetite for grain was so great until the early 1970s, subsidisation and protection 
of European farmers by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): 
did not substantially worsen the terms of trade for non-European suppliers.'^  
But Morgan notes that when agricultural production went into surplus, and Europe's 
"food mountains" grew in the late 1970s, the terms of trade shifted against non-
European suppliers - a viewpoint shared by Kym Anderson and Rodney Tyers'^ in their 
detailed arguments for GATT reforms in farm trade. This was true for dairy products as 
well as cereals. CAP dairy subsidies resulted in surplus butter moimtains and milk 
lakes that the Germans (prime contributors to it) collectively termed der Butterberg}"^ 
In fact, French and German contributions to EEC dairy surpluses were much greater 
than would have been the case without CAP subsidies. 
Writing more than a decade after Morgan (and a year or two before signing of the 
Uruguay GATT accords on agriculture), Paul Kennedy wrote that agricultural lobbies in 
ICs still played a strong role in world trade: 
Although the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture is not large in 
developed countries - 3% in the United States, 4.8% in (West) Germany, 2.1% in 
Britain, 6.7% in France, 8% in Japan, 9.1% in Italy - farming lobbies remain enormously 
influential. '* 
Among opponents of the status quo, the Cairns Group of more than a dozen agricultural 
exporters (which fought EEC and US subsidies in the Uruguay round of the GATT 
negotiations) reflected Morgan's view. In a study by the University of Missouri of 
nearly 300 farms over the years 1985 to 1993, 41% of net income of average farm 
operators came from US govenunent subsidies; 33% of net dairy farmers' income came 
from the same source. '^ Figures for comparable EEC subsidies were even higher. The 
Cairns countries, comprising ICs such as Argentina, Australia, New Zealand along with 
'"•in Europe, farm subsidies helped improve the rural economy, slow rural-to-urban migration - and shore 
up farmers' political support for the largely Christian-Democratic governments (in tune with US- and 
NATO-led Cold War strategy) that dominated post-WW-11 politics for decades. 
'5 Dan Morgan (1979) Merchants of Grain: p 185. 
'^  Kym Anderson & Rodney Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products. 
17 Dan Morgan (1979); p 189, 
'* Paul Kennedy (1993) Preparing for the Twenty-First Century: p 75. 
'^  University of Missouri (May 10, 1995) "Government pays 41% of net income" in Hoard's Dairyman: 
p 344. Jim Kennel, supervisor of the study said, "These are not giant corporate or mega farms. They are 
family farms and small commercial farms...with annual sales of $200,000." 
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several net food exporters from the Third World, argued that subsidies in the rich US 
and EEC unfairly attacked their natural comparative advantage in food production. 
The Cairns Group decried EEC and US farm subidies in general and subsidising 
agricultural exports to the world market in particular, while protecting their domestic 
markets from cheaper imports from Cairns countries, etc. In the Uruguay Round of 
GATT, the Cairns Group demanded liberalisation of trade including dairying, which the 
US had caused to be exempted from GATT rules from the beginning in 1947. 
Calls for radical change 
At the other end of the range, detractors of the international food aid and trade regime 
such as Susan George^ *^ , readily acknowledge that IC agricultxu^ subsidies and other 
practises badly skew world agricultural trade. Because George's view was, at least until 
recently, shared by many others including policy makers in developing country 
governments, it bears lengthy discussion. This analysis identifies food and 
development aid as an intrinsic part of the systematic exploitation of poor countries by 
developed countries. George has claimed that since aid programmes burgeoned after 
WW-H: 
the relative and absolute numbers of hungry and destitute people have vastly increased.^ ' 
George is joined by Arturo Escobar^ ^ demanding more radical measures than the 
reforms sought by the Cairns Group, and in charging that rich country farm subsidies 
are possible, at least in part, due to profits that IC-based MNCs expropriate unfairly 
from the Third Worid. Examples include sales of high-value-added, high-technology 
products (e.g., arms, machine tools and electronics), in what is clearly a seller's market. 
The positive net flow of debt repayments from poor to rich countries is also decried as 
unfair by George and Escobar. They cite as hideously ironic the fact that, at the height 
20 Susan George (1977) How the Other HalfPies-The Real Reasons for World Hunger. Until the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and consequent break-up of the USSR, perhaps most policy makers in developing 
countries resisted market-oriented policies. More recent acquiescence to market reforms (encouraged by 
progress in China after its agriculture was Uberalised) should not mask poor countries' residual fears of 
interference in their economies by international capital. 
21 Susan George (1984) III Fares the Land, p 102. 
22 Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
Escobar's critique nught be described as neo-Marxian, or postmodern. 
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of the drought in the 1980s, the resources of governments in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
sapped by structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), mandated by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The putative trade surpluses of many African 
countries were absorbed entirely by their debt repayments to rich countries and lending 
institutions. From the 1980s, a decade lost to drought and debt, through the year 2000, 
Africa was expected to suffer a net disinvestment of approximately $40 billion. 
Given this exacerbation of poverty in poor countries in Africa and elsewhere, it smacks 
of reprehensible greed that the ICs, which have a pronounced lead in manufacture and 
marketing of high-value-added goods, should also seek to sew up the international trade 
in low-value-added commodities such as farm products. But, as Paul Kennedy notes, 
farmer groups in the US and elsewhere (whose farmgate prices in constant dollars have 
suffered a long-term decline), have pressured their governments to "discover and open 
up markets overseas."^^ Moreover, the US trade deficit with Japan - and newly-
industrialising countries (NICs) like Korea, and lately, China - gives the US government 
strong economic incentives to market its agricultural produce abroad as profitably as 
possible. 
That critiques of George, Escobar and the like deserve careful examination seems 
obvious, when even the proponents of multinational (or transnational) capitalism and 
laissez-faire trade admit that, at times (e.g. the 1973-74 US grain sale to the USSR) 
international grain cartels, and lobbyists have skewed the marketplace - generally tilting 
the advantage toward the industrialised countries, and heavily against the developing 
Third World.2'* Somewhat differently, William Greider^s argues that uncontrolled 
movements of international capital can erode producer (or farmer and worker) interests, 
and even threaten the ability of rich country govenmients (not to mention poorer ones) 
to regulate their economies. 
23 Paul Kennedy (1993) Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, p 317. 
2'* Arturo Escobar, Dan Morgan, Susan George. 
25 William Greider (1997) One World Ready or Not: ne Manic Logic of Global Capitalism. Perhaps 
capital movements will be the object of reform in future GATTAVTO negotiations. Kennedy (1993) is 
also pessimistic in his analysis of the m^or roles of capital and MNC agribusiaess in world agriculture. 
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Escobar sees a hubristic Western world-view behind many mistakes made in the post-
WW-n "development discourse", and portrays the West's aid and development 
establishment as a means to induce Third World acceptance of First World 
rationalisations for their economic and cultural subservience. Escobar concurs with 
George that more than simple human error or (in a postmodern sense) an incomplete 
worid-view contributed to the inequity of the international trading regime. They 
suspect the system is fixed to steadily expropriate the natural resources and productive 
capacity of the developing worid, while it (LDCs) serves as a dumping ground for the 
food mountains resulting from Europe's CAP and similarly supported North American 
farm programs (e.g. the US Food Security Act of 1985). In the spirit of the moribund 
New International Economic Order (NDEO), this wing on the left believes that radical 
reform of the IMF, Worid Bank and other institutions is necessary to curb harm done by 
capitalist powers to small players in the international food frade. 
A direct link might be traced between the harshest critics of the international food aid 
and trade regime such as Susan George and Arturo Escobar, the most vociferous critics 
of international dairy aid such as Shanti George^^ and Claude Alvarez^^, and numerous 
socialist Members of the European Parliament - all the way back to the world-view of 
V. I . Lenin. In a 1917 essay Lenin^s claimed that, since by its inherent nature, capitalism 
must continually expand its markets - or die - it faced a crisis and critical turning point 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Lenin wrote that the capitalist countries of 
Europe had saturated their own domestic markets - partly because the purchasing power 
of labour and the proletariat were limited or even frozen in the class system. Their 
markets had matured. Faced with mature domestic markets, capitalists had, according 
to Lenin, reached for the geographical solution. 
In the context of international dairy aid and trade, Marxist or neo-Marxist critics have 
fixed on the activities of MNCs such as Carnation, Monsanto and Nestle, in concert 
26 Shanti George (1985) Operation Flood. 
27 Claude Alvarez, ed. (1985) Another Revolution Fails. 
28 V.I. Lenin (1917) "Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism". Lenin's description roughly 
corresponds to the "price-squeeze" affecting rich country farmers, who found that they had to produce 
more for lower prices, but consequent over-supply in the marketplace fiirther reduced their compensation 
in real dollars. 
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with the governments of the rich countries in which they are based, as seeking to coopt 
poor countries such as India into their international marketing plans. (Certainly Nestle 
encountered criticism from Right, Left and mainstream critics for marketing its human 
milk-replacer in poor countries.) In this view, initial shipments of donated or 
concessionary dairy aid might, for example, be tendered to encourage India's 
acceptance of future sales from Europe. The worst case might be one in which India 
loses its dairy self-sufficiency (not just in baby milk-replacer and baby foods, but also in 
adult dairy intake), after abandoning attempts to improve its population's nutritional 
entitlements by developing its own dairy production, processing, distribution and 
marketing systems. The best case might be one in which India reverses that dismal 
scenario and emerges as one of the worid's leading dairy producers, with a population 
that gradually enjoys greater access to nutritious dairy products. Fortunately, the latter 
scenario represents the results of Operation Flood, the case study for this thesis. 
View of this thesis 
That the massive transfer of surplus dairy products from Europe to India in the 
Operation Flood (OF) programme from the late 1960s to the 1990s was fraught with 
potential dangers to Indian dairy autonomy was properly pointed out by many critics. 
Even a leading proponent of food aid, Hans Singer acknowledges its two-sided 
potentiality; 
...most reasonable people would however, agree that food aid, if improperly handled, 
can do more harm than good, and there are plenty of horror stories to testify to that. 
Yet equally, when properly handled, food aid can do a great deal of good and be a vital 
instrument of development - and there are plenty of success stories to testify to that.^^ 
As wil l be discussed at length below, Martin Doombos et a?^ found that while 
Operation Flood was not without success under certain criteria (e.g. fostering dairy 
cooperatives), early mistakes in pricing of dairy commodities available to large urban 
processors in India acted as disincentives to Indian dairy farmers before they were 
rectified. Doombos concurred wdth many other critics that some claims made about OF 
(e.g. that it would result in significant welfare gains to women, children, lower castes 
and tribal groups in India) were either exaggerated or doomed to failure. 
29 Hans Singer, etal (1987) Food Aid: The Challenge and the Opportunity. 
^0 Martin Doombos, Frank van Dorsten, Manoshi Mitra and Piet Terhal. (1990) Dairy Aid and 
Development: India's Operation Flood 
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Observers with more limited (perhaps more realistic) expectations for a programme that 
was originally constructed to facilitate marketing and nation-wide distribution of Indian 
milk, are more ebullient in their praise. Relatively recent data from Agrostat/FAO 
(1990,1994) that per capita consumption of milk and ghee increased during Operation 
Flood, while imports of EEC commodities declined, makes it very difficult to portray it 
as a horror story. Instead of serving as an instrument of European neo-colonialism, 
imported dairy products were "monetised" to finance much-needed infrastructure. In 
retrospect, it appears that Operation Flood helped increase India's food security during 
a period when many developing countries lost ground. 
Increasingly, since the early 1980s (partly due to the free market influence of the 
Reagan adminisfration in the US, and the Thatcher administration in the UK), aid 
practitioners have scrutinised their activities, identifying and ceasing coxmter-
productive operations. Aid practitioners have also sought to quicken their response to 
emergencies (such as drought in Ethiopia or Somalia) by improving information 
gathering, while increasing their sensitivity to circumstances where food aid should be 
augmented by cash or technical aid. 
Dairy aid as a Troian Cow? 
Today it is clear that in most cases, dairy aid programmes should be limited to 
circumstances where donations can be utilised by the recipient government without 
posing long-term disincentives to indigenous farmers - a danger that even long-time 
food aid advocates such as Hans Singer and John W. Mellor are well aware oV^ 
However, an examination of Operation Flood, the case study for this thesis, reveals that 
instead of acting as what Shanti George scorned as a "Trojan Horse" inviting 
dependence on European imports, it helped enhance India's long-term dairy autonomy. 
When the programme began, there was milk rationing in India. Today, dairy products 
31 John W. Mellor (1987) in Clay & Shaw Poverty. Development and Food.: pp 187-88. This is not to 
say that there are not (according to David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage) many instances 
where reliance upon food imports is warranted. Britain led the way with repeal of the Com Laws in 1846. 
Presently, Egypt has a high degree of food security despite (or because of) its reliance upon US cereals 
imports (Anne Thompson, 1985), but it may be able to improve its economy through earnings achieved by 
the release of labour from its farm sector to more remunerative work, just as Britain did. 
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are of better quality and more widely available, production has doubled and per capita 
consumption has increased by at least 20% for butter and ghee and around 50% for 
some other dairy products. Although a large portion of the Indian population remains in 
poverty, food security has been generally increased, and economic output is improving. 
Tested by Hippocrates' maxim, it seems that in the aggregate. Operation Flood "did no 
harm", and it is reasonable to conclude that the programme has already brought 
significant welfare gains to India. As Peter J. Atkins concluded in a 1988 paper: 
This type of project, which seeks fundamentally to restructure whole subsystems of the 
rural economy, will take at least 20 or 30 years to reach its basic goals but, given the 
political will on the part of the Government of India and the state authorities, OF will 
prove a great boon to both urban consumers and rural producers. ^ 2 
Obviously, the detractors of the present international food and dairy aid and trade 
regime are right to insist that world food systems should be audited continually for 
counterproductive food aid schemes, or the cartels, monopolies and protection that 
impede development in poor countries. Adam Smith wrote that a sort of benign 
capitalism was possible i f governments guided "the invisible hand", but only i f 
every improved and civilised society...takes pains to prevent [oppression by]...the 
masters of mankind...[under their] vile maxim.... All for ourselves, and nothing for 
other people.^ ^ 
Despite the dangers that rich capitalist countries can subvert poor cotmtry agriculture to 
their own ends. Operation Flood shows that this need not be the case. Furthermore, this 
thesis finds evidence that some reforms of potential benefit to developing countries 
have already been made, and can be extended under the aegis of the WTO, which began 
in the GATT process. 
32 Peter J. Atkins (August, 1988) "Rejoinder: India's dairy development and Operation Flood" in Food 
Policy 13: pp 305-312. Also in Indian Dairyman. 40: 9: pp 515-523. 
-^ -^  Adam Smith quoted by Noam Chomsky (March 29, 1993) "Notes on NAFTA: The Masters of 
Mankind" in The Nation: pp 412-416. 
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CHAPTER 1: EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL FOOD TRADE, 
DAIRY TRADE & DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES FROM 
MERCANTILISM TO GATTAVTO-1994 
Introduction 
This chapter fraces the rise of agricultural trade in the last few centuries to the 1990s. 
Brief reference is made to Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, Karl Marx 
and other voices still heard in debate on economics, population and worid trade. 
Particular attention is paid to the post-WW-II period of the Cold War, when resistance 
to ideological interference from the West and the Eastbloc resulted in Jawaharlal 
Nehru's declaration of a non-aligned "Third World" in 1955. Mainstream Western 
efforts, epitomised by W.W. Rostow's "take-off' theory, often failed to achieve their 
goals. Food and dairy aid programmes at times appeared counterproductive. Criticism 
of aid and development programmes from, e.g. Peter Bauer on the Right, and Susan 
George and Arturo Escobar on the Left, is examined. 
•V, 
Chapter 1 also describes how the agricultural "protectionism" which Jagdish Bhagwati 
says was originally buih into GATT-1947 by the US, was addressed in the Uruguay 
Round of world trade negotiations culminating in the controversial GATT-1994 
accords. In the Uruguay Roimd, agriculture and dairy trade were brought under the 
aegis of the GATT for the first time, A discussion of Kym Anderson and Rodney 
Tyers' work suggests that developing coimtry exporters which lost world market share 
from 1961 to 1986, could profit from GATT-1994 removal of rich country agricultural 
subsidies, and other liberalisations of international food trade. A synopsis of key 
provisions of the GATT-1994 agreement, and creation of the Worid Trade Organisation 
(WTO), is followed by some possible best case/worst case scenarios for rich and poor 
nations. 
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Historical Back£round 
The benefits of free trade are not universally recognised. Trade often takes lower 
precedence to other values of ethnic groups or countries. History is replete with 
examples of groups valuing ideological purity and self-reliance over unrestricted 
commerce, such as the Puritans who settled New England. Until Britain repealed the 
Com Laws in 1846, government policy favoured agricultural self-sufficiency over free 
trade. Although the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 inaugurated the post-WW-H era 
of expanded international trade, countries including Albania, China, India and Burma 
{aka Myanmar) have chosen policies ranging from "import substitution" to virtual 
autarky. Jagdish Bhagwati writes: 
The virtues of division of labour and exchange, noted even in Plato's Republic, had 
been lost to oblivion. Mercantilism and its legitimation of autarkic protective policies 
seemed to be only common sense, reminding one that common sense is what makes a 
person assert that the earth is flat, for that is how it appears to the naked eye.' 
On the intemational (and even regionally intranational) level, free trade is often 
opposed on the basis that it harms domestic farmers or producers - even the nation (or 
region) as a whole. Today, farm lobbyists aroimd the world frequently insist that their 
respective nation's power and wealth depends (at least in part) upon its own thriving 
agricultural sector. (Such an assertion might be closer to the tmth i f free trade 
opponents argued that the political fiature of the governing leadership depended on the 
goodwill of their agricultural constituency.) Writing recently in a survey of agriculture 
in The Economist, a publication that was instnmiental in repeal of the English Com 
Laws in 1846, Edward Carr wrote: 
Every age has found a pretext to protect its farmers. In the 19th century that pretext 
was unfair competition from cheap American and Australian wheat. In the 1930s it was 
farm poverty. After the second world war it was food security. In the 1960s it became 
preservation of the rural character. The farm lobby is quite capable of finding something 
new for the 1990s. 2 
Mercantilism 
In Europe, after the decay of feudalism (which was weakened by the formation of city 
states and the other manifestations of the Enlightenment), the preponderant 
"mercantilist" philosophy of new nation states such as France and England included the 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism: p 25. 
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tenet that self-sufficiency in food (as well as iron, textiles, etc.) was an important pillar 
of national power.^ In the starvation-prone time of Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), when 
food production limited population - and hence the numbers of well-fed soldiers that 
could be fielded - this argument was intuitively apparent. 
In the "zero simi" economics of the age of "mercantilism", one country's loss was 
another's gain; when English pirate-adventurer Francis Drake seized a Spanish 
merchant ship, Spain's loss was England's gain. It seemed one coimtry could be rich 
only i f another were poor. This was partly due to a widespread confiision, or 
misapprehension, equating specie (usually gold or silver coins) with wealth. As Paul 
Kennedy notes, "lessening the outflow of specie'"* by relying upon domestic supplies of 
"textiles, iron, grain", and denying foreign competitors profitable trade relationships 
seemed nearly as important as accumulating one's own wealth. (See Table 6) 
The Wealth of Nations 
The name forever to be associated with the first great erosion of what Kennedy called 
"the mercantilist, protectionist state" is Adam Smith. 5 In The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
Smith argued that the "invisible hand" of individual self-interest was the best guarantor 
of greater aggregate local, regional or national wealth. Smith argued that wage and 
price controls, imposed domestically (i.e. intranationally) by national governments, 
often hindered productivity, and hence national wealth. Acceptance of Smith's free 
trade philosophy was a precursor to the dismantling of centrally planned economies 
(CPE) of the COMECON coimtries in cenfral Europe, and aroimd the world, in the 
1980s and 1990s.6 
^ Edward Carr (December 12, 1992) "Grotesque; a survey of agriculture; the new Com Laws" in The 
Economist survey ppl6. 1-18. 
Paul Kennedy (1993) Preparing for the Twenty-First Century: pl24. 
''PaulKennedy (1993). p. 124. 
5 Paul Kennedy (1993); p. 125. 
^ It should be noted that Smith did not advocate absolute laissez-faire economics, but insisted on 
government limitations upon monopolies as well as individual accumulation of wealth. Aside from 
concerns that monopolistic conditions tend to exacerbate income inequalities in the population. Smith 
believed monopolies also are likely to lead to ineflBciencies in production, as a result of the loss of 
competition. A botanist might use this metaphor; the climax crop of laissez-faire economics is monopoly -
stifling to new growth until a cleansing forest fire comes along. 
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However, it is a long way from an intranational policy of liberalised trade within 
territory controlled by the British Crown, such as the former Empire, to a policy of 
tariff-free trade internationally (both of which Smith advocated). While the Crown 
enjoyed the gains from trade with its colonies or less powerful countries, it was loath to 
see its rivals such as Spain or France profit from a similar free trading relationship with 
itself Additionally, the landed aristocracy of the British Isles, which depended upon 
rents from tenant farmers for its income lobbied the Crown to retain protective tariffs 
on food imports from other countries that would compete with domestic agricultural 
production, lowering their prices and rents. 
J.D. Nicholson wrote that, although consimiers had suffered from a dearth of imports 
from 1765'', Britain did not become a net food importer until 1788. Nicholson asserts 
that even Adam Smith, who noted this harm to consumers, had missed an important 
raison d' etre of the protective tariffs called the Com Laws: to bolster the power of the 
Crown. 8 Mercantilist policy protected the Crown through the ability, in emergencies, to 
commandeer British merchant ships into status as temporary warships. Another abiding 
attraction of a mercantilist, managed trade policy (in an era long before the imposition 
of income taxes), was the fiscal power to raise monies through the granting of import 
and export licences, and levying tariffs on exports and imports. 
When the English Crown finally concluded that more revenue could be raised by 
liberalised policies (i.e. by levying tax on freely traded goods, instead of selling licences 
to conduct closely managed trade), a policy of free trade became politically practicable. 
The death knell of mercantilism as a national strategy came when enough policy makers 
agreed with industrialists (and according to the interpretation of the writings of Ricardo, 
and later Mil l ) , that free trade would enhance national power. Jagdish Bhagwati points 
out that a free-trading nation would profit: 
whether its trading partners were free-traders or protectionists. Unilateral free trade 
emerged as the prescription from this corpus of thought.^  
' J.S. Nicholson (1904) The History of the English Com Laws. 
8 J.S. Nicholson (1904): p 122. 
^ Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism: p 24. 
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Acceptance of free trade represented a landmark defeat for Britain's "agrarian 
protectionists'''^ in the mid-19* century, according to Hobsbawm. Assuredly, free trade 
has been a troubling prospect for high-cost producers in all countries, from the age of 
mercantilism to the present, liberalised post-GATT world trading system. 
Industry versus Agriculture 
It was the rise of industry that prompted a paradigm shift away from "zero sum" 
economics. Britain, whose power was enhanced by its leading role in the Industrial 
Revolution (making it well-placed to profit from exports to the continent, during the 
time of revolution and Napoleon in France''), experienced structural shifts that were 
later mimicked by nations world-wide. 
As Britain's textile, coal, steel, armament, shipping and rail industries raised national 
output, and manufactures and industry became more important to the national tax base, 
the relative weight of agricultural interests declined. (Perhaps it is politics, not 
economics, that truly is a "zero sum" competition.) Although Thomas Malthus' 
predictions of apocalyptic famine were later disproved, his assertion that humanity is 
limited by the food available to keep it alive was self-evident, as well as tautological. 
Malthus did not anticipate increased factorial productivity in agriculture, which due to 
technological change, is why his dismal logic of the arithmetical growth of the food 
supply lagging behind the geometric growth of humanity was faulty. 
In our own time, increased factorial productivity wrought by the Green Revolution has 
helped food supply keep pace with demand, as world population doubled in the period 
1950-1988.'2 Yet, Malthus' dire warnings linger on. Paul Kennedy, whose book 
Preparim for the Twenty-First Century'^ often refers to Malthus, remains pessimistic. 
Citing the research of Lester Brown and the World Watch Institute, Keimedy writes that 
droughts of the 1980s, along with an estimated 500 million "seriously undernourished" 
people (a wedge of worid population believed by Brown and Kennedy to be rising) 
'0 E.J . Hobsbawm (1962) The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848: p 359. 
" Paul Kennedy (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000: pp 126-139. 
12 Economist (June 10, 1995) "Will the worid starve?"; pp 63-64. 
"Paul Kennedy (1993) Preparing for the Twenty-First Century. 
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could be neo-Malthusian harbingers of a new era when population outstrips food 
production."* Pessimists claimed that in the early 1990s, world grain production was 
rising at only 15 million metric tonnes annually, when 28 million MT were needed to 
match worid population growth. Yet better harvests in the mid-1990s reversed this 
trend and began restoring depleted stocks of grain, etc. 
In the Industrial Revolution witnessed by Malthus in the late-eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, industry competed with agriculture for scarce workers. Since 
industrial wages must, at a minimum, be sufficient to feed and clothe workers, clever 
industrialists realised that, i f cheaper sustenance were available to workers, the cost of 
"a living wage" could stabilise or even fall, reducing overhead. According to E.J. 
Hobsbawm manufacturers believed food prices: 
were kept artificially high by the monopoly of the landed interest, made even worse 
by...the Com Laws.'^ 
So in their own interests, industrialists and the Anti-Com-Law League fostered a mass 
campaign^^ to abolish the Com Laws in Britain, and permit the import of cheaper grain 
from North America and elsewhere. This was resisted - to no avail - by the landed 
aristocracy, which argued that relying on food imports would subject their island nation 
to embargo and siege by foreign navies. But the ability of the British navy to defend its 
sea lanes was too well known, and the political influence of industry had so far 
exceeded that of agriculture, that the arguments of the agricultural gentry were to no 
avail. Food shortages, indeed famine, were never entirely out of the picture. As late as 
the year 1842, there were reports of unemployed workers dying of starvation on the 
streets of Manchester, 
Typical of most of history's so-called famines, starvation in Manchester resulted more 
from stractural defects in food distribution (or limited "entitlements"^* to food, in the 
vocabulary of Amartya Sen) than food shortages. At any rate, the horror ftielled public 
support for reductions of tariffs on food imports. By 1846, most of the listed Com 
I'* Lester R. Brown (1990) State of the World: pp 65-67. 
15 E.J. Hobsbawm (1962) TheAee of Revolution: 1789-1848: pp 60-61. 
16 E.J . Hobsbawm (1962): p. 157. 
1'' Horace White (1888) in Frederick Bastiat's Sophisms of Protection: page ix. 
'8 Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, eds. (1990) The Political Economy of Hunger - Volume I - Entitlement 
and Well-Being. 
29 
Laws were rescinded. As capital-heavy Britain tumed from textiles to iron, steel and 
railways, repeal of the Com Laws freed up labour from the agricultural sector. 
Cmcial to this structural shift was a 9% drop in food prices between 1850 and 1869. 
Further drops in real food prices after 1882, due to cheaper freight and efficient foreign 
producers2o, convinced many remaining doubters of the advantages of free trade. 
Domestic farmers responded to foreign competition by rationalisations (e.g. drainage of 
marshes) that increased farm productivity in Britain in the 1850s and 1860s. Because 
the influx of foreign grain forced down domestic farmgate prices, some British fanners 
switched production from cereals to higher-value-added (HVA) products like milk and 
cheese, to supplement the improved diets of industrial workers. 
Free trade policies were part of a "virtuous circle": the increased profits on sale of 
British manufactures (cheaper to produce, since workers' living wage was stabilised or 
even lowered in "real terms") on world markets provided a richer tax base. Taxes 
funded the navy, which in tum protected the commercial sea routes in which flowed the 
life blood of the British Empire. 
Comparative Advantage 
The British refined a principle earlier recognised by the Dutch: in the long run, military 
power is based on commercial power, not vice-versa. 21 The British embraced free trade 
with perhaps more fervour than the Dutch, because so many were convinced by the 
theory of "comparative advantage" advanced by David Ricardo in the early 19* century. 
By comparative advantage, Ricardo's proofs showed that even i f England were 
absolutely more efficient than Spain in all types of production, it would still benefit 
from free trade.22 For example, England should trade its cheaper linen for Spanish 
com (which Spaniards were comparatively better at producing than linen). In a leap 
from the "zero-sum" economics of mercantilism, policy makers now agreed that both 
countries would be wealthier than they were before forsaking autarky, by adopting 
1^  E.J. Hobsbawm (1962) The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848: pp. 61-67. 
20 J.S. Nicholson (1904) History of the English Com Laws: p 157. 
21 Paul Kennedy (1987) Rise and fall of Great Powers. 
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specialisation of labour and engaging in international trade. Mathematical proofs of 
comparative advantage are simple and convincing. According to Paul Samuelson: 
the theory of comparative advantage is a closely reasoned doctrine which, when 
properly stated, is unassailable. With it we can identify gross fallacies in the political 
propaganda for protective tariffs aimed at limiting imports. With it we can identify the 
germs of truth that sometimes pop up in the heated claims for tariff protection.23 
Protection of Infant and Strategic Industries; Farm Protection 
Of course, the real worid is more complex than Ricardo's proof, and at different times, 
in different countries, the arguments continue over whether or not to protect sectors of 
an economy by taxing imports, or to adopt less restricted policies for international trade. 
Such disparate industries as steel, consumer electronics, military production, agriculture 
and baby formula frequently entertain (to a surprising degree) similar arguments both 
for the removal of protection from foreign competition, and arguments for the removal 
of protection. 
It is difficult for any govenmient to impose unpopular policies (including free trade) 
indefinitely, i f the governed remain unaware of gains from those policies. 
Governments are routinely lobbied by domestic interest groups for subsidies, or 
protection from foreign competition. Even proponents of comparative advantage and 
free trade sometimes excuse tariffs on competing imports, to protect infant industries. 
Economists including John Stuart M i l l and Jagdish Bhagwati have argued that indeed 
there are instances when temporary protection of infant industries from foreign compet-
ition is justified^* i f returns to society outweigh the costs of protection in the long run. 
This rationale was offered for India's infant steel industry which benefited from direct 
govenmient subsidies and tariffs on imports for decades after independence. It also 
guided Indian policy makers in efforts to protect domestic production of skimmed milk 
powder, baby food and other dairy products that had been supplied by low-cost foreign 
producers such as Glaxo and Nestle.25 Although these efforts (later subsumed under the 
Operation Flood dairy development programme, ca. 1970-94) involved heavy 
investments and the use of dairy aid from Europe and the Worid Bank, they were partly 
22 Paul Samuelson (1967) Economics: p 649. 
23 Paul Samuelson (1967) Economics: p 646. 
2'» Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism: p 25. 
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motivated out of a desire to save foreign exchange. Indeed, after 1976, India virtually 
stopped commercial imports of milk powder, saving millions of mpees on the debit side 
of its balance of payments accoxmts.26 Indian dairying will be much discussed below. 
A European instance of a staunch defence of its farm sector is that of Ireland. The Irish 
dairy industry played a more strategic role in that country's economy than was tme in 
more industrialised EC countries. In the early 1980s, over a decade after Eire entered 
the Common Market in 1973, the European Commission planned mandatory milk 
quotas to cap the burgeoning butter mountain, milk lake and beef stores. But Eire saw 
this as a significant threat to its welfare, and negotiated fiercely. Margaret Thatcher 
herself admired the Irish government's vigorous defence of this "strategic" national 
interest.2'7 
In the end, Bmssels made Irish dairy farmers less subject to cutbacks than its European 
partners. Half a decade after the introduction in 1984 of the EC milk quotas, statistics 
reflected Eire's defence of its agricultural sector: agriculture still accounted for 12% of 
Ireland's GDP - a portion exceeded only by Greece (13.2%) within the EC-12. 
Moreover, 68% of freland was in permanent pasture, 14.4% of its labour force in 
agriculture (in the EC only Portugal with 17.5%, and Greece with 25.5%, had more) 
and food comprised about 32.5% of exports. In fact, some room for expansion was 
allowed Irish dairymen after 1983-84, whilst those in other countries, notably France 
and Germany, had to contract. Nevertheless early-1980s imposition of milk quotas and 
cuts in guaranteed beef support did not totally melt the butter mountain. As late as 
1991 (eight years after imposition of milk quotas and cuts in beef support) EC dairy 
surpluses exceeded 500,000 tormes, while an almost record 700,000 tonnes of beef was 
in storage. 28 
25 M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien Style: The Story of the White Revolution. 
26 It is the viewpoint of this thesis that while India's steel industry probably deserved early protection, that 
relatively more exposure to foreign competition would have been beneficial. At any rate, economic 
liberalisation of the Indian economy since 1992 is exposing most sectors to more protection. 
2^ Hugo Young (1989) One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher. 
28 European Commission Statistics (January 26, 1991) in The Economist: p 27. 
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More significant CAP reforms awaited the knife wielded by EC agricultural 
commissioner Ray MacSharry in 1992. From its begiiming, the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) was a compromise between the industrial power of Germany, and a more 
rural oriented France - which Germany needed as a market for its goods, as well as a 
partner with which to enhance its prestige after the condemnation it received after WW-
I I . The peasant culture remained so strong in France that Henry W. Ehrmann remarked: 
In a sense, France never repealed its Com Laws. 29 
John T.S. Keeler wrote that post-WW-II French agricultural reforms were fashioned 
according to "neo-corporatist" policy, which in turn influenced the design of the CAP.^ o 
Thus, until 1992, the CAP little discriminated between rich and poor farmers, but 
subsidised them on a simple pro rata system according to acreage or stock numbers. 
This explains why the CAP produced such prodigious food mountains, and why EEC 
commissioners resorted to export subsidies, surplus disposal - and dairy aid 
prograiiunes involving India and other countries to clear its expensive storehouses. 
Calculated thus, a rate guaranteeing survival of small-holders entailed very large 
incomes for large farms. Frances's neo-corporatist philosophy envisioned medium 
sized family farms - a compromise between unviable small-holding of the peasant past 
and gigantic agri-businesses in the US, which were viewed with so much apprehension 
by French fanners. 3' However, various factors inhibited rationalisation, keeping nearly 
a million holdings under the 50 acres considered economically viable. Needless to say, 
such smallholdings drained an alarming portion of EC farm expenditure. In fact, at its 
peak the EC farm budget accounted for an untenable 70% of Community spending, 
with milk programmes accounting for 30% of that.32 
29 Henry W. Erhrmann (1983) Politics in France: p 29. 
30 John T.S. Keeler (1981) "The Corporatist Dynamic of Agricultural Modernization in the Fifih 
Republic"; p. 277. Article in The Fifth Republic at Twenty (1981) Wm. G. Andrews & Stanley HofiBnann, 
eds. A later book by Keeler explores French post-WW-II agricultural neo-corporatism in detail. 
3 ' John T.S. Keeler (1981) in Andrews & Hof&nann; pp 225-277. Keeler studied under Stanley 
Hofimann. In 1987-88, Keeler kindly supervised my (BA) senior thesis on "Political Economy of the E C " 
at the University of Washington in Seattle. 
32 B.A. Scholten (February 10, 1989) "Milk quotas help melt Europe's Butter Mountain" in Hoard's 
Dairyman: pp 91, 121. 
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In a major break with original CAP policy, EC farm commissioner Ray MacSharry 
"differentiated" between rich and poor farmers in eligibility for income supports. The 
other chief point of MacSharry's 1992 CAP reform was that for the first time CAP 
income subsidies were "decoupled" from farm production - another break with past 
policy.33 Clearly, Europe's agriculture could be described as a "mature industry", ripe 
for the removal of subsidies, as long as harmful structural or social dislocations could 
be avoided - as they were in the case of Eire. 
Deciding i f government protection of industries (whether they are portrayed as "infant" 
or "strategic" industries) is justified is difficult for economists, but even more so for 
politicians, who are vulnerable to lobbying by special interest groups. As mentioned 
above, the government of India, a continent away from Europe, imposed protection 
against commercial imports of dairy products such as baby food and milk powder (by 
more than one definition an infant industry), after domestic suppliers began competing 
with Glaxo, Nestle and other low-cost foreign producers.^ "* Some economists would 
argue that there were indeed more potential gains from protection of India's dairy 
industry than its steel industry on the grounds that the demand for milk powder, baby 
food and sweets had a steady domestic market, making it less cyclical than steel; that 
production of dairy products was likely to improve India's international trade situation; 
and dairy processing was less capital-intensive than steel. In fact, these were some of 
the reasons motivating dairy development in India. Although its White Revolution was 
criticised for its emphasis on capital investment in processing facilities and transport 
infrastructure, the heavy investment in dairying was probably far outweighed by that in 
steel - an industry less likely to absorb India's surfeit of surplus labour. 
Aborted LDC "Takeoffs" compared to the Marshall Plan 
After WW-II dozens of former colonies gained national independence and assumed 
their own macroeconomic planning. Many Third World countries tried a variety of 
strategies to reach the stage of development that, in a 1956 article Walt W. Rostow 
33 B.A. Scholten (October 10, 1991) "Trade talks threaten European farmers, too" Hoard's, p 762. 
34 M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien-Stvle: The Story of the White Revolution: p 126. 
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coined "The Take-Offinto Self-Sustained Growth,"35 Briefly, Rostow termed his five 
stages of growth: 
traditional society, preconditions, takeofi^  drive to technological maturity, age of mass 
consumption. 
Rostow's takeoff theory found wide acceptance among rich, industrialised country (IC) 
interests concerned with poor, less developed country (LDC) development during the 
Cold War. Rostow's takeoff theory has also been blamed (unfairly or not) by critics 
such as Peter Bauer, for waste and failures of IC aid to mitigate LDC development 
problems. Even before Rostow was prominent, many LDCs including India chose to 
adopt USSR-style centrally planned economies (CPEs). Emphasis on heavy industry, it 
was hoped, would help their countries leap-frog from what Rostow termed "traditional 
society [over the] preconditions" for takeoff into self-sustaining development. 
Michael P. Todaro wrote that the main obstacle to, or constraint on development was 
(in Rostow's theory) the relatively low level of new capital formation in most poor 
countries. But i f a country wanted to grow: 
then it could seek to fill this "savings gap" ...either through foreign aid or private foreign 
investment.^ * 
Unfortunately, this strategy too often met with disappointment. Planners were correct 
to note a positive correlation between rising investment and rising output. This was 
seen in the examples of the Soviet Union after 1917, Germany in the 1930s, and Europe 
during the Marshall Plan, 1948-52.39 
What planners had ignored was the crucial fact that, prior to these periods of massive 
investment and succeeding growth, large portions of Germany, Europe in general, and 
parts of the USSR had already experienced post-takeoflf stages of "technological 
maturity", characterised by "modem attitudes and motivations, as well as modem 
technologies"; significant portions of these industrialised countries had even entered the 
35 W.W. Rostow (1990) Theorists of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present: pp 432, 
428-441. 
36 W.W. Rostow (1990): p 433. 
37 W W. Rostow (1990): p 433. 
38 Michael P. Todaro (1985) Economic Development in the Third World, p 66. 
39 J.p. Cole (1979) Geography of World Affairs: p 174. Europe received about $14.5 billion under the 
Marshal Plan. Contrary to myth, Britain received more Marshall fiinds than did Germany. 
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"age of mass consumption" (i.e. Rostow's fifth stage, marked by consumer durables 
such as motorbikes and family automobiles.'^ o 
Yet more auspicious for their post-WW-II recovery, Germany, most of Europe and 
much of the USSR already had important networks of physical capital, in the form of 
harbours, railroads and other transport and communications infrastructure. And 
crucially, European labour had already entered one of the post-takeoff stages of growth 
(marked by modem education and attitudes toward work, e.g. punctuality) which 
Rostow called "the drive to technological maturity".''^  Thus, they could convert 
investment into output more efficiently than poorer "traditional" societies, marked by 
low literacy and a dearth of scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs. 
This is not to say that Britain, for example, stymied all economic development in its 
colonies. Bauer points out that while Marx accused the metropolitan countries of 
plundering their colonies, he also regarded them as a progressive force of 
modernisation.''^  Some economists fi-om the Third World ''3 acknowledge that some 
benefits did accrue from the age of empire. These included development of transport, 
communications and services, as well as investment in textile and other industries. 
In contrast to progress made in the colonial period, there were of course many instances 
of imperial exploitation resulting in technological stagnation in colonies. Examples 
may have included the relocation, from India to Britain, of the manufacture of high-
value-added textiles.''^  
At any rate, while components of modem industrial economies were operating in and 
around trading cities in India (e.g. Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras - nodes 
pertinent to this thesis), India in toto had by no means been modernised as thoroughly 
as the European areas that benefited so quickly from Marshall Plan aid. 
W.W. Rostow (1990) Theorists of Economic Growth: p 432. 
41 W.W. Rostow (1990): p 432. 
'^^P.T. Bauer (1971) Dissent on Development: p 164. 
'*3 Dr. Mahmoud Khan (1988). Personal communication during development economics course at 
University of Washington, Seattle. 
'^^  Relocation of HVA textiles fi-om colonies to the metropole has been a hotly disputed debate, in which 
the conclusions of the combatants often fall in line with their ideological stance. 
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P.T. Bauer s^ dissent on Harrod-Domar and Rostow s^ "take-ofPmodels 
Many underdeveloped Third World coimtries, aspiring to economic takeoff and 
impressed by the regeneration of Etirope during the Marshal Plan, were influenced by 
variants of the Harrod-Domar growth model. Briefly put, the H-D model assumes a 
positive correlation between increases of net investment and GDP growth (according to 
an economy's underlying capital/output ratio). Peter Bauer attacked the limitations of 
the Harrod-Domar model, along with Rostow's stages-of-development theory, under the 
heading "Two Unsuccessfiil Approaches" in his 1971 book'*^  Dissent on Development. 
Bauer pointed out that Harrod and Domar were concerned with "advanced industrial 
societies", and their models being "largely Keynesian in their main aims and 
assumptions", were inappropriate for underdeveloped countries. Bauer wrote that an 
overemphasis on capital accumulation contributed to the failure of development 
policies, and he castigated schemes that raised capital through unnecessary 
"compulsory saving", unduly restricting consumer spending and domestic markets. 
Bauer scorned "large-scale foreign aid" (i.e. grants or soft loans) that was often wasted 
by LDCs: 
[without the] recognition that expenditure does not become productive simply because it 
is termed investment.'*^ 
In a 1969 essay, Bauer attacked what he called the "spurious consensus" "of 
contemporary development economists", whose main tenets he depicted as "invalid" 
and "not even generally accepted." These tenets included the supposition that through 
"historical accident" and "colonial exploitation", it is "a vicious circle" of "extreme 
poverty" that blocks "the capital formation required for raising income." Bauer said 
plarmers were wrong to assume that post-colonial development hinged on: 
comprehensive central planning...compulsory saving...large-scale foreign aid. '^ ^ 
By contrast, Bauer thought that genuinely productive development projects could attract 
investment by domestic or foreign commercial banks - bypassing the "aid trap" 
completely. Although the amounts of monies and materiel comprising aid programmes 
seemed large, they seldom amounted to more than 1% of the GNP of the economies 
Michael P. Todaro (1985) Economic Development in the Third World: p 64-66. 
'^^P.T. Bauer (1971) Dissent on Development: p 295. 
P.T. Bauer (1971): pp 309, 295. 
"8 P.T. Bauer (1971): pp 308, 309, 306-342. 
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they were supposed to improve. Thus, said Bauer, what in reality were relatively small 
amounts, often had less potential to improve poor countries than to destabilise their 
economies when inappropriately disbursed. According to Bauer, it was generally better 
to rely upon commercial capital formation and investment. In so doing, Bauer invoked 
even the name of Karl Marx in his synopsis of the gap between neoclassical economists 
and the aforementioned "spurious consensus": 
classical writers, including Adam Smith and Marx, closely related capital accumulation 
as an engine of development to...particular groups, organisations and classes, such as 
traders, governments and the bourgeoisie, and to social attitudes, relationships and 
institutions, and to changes in these. Some of the most influential growth models 
abstract these forces, and apparently treat long-term progress as dependent on capital 
expenditure alone; and this abstraction differentiates this modem approach from that of 
the classical writers. 
The above passage is important to our later discussion of contemporary dairy aid. It 
informs our analysis of attempts to ensure that such capital (in the form of commodity 
dairy aid and loans to India) was deployed appropriately by farmer cooperatives to raise 
the country's aggregate dairy output, and avoided either direct or indirect taxes that 
would increase dairy production costs. So poles-apart was Bauer from Rostow's take-
off theory that Rostow once remarked: 
If Professor Bauer did not exist, it would have been usefiil to invent him. . .^^ 
Certainly Bauer dissented on the received wisdom that all societies are limited to the 
five step programme choreographed by Rostow. Bauer suggested that when its 
formulations were not tautological, they were "so vague and open-ended as to be 
unserviceable."^^ He derided Rostow and similar development theorists for ignoring 
the anthropological uniqueness of societies (one point at least, on which Bauer and 
Arturo Escobar52 could concur), the unpredictability of historical forces (e.g. technical 
irmovation) and other factors more important to LDC development than external aid 
flows. The difficulty of separating the causes of growth from mere co-variants helps 
explain the seemingly endless, often politicised debate on development in the Third 
World. As hinted above, one side of this debate was epitomised by Bauer (on the 
Right) claiming LDCs are largely unable to absorb massive extemal investment flows. 
49 P.T. Bauer f 1971) Dissent on Development: p 295. 
50 W.W. Rostow (Nov/Dec 1982) in Transaction/Society: pp 88-89. Noted in Theorists. 1990. 
5J P.T. Bauer (1971). p 296. 
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Bauer acted as a Right wing gadfly to Rostow, a mainstream53 establishment figure in 
the Democratic administration of President Lyndon Baines Johnson in the US (the 
world's leading aid donor) who claimed LDC development could benefit from large aid 
flows from ICs. 
For the purposes of this discussion, we shall refer to the Bauer and Rostow camps. Of 
course, other camps took part in the development debate - notably before the end of the 
Cold War, when the Umguay GATT trade negotiations finally superseded nuclear arms 
limitation talks on the world stage. To the Left of Rostow were "world systems" 
theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein, ideologically close to Susan George and Arturo 
Escobar^ *, who critiqued global food aid and development schemes generally, and 
Shanti George^ ^ who critiqued Indian dairy development specifically. Todaro cites 
additional views to the Left of Rostow as including "the neo-Marxist school - Baran, 
Sweezy, and MagdoflP'.^ s Not to be forgotten were official Communist Party theorists 
in the USSR and China - who fuelled propaganda that Western capitalism and neo-
colonialism were the principal obstacles to LDC development, while ignoring the flaws 
in their ovra centrally-plarmed economies. 
To varying degrees, critics on the far Left viewed the RostowAVorld Bank nexus (which 
on the political spectrum was nominally closer to them than the Bauer camp on the 
Right) as being too preoccupied with Cold War strategy to be effective promoters of 
Third World development - i f not actually inimical to it. Rostow conceded that: 
.. demonstrating that underdeveloped nations - now the main focus of Communist hopes 
- can move successfully through the preconditions into a well-established take-
off, .resisting the...temptations of Communism...is I believe, the most important single 
item on the Western agenda.^ ^ 
Whatever the efficacy of Rostow's stages-of-grovrth theory for LDCs, it so profoundly 
influenced Western Cold War policy, that it is understandable why Bauer termed it a 
Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
^3 Although characterised as a mainstream figure here, W W. Rostow was a focus of far-Right attacks in 
the US, painting him as part of the Left-oriented political establishment dominating the US government 
and the UN. This influential wing demanded US withdrawal fi-om the UN and cessation of foreign aid, 
5'* Arturo Escobar (1995) Emotmtering Development. 
55 Shanti George (1985) Operation Flood. George's critique will be discussed fiirther in later chapters. 
56 Michael P. Todaro (1985) Development in the Third World: p 94-99. 
57 W W. Rostow (1990) Theorists on Economic Growth: p 439 
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"spurious consensus." Their debate on investment echoes the proverbial question: 
what came first - the chicken or the egg? Both Bauer and Rostow camps identified a 
concomitant surge in investment, as economies experience the preconditions for 
"takeoff'. But: what came first - the investment or the growth? Plainly, Bauer 
(described as an iconoclast by many, and less benignly by Club of Rome adherents) 
believes that historical accident and technical innovation, such as made possible the 
mbber industry and consequent economic development in colonial Malaysians, are 
stronger determinants of long-term material growth than intemational development 
strategies (i.e. foreign aid) touted by the Rostow camp. Late in his career, Rostow 
defended himself against critics such as Bauer and Simon Kuznets: 
My colleagues insisted on regarding the rise in the investment rate in the take-oflF as a 
primal cause in the matter, say as a Harrod-Domar growth model. If I had it to do 
over again, I would state emphatically, right at the beginning, what I wrote , in 1960: 
"...The emergence of a rate of net investment suflRcient to outstrip the rate of 
increase of the population and to yield a positive net rate of growth is at least as 
much the result of prior [sectoral] growth as a cause of growth."^^ 
Here Rostow agrees with Bauer that previous indigenous growth is "at least as 
important" as what might be provided by extemal investment, but he leaves the door 
open to foreign aid - Bauer's regular object of scom. After decades of development 
experience, perhaps the positions of Rostow and Bauer began to converge. They are 
close to agreement that investment alone is no guarantor of growth, but rather a 
covariant, along with a society's ability to treat historical accident and technical 
irmovations as opportunities for growth. It seems obvious (comparing say, the different 
historical paths to modemity taken by South Korea and Britain) that peoples are not 
consigned to any preordained path to economic development. What is incontrovertible 
is that many of the detailed (generally "top-down", centrally planned) blueprints for 
development in Third World countries which large-scale investment failed. But not ali-
as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, India's White Revolution programme Operation 
Flood probably benefited from a mix of ambitious top-down, government-sanctioned 
plarming and investment in urban centres, while measures of democratic procedure 
augmented the formation of rural milk cooperatives. 
58 P.T. Bauer (1971) Dissent on Development: pp 293, 294, 297-8. Rostow and Bauer himself write that 
Bauer's views on development were influenced by his observations and appreciation for the rubber 
industry in Maylasia, and the cocoa, and other cash crop farming in West Africa. 
59 W.W. Rostow (1990) Theorists on Economic Growth: p 434. 
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It may, however, be useful to add that, where investment or aid has failed to fuel growth 
(perhaps in a cmde application of the Harrod-Domar model), blame may be due to 
inappropriate or ill-timed investment. In the post-colonial era, many LDCs (overly-
impressed by heavy industry in rich ICs) attempted "take-ofF'^ o by squandering scarce 
treasury resources or development aid on single industries. J.P. Cole wrote: 
a political goal in many developing countries... has been the establishment of an iron 
and steel industry. A heavy industrial base has also been considered essential in most 
socialist ones.^ ' 
This was tme of post-WW-H India and China, influential models for smaller LDCs.^ ^ 
Perhaps, due to India's large domestic market its state-managed steel industry has had 
some success. Yet, neither has it - beset by over-manning and other inefficiencies that 
drain government expenditure - served as a rocket to economic growth. China, whose 
overall post-WW-II growth has roughly doubled India's^3 also mistook steel production 
for economic progress. Consequently, China wasted labour, and the landscape suffered 
long-lasting degradation in the "back-yard" steel furnaces of the Mao era. 
Unfortunately, many smaller countries with factorial advantages of iron ore and coking 
coal but smaller domestic markets followed such unrealistic industrial policies, but 
were less able to afford them. They neglected agriculture and consumer goods such as 
textiles using farm products, instead spending on metallurgy what Hobsbawm termed: 
the very heavy investments required by even quite modest ironworks (compared to quite 
large cotton-mills).^ 
Others, finding deposits of bauxite (common around the world, just as iron ore and 
coking coal are), over-invested in the aluminium industry. Output usually exceeded 
domestic demand, and often had the bad fortune to come on line when the cyclical 
world market was not remunerative. In many cases, centrally-plarmed industrial 
policies impoverished consumers and left LDC governments deeply in debt to 
international lenders. Unable to sell their commodities abroad, these LDCs were unable 
^0 Michael P. Todaro (1985) Economic Development in the Third World: pp 64-66. Todaro agrees 
investment is necessary but not sufficient for take-olF. 
61 J.P. Cole (1979) Geography of World Affairs: p 284. 
62 J.P. Cole (1979): pp 118, 391. After 1947, India built up its iron and steel industry in Jamshedpur. 
63 Economist Book of Vital World Statistics (1990): p 42, 69. 
6'' E.J. Hobsbawm (1962) The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848: p 62. 
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to purchase cheaper food and other goods from overseas. After ignoring their 
agricultural sectors, many such countries became dependent on food aid. 
Over-valued currencies & other disincentives to LDC agriculture 
In some developing countries (LDCs), agriculture suffered worse than benign neglect. 
Policies often skewed the domestic balance between agricultural and industrial sectors, 
favouring industry over farms. Although most rich countries achieved developed status 
by expropriating wealth from their farm sectors, too many LDCs taxed farmers without 
returning any commensurate amount in goverrmient services. This amounted to 
"looting" farms to advance heavy industry. 
More often it was "indirect taxes" that were even more harmful to agriculture: LDC 
governments often hurt domestic agriculture by maintaining their national cmrencies at 
artificially high rates of exchange against the currencies of the major industrial 
countries (e.g. the $US and the D-mark). This acted as a subsidy exacted from 
agriculture by industry, from effectively lowering the prices of machine tools and other 
capital-intensive imports from richer countries.65 (Chapter 4 will examine issues of 
appropriate technology in Indian dairy development.) Rural economies were typically 
stunted when over-valued national currencies made the produce of Third World farmers 
artificially expensive and uncompetitive on world markets. That is one reason 
Bhagwati described over-valued currencies as prime "disincentives" to LDC 
agriculture.^ ^ Meanwhile, capital-intensive investments in high-tech factories around 
urban centres made cities employment magnets. More migrants from the 
disadvantaged countryside than could ever hope to find jobs streamed into the cities. 
This was a mixed blessing; it reduced rural unemployment, but robbed the countryside 
of productive workers. 
Todaro Model of Rural-Urban Migration 
According to Michael P. Todaro, early research tried to explain excessive rural-urban 
migration in Third World counfries in terms of "social, cultural and psychological 
^5 Thus encouraging the import of inappropriate, capital-intensive high technology into countries where 
labour-intensive production was more appropriate, setting oflf a vicious circle of unemployment, declining 
income among workers, and declining demand for consumer goods. 
^Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism. 
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factors",67 but he determined that the chief motivation for migration was the chance of 
high-paying jobs in urban centres. Operating from the economist's perspective that, 
given perfect information, most consumers make rational decisions, Todaro postulated 
that farmworkers moved to cities because of "urban-mral differences in expected rather 
than actual earnings." Todaro's theory of rural-urban migration explained: 
the apparently paradoxical relationship (at least to economists) of accelerated 
rural-urban migration in the context of rising urban unemployment.68 
In Other words, even i f rural migrants could not immediately find better jobs in the 
cities, typically paying three or four times the average rural wage, Todaro showed their 
behaviour was not merely optimistic, but rational i f their urban income eventually 
exceeded the opportunity costs of income they forsook in rural employment.69 Their 
behaviour appears even more rational in the context of over-valued national currency 
rates, which Bhagwati condemns as a serious economic disincentive to rural 
agricultural sectors in LDCs.^ o 
Import substitution & cash crops v. food crop debates in LDCs 
When steel, aluminium and other commodity exports from too many LDC countries 
flooded the world market, or when there was a periodic dip in world business cycles, 
world prices fell, putting their national development plans in jeopardy. An LDC's 
economic crisis was compounded i f it was short on cash to pay for imports. Import-
substitution schemes were often imposed, in order to meet domestic demand, stimulate 
production and save foreign exchange currencies. Unfortunately, import-substitution 
often proved counter-productive to all of these goals'^ ", and in the long-term left LDCs 
less competitive than before on the world market. (Rich country technical advisors 
echoed these caveats to Indian dairy leaders, whose import-substitution in milk powder 
production was eventually successful.) 
Another trenchant argument that has long embroiled agronomists, economists, 
geographers and others concerned with development is the cash crop versus food crop 
6'^  Michael P. Todaro (\9S5) Economic Development in the Third World: p 256. 
68 Todaro (1985): p 258. 
69 Todaro (1985).p261. 
'''^  Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism. 
7' Michael P. Todaro (1985): pp 409-415. Import-substitution entailed tariffs on specified imports, and 
subsidies for their domestically produced counterparts. 
43 
debate. (It somewhat resembles the debate over the role of industrial policy in 
developing countries, i.e. whether industrial activities ought to be monolithic or 
pluralistic.) Should a nation concentrate on export crops for the world market, or self-
sufficiency in food? Such a controversy with relevance for this thesis was over oil 
seeds (from cotton, rapeseed and other plants), which preoccupied plarmers and opinion 
makers in India over the last decade. The oil seeds question bears brief discussion here. 
When Operation Flood, the White Revolution programme in India (relying on high 
input fodder, nutrients and concentrates to raise milk yield) got underway, oilseeds had 
long been a fraditional adjunct of dairy cow fodder. Thus, to observers like Martin 
Doombos, it was a "paradox"''^  that, just as development of the Indian dairy industry 
required additional intensive inputs including oilseeds, the liberalised economic 
policies of the Indian government allowed export of oil seeds as a cash crop. But India 
is a large country and oil seeds are just one of many products. Moreover, the country 
has a huge, relatively diversified domestic market which can buffer the fluctuations of 
the world market more easily than smaller, single-crop LDCs. When India sells 
oilseeds on the world market, it is possible that other domestic products can adequately 
substitute for exported seeds. 
As intimated above, smaller LDCs find the cash crop versus food crop question even 
more difficult than sub-continent-sized India. I f LDCs depend heavily upon just one or 
two export products, they are naturally more vulnerable to world market fluctuations 
than a multiple exporter like India. For instance, many LDCs which were not 
petroleum exporters suffered serious trade deficits after the OPEC oil embargoes of 
1973-74 and 1979. Typically dependent upon widely available conunodity exports such 
as coffee beans, these economies suffered severe curtent account trade deficits, 
because, lacking the economic leverage of the oil cartels, they were helpless to raise 
prices on their commodities enough to pay for oil and other imports. 
However, recent experience in India underlines the need for realistic economic policies 
in all developing countries, whatever their size. Chapter 4 discusses further the 
economic austerity (and also a temporary resumption of dairy aid imports) forced upon 
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India by oil price rises in the Gulf War of 1991. On a happier note. Chapter 4 also finds 
evidence of increases in Indian oilseeds production. 
The GATT & Liberalisation of Agricultural Trade 
Global food trade is now at unprecedented heights. Food is rapidly becoming as freely 
traded a commodity as coal, or manufactured commodities like steel. However, until 
recently, agriculture was too sensitive a political and social issue for most countries to 
consider dismantling the array of overt and covert subsidies and tariffs that made the 
food trade one of the world's most regulated activities. This was tme - to a surprising 
degree - of even the powerful industrialised countries of North America and Europe. 
Jagdish Bhagwati vmtes that agriculture was: 
Exempted fi-om most of GATT's discipline...right fi-om the start.'3 
In fact, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was first drawn up 
in 1947, it was the US'''' (which in the 19th century specialised in agricultural exports in 
order to buy manufactures from Europe) that led efforts (applauded by France and other 
agricultural countries) to write loopholes into Articles XI and XVI, removing 
agriculture from the GATT agenda. In 1955, the Eisenhower administration pleased US 
farm lobbyists when GATT granted them a further waiver from agricultural 
liberalisation. In the early decades of the GATT, Bhagwati believes that their "small 
role in overall world frade and their low political profile and clout" probably deemed 
LDCs powerless to block IC waivers on agricultural trade. More to the point, Bhagwati 
writes that: 
the major developing nations were protecting their manufactures instead and therefore were 
not interested in lobbying for agricukural trade liberalisation. 
As world frade experienced aimual real growth of 7% in the period 1948-1970^ 6^  some 
progress toward bringing agriculture under the GATT aegis was made in 1967 in the 
"Kennedy Round" of GATT talks, when tariffs on primary commodities were cut 
Martin Doombose/a/ (1990) Dairy Aid and Development: p 15. 
"^ 3 Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism: p 9. 
'^ '^  The US was reportedly a net exporter of raw materials and agricultural commodities until well into the 
20* century. 
•75 Jagdish Bhagwati (1988): p 9. All references this quotation and paragraph above are fi-om Bhagwati. 
'6 William. R. Keylor (1984) The Twentieth Century World: p 277. 
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sharply.''•^  More dramatic changes were to come. In the 1980s, when New Zealand and 
Argentina joined a dozen (mostly poorer) countries led by Australia in the Caims 
Group, to lobby for freer world trade in agriculture, all Caims members, irrespective of 
their degree of "development" (via industrialisation or expansion of the services portion 
of their economies), shared one trait: a comparative advantage in agricultural 
production that could be exploited i f worid food trade were liberalised - particularly i f 
the US, and especially the EEC, reduced farm export subsidies. Paul Kennedy writes 
that the "greatest beneficiaries" of a global phase-out of farm subsidies would be 
Australia, New Zealand and Argentina, in contrast to some farm communities in the US 
that might "wither away".^ ^ Nevertheless, despite the possible threats to some 
individual communities, the US (and trade representative Clayton Yeutter) became 
convinced that agricultural liberalisation would benefit the US in the aggregate, and it 
joined the Caims Group demands.'^  
While Kennedy's gloomy prediction for some individual farm communities is likely 
correct, the US goverrmient has been working for decades to improve the profitability 
of its farm exports. Changes in US trade policy were forced by the costly over-
extension of its military hegemony - in a pattern that Paul Kermedy compares to the 
history of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and British empires.^ o Robert Gilpin fully 
agrees that functioning as military linchpin of the Western Alliance became a burden on 
the US. Most observers agree that the economic miracles of Japan, South Korea and 
other "little dragons" were partly due to US patronage. Access to the US market 
gradually raised Asian competitiveness, threatening US dominance. Gilpin accepts this 
analysis, crediting Cold War geopolitical initiatives by the US for it: 
there were no large, neighbouring non-communist economies to which the Japanese 
economy could be attached. In order to overcome this problem , the United States took 
several initiatives. One was to expedite the decolonisation of Southeast Asia; after all, 
one cause of the Pacific War had been that European colonisers had closed Southeast 
Asian economies to the Japanese. The US also sponsored Japanese membership in the 
"Western Club." [I.e. IMF, Worid bank, etc.] ...In addition, the US gave Japan 
relatively free access to the American market and American technology without an 
•''^  Michael P. Todaro (1985) Economic Development in the Third World: p 587. 
Paul Kennedy (1993) Preparing for the Twenty-First Century: p 318. 
The Economist (December 22, 1990): p 89. Trade war threatened as the GATT talks floundered. 
^0 Paul Kennedy (1987) Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Robert Gilpin and William Greider (see below) 
back up Kennedy's analysis that an over-extension of US military hegemony and openness to imports from 
Cold War clients undermined the post-WW-II Bretton Woods system. 
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economic quid pro quo, although it did require strategic concessions (i.e. air and naval 
bases) fi-om the Japanese.*' 
Apparently in essential agreement v^ dth Gilpin, Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph 
Collins relate that the US defined two export responses to rectify a persistent balance-
of-payments deficit wrought by: (1) imports of consumer goods (especially from US 
allies on the Pacific Rim, e.g. Japan, Korea and Taiwan, whose access to the US market 
fuelled their export-led-growth); and (2) the one-half trillion dollars spent by the US -
much of it overseas - on the Vietnam War (not to mention the US network of overseas 
bases and the nuclear umbrella over its allies). 
One response was to raise exports of high-technology products, e.g. today the US 
continues to lead the world in civil and military aviation, and is also first in worid arms 
exports - followed by Britain. Another response was a package of "Food Power" 
policies to increase US agricultural exports. *2 Lappe and Collins list several initiatives 
taken by the Nixon adminisfration and the USDA in the early-1970s, to unleash US 
"FoodPower":83 
• The US renounced the Bretton Woods system of fixed international currency 
rates, in which the US$ was pegged at $35/ounce of gold, in 19718* This was 
followed by devaluations of the dollar (by 11% in December 1971, and a further 6% 
in early 1973), making US exports more atfractive. 
• The US would "tempt potential buyers" with low prices and cheap financing by 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). (The concessionary terms of these sales 
made them hard to distinguish from soft loans in food aid programmes, and it can be 
argued that they had the same purpose: promotion of US commodities exports.) The 
US brandished the banner of free frade, in urging other coimtries to accept US food 
Robert Gilpin (1987) "American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era": p 37. This paper was originally 
presented at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, at the University of Washington, in 
Seattle, to honour the late Senator Jackson on May 30, 1987. Gilpin's book The Political Economy of 
International Relations develops the themes of US-Japanese and West European Cold War policy, etc., in 
the late-1980s' light of declining US international economic hegemony. Gilpin's themes find resonance 
and citations m Paul Kennedy's (1993) Preparing for theTwentv-First Century. 
82 Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins (1982) FoodFirst: pp 50, 176-186. 
83 Lappe & Collins (1980) FoodFirst: pp 177-178. 
84 William R. Keylor (1984) The Twentieth Century World: p 401. 
47 
exports, pointing to plans to abolish US domestic price supports as evidence of its 
good faith. 
• Then USDA ordered cutbacks in US crops acreage - thus almost ensuring that 
world market prices would rise (irrespective of bad weather in other grain exporting 
countries, which as fate would have it, catapulted worid prices beyond USDA 
predictions). 
• USDA Secretary Earl Butz urged US farmers to plant "fence row to fence row", 
diluting their resistance to the abolition of price supports with reassurances of profits 
to be made from a "hungry world" ready for US food. 
By these steps, the US improved its balance-of-payments accounts, prepared foreign 
acceptance of US grain sales, and weakened the position of foreign exporters such as 
France. The scene was also set for the huge 19 million MT sale of US grain to the 
USSR in 1972-73.85 xhis sale was a fascinating saga which is important to this thesis, 
primarily for this reason: the exercise of US muscle on world grain markets served as a 
model for the expansion of US dairy sales, as surplus stocks (in both the US and EEC) 
mounted in the 1980s. 
Like US grain exports, dairy exports were assisted by financing from the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) arm of the USDA, in what is called the Dairy Export 
Incentive Programme (DEIP). US guaranteed "soft" loans were instrumental in 
countering EEC dairy dumping on world markets in the 1980s. Although the GATT-
1994 agreement was to cut the legality of CCC export subsidies for dairy and grain, it 
was, ironically, the muscle of CCC soft loans that helped bring the EEC to the GATT 
table in the first place. Current gains being made by the US on the Pacific Rim, in 
Ausfralia and New Zealand's fraditional dairy export enclaves (e.g. Malaysia), testify to 
the resolute success of the US "Food Power" drive. 
*5 Not all US government oflBcials were aware of the impending Soviet grain deal. See Anthony Sampson 
(1974) and Dan Morgan (1979) for fascinating analyses of this landmark episode. 
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The US seeks to open Japan & OPEC countries to farm imports 
It was ironic that Japan, Asia's chief industrial power (which had benefited from US 
markets in export-led-growth) also had some of the world's highest rates of protection 
for rice, beef and other US exports. Frances M. Ufkes details how Japan's "state 
sponsored beef sub-sector" and protection against other US farm products were "highly-
politicised" issues in US-Japan frade negotiations.86 The US attitude to the EEC was 
similar. Within the US, even opponents of the country's military policies resented the 
fiscal ability of the EEC (which spent less of its output on defence than the US) to 
protect its own farmers while subsidising sales abroad. A combination of factors were 
pushing the US into the arms of the CAIRNS group. Altogether, they would pester the 
EEC into liberalising world farm frade in the GATT-1994 agreement - including even 
those most sacrosanct of commodities, sugar and milk. 
There will be more discussion of the Umguay GATT negotiations, which culminated in 
the 1994 agreement, below. Of particular importance is a discussion of the analysis of 
Anderson & Tyers (1991) which explicates some of the frade problems of LDCs, which 
are meanwhile discussed in Nigeria's "wheat frap" following. 
Nigerian "wheat trap" compared to Indian situation 
The US became the world's largest agricultural exporter in the 1980s, with sales in 
1989 worth $40 billion.*? (Most of this was wheat, with the US accounting for nearly 
half of world imports. US penefration of foreign markets is illusfrated in Nigeria. In 
1910, just 20% of wheat imports came from North America, with the remainder 
originating in Britain and Germany, but by 1936, US fraders accounted for 98% of 
Nigerian wheat imports. The US continued to dominate Nigerian imports, although 
France'and the EEC made inroads, with subsidised sales comprising 5-10% in imports 
of (mostly soft) wheat. Andrse and Beckmann point out that (because of its oil exports): 
It is true that in Nigeria wheat imports have nearly always been on fiilly commercial 
terms. When in the 50s and 60s, great subsidies were given to many Third Worid 
countries, notably through the PL 480 campaign, Nigeria was not among the major 
beneficiaries. The trade has ejqianded enough by other means.** 
86 Frances M. Ufkes (1993) "Trade liberalisation, agro-food politics and the globalisation of agriculture" 
in Political Geography. May: pp 215-231. 
87 B.A. Scholten (October 20, 1990) "Wird Bush Umwelt-Prasident" Wiirttembergisches Wochenblatt 
fiir Landwirtschaft (WWL/BLW): p 8. 
88 Gunilla Andrae and Bjorn Beckmann (1985) The Wheat Trap: p30. They cite Clay &Pryer( 1982): 
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In the early-1970s period of drought, civil war, and famine in Biafira, Nigeria did accept 
food relief, e.g. 56,000 tonnes, predominantly wheat, in 1971. Wheat donated during 
the Biafran famine probably accustomed an even greater share of the population to the 
taste of wheat - away from indigenous grains such as barley from the Jos Plateau. 
Andrae & Beckmann say that US wheat imports led to "under-development" in Nigeria 
by severing the backward linkages between urban mills and bakers to traditional 
farmers. But conspiracy theorists would be wrong to assume the famine as the only 
wedge to penetrate Nigeria. After all, the US had sold wheat to Nigeria for many 
decades. True, US food aid functioned as a "loss leader" for future commercial sales 
in many poorer countries. But Nigeria could pay for most imports on a commercial 
basis. Furthermore, oil price rises following the second OPEC oil embargo of 1980-81 
made the US more aggressive in promoting commercial agricultural sales to all 
countries, with oil exporters like Nigeria high on the list. So sophisticated marketing 
overtures were in the offing. 
Assiduous plotting of possible market prospects by the USDA office in Lagos 
developed commercial sales of maize, rice, tallow and (mostly) wheat. Andrae & 
Beckmann write that the Nigerian market was opened by: 
the classical means of oflFicial support for US wheat penetration '^ 
The US had supplanted French interests by establishing the first flour milling plant in 
Lagos in the early 1960s. In 1980 a "Great Plains Wheat team" of US millers and 
bakers associations held courses to promote consumption of wheat-based foods. 
Andrae & Beckmann quote the following USDA memo to illustrate how crucial was the 
establishment in Lagos of a US-Nigerian Joint Consultative Committee(AJCC) to 
eliminate: 
the major constraint to the rapid expansion of US agricultural commodity exports to 
Nigeria...the lack of physical infrastructure, i.e. port facilities, feedmills, integrated 
poultry/ piggery/ livestock operations, flour mills, etc. The AJCC will facilitate private 
US investment in the Nigerian agrobusiness sector (USDA 1981).'° 
p 5; I . Wallerstdn (1980); and P. Kilby (1965): pp 8, 19. 
89 Andras & Beckmann (1985) The Wheat Trap, p 31. They cite USDA (1981), and interviews with 
USDA counsellor George Pope. US expansion in Nigeria was akin to its earlier success in South Korea. 
90 Andrae & Beckmann (1985): p 31. 
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Needless to say, dairy marketeers around the world were familiar with the methods 
employed in US wheat promotions and sought to emulate them. 
Food self-sttfBciencv matters more to India than to oil-rich Nigeria 
The table below (Agrostat/FAO/1994: Trade/Index) compares the food imports of 
Nigeria and India and reveals some facets of their relative degrees of food self-
sufficiency. Nigeria's 1979-81 (=100) import value of dairy product imports soon 
halved to a level still held in 1992, whereas the import volume of Nigeria's dairy 
imports gradually fell to 19.1 in 1989, rising to just 38.6 in 1992; meanwhile the import 
unit value of dairy imports rose to 128.4 on the scale of 1979-81=100, by 1992. 
Nigeria's dairy import trend was generally up in the early 1990s. 
India's dairy import value hit a low of 3.6 on the 100 index in 1990 as EEC dairy aid to 
Operation Flood virtually stopped. Just two years later India's dairy import value index 
was 52.7 (close to Nigeria's) begging the questions: (1) what role did politics play in 
low dairy import value in India in 1990? '^ and (2) was the rise in value of imports to 
Nigeria in 1992 due to a surge in US dairy exports? That seems likely, because after 
the US dairy product exports index dropped to 127.8 due to severe drought in 1989, it 
rebounded to an impressive 138.0 in 1992. As for US dairy production, the index 
figures generally follow the pattern of exports, showing a dip in the drought year of 
1989 (112.8 in 1989 compared to 113.4 in 1988) before a steady rebound to 118.74 in 
1992.92 These figures reflect success in the US drive to promote exports aggressively, 
as one means to pressure the EEC into liberalisation of agriculture trade under GATT. 
In the case of cereals, Nigeria's 1979-81 (=100) import value of cereals fell to 17.1 in 
1989 and 34.1 in 1992, whereas the import volume of Nigeria's cereals hit 24.9 in 1989 
(lowest: 20.8 in 1990) and rose to just 49.0 in 1992; meanwhile the import unit value of 
cereals changed little (1989: 68.9) between 1985 and 1992 when it was 70.2. (Below, 
related Agrostat data reflect that as the Green Revolution progressed 1961-92, India 
became a net cereals exporter while Nigeria relied more on cereals imports.) 
9' Chapter 4 of this thesis suggests that the 1992 renewal in India dairy imports was due to an economic 
crisis brought on by Gulf War oil price increases. 
92 Agrostat/1994/FAO: Trade/Index/US dairy product exports/ and milk production in the computerised 
database. 
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Table 1 
1961 import value 
t i ^ t o ^ ^ . . , . , . . f , . > V , IJ 
1989 import value 1992 import value 
dwry 
India 12.6 52.4 (1990=3.6) 52.7 
Nigeria 6.0 23.4 51.7 
1961 import 1989 import 1992 import 
India 58.6 (1970=46.9) 45.2 (1990=2.9) 55.5 
Nigeria 22.0 19.1 38.6 
value (u/v) dairy value (u/v) dairy value (u/v) dairy 
India 20.1 (1970=20.8) 94.1 (1990=104.1) 96.4 
Nigeria 34.0 90.9 (1990=121.5) 128.4 
"•*•) T96T import value 
cereals c^eals 
India no data no data no data 
Nigeria 1.8 17.1 34.1 
' J, 
1961 import 1989 import 
i l r t i l ^ i i p a i * . ..... 
1992 import 
India no data no data no data 
Nigeria 4.0 24.9 49.0 
t 1961 import unit 
va&»{tt/«v)<a«ials 
1989 import umt 
India 27.5 85.1 66.5 
Nigeria 44.9 68.9 70.2 
Stmrce: Agrostat/FAO/l994^3 
Observers aware of the similarity between the "top-down" establishment of transport 
and dairy processing facilities in India's programme Operation Flood to the 
infrastructure-building in Nigeria (i.e. the wheat processing plants buih by the US in 
Nigeria, noted by Andrae & Beckmann) might well have become more fearful that 
India's White Revolution being coopted by the EEC for its own benefit. However, 
Agrostat figures in the accompanying table show that compared to Nigeria (whose oil 
earnings could pay for food imports), India was moving toward self-sufficiency in 
cereals and dairy products. (More on this in Chapters 3 aM 4.) Meanwhile, the next 
section recounts Anderson & Tyers' analysis of the damage done to the world's poor 
country farmers by rich country protectionism. 
9' Agrostat/1994/FAO: Trade/Index/ India, Nigma. 
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Anderson & Tyers on L D C loss of world exports via I C subsidies 
Among the plethora of economic arguments made by Kym Anderson and Rodney 
Tyers' in favour of liberalising world farm trade, is one with appeal to geographers, 
geneticists and health workers as well as economists. They argue for a more 
geographically-diverse network of food exporters, because dispersed production is less 
liable to supply and price fluctuations, due to the vagaries of climate and disease. Thus 
world food security (and the genetic pool of foodstuffs) would probably be safeguarded 
i f many more geographically-dispersed LDC farmers contributed to world stocks.94 But 
the thrust of Anderson & Tyers' thesis is the inequitability of the terms of trade suffered 
by poor countries, and the need for liberalisation imder GATT. Anderson & Tyers note 
that rich industrial market economies (ICs) gradually eroded the world market share of 
developing countries (LDCs). (See Table 1 titled Indian & Nigerian dairy & cereals 
imports.) 
Anderson & Tyers' research investigated trade in the most important agricultural 
commodities traded on world markets - a weighted selection of grains, meats, milk 
products, and sugar, measured in $US. In the early 1960s, rich countries (i.e. the First 
World) held about 50% of world of world market share, with the other half divided 
between centrally-planned eastern Europe (i.e. the Second World) and developing 
countries (i.e. the Third World). By the mid-1980s, the First World held an astounding 
70% of world market share, while eastern Europe and developing coimtries combined 
had to settle for just 30%. 
Ominously, the terms of trade worsened for the centrally-planned Eastbloc as well as 
the developing world. From the period 1961-64 to the period 1983-86, the food self-
sufficiency of the Eastbloc dropped from - 1 % to -2% to -5% . Most alarmingly for 
developing countries, what had been a food surplus of 2% to 3% in 1961-64 plunged to 
-2% to -3% in 1983-86.95 
9"* Kym Anderson & Rodney Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products. 
Indeed, it seems intuitively obvious that a more geographically diverse food production portfolio would be 
a better guarantor of world food security than one centred in North America and western Europe. A 
dispersed system could better compensate for regional animal or plant disease, as well as climatic upheaval. 
95 Anderson & Tyers (1991): pp 12-18. 
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Because the food security, as well as the export competitiveness of poorer countries was 
falling, the CAP has been seen as an instrument of neo-colonialism by LDCs who could 
not afford to compete on world export markets with the EEC. What began in the 1957 
Treaty of Rome as an admirable attempt at food self-sufficiency eventually came to 
represent unfair trade practises by the EEC {aka the EC and EU). Anderson & Tyers 
charged that past (i.e. pre-GATT-1994) export and production subsidies in the EEC cost 
poor country farmers nearly 50p in lost earnings for every £1 spent on EEC protection. 
This was a serious charge. But it is a fact that the EEC subsidised its farm exports far 
more than any other large exporter, including the US. AVhen the US stepped up its 
subsidy war against Europe with the Food Security Act of 1985 (using export subsidies 
to double US worid dairy exports share from 4.4% in 1990 to 7.9% in 1992) because 
the EEC was taking US world market share, even then, US farm subsidies rose to just 
half EEC levels! At the same time that the EEC claimed to be alleviating poverty in 
India with its donations of dairy aid, France and other highly-subsidised wheat 
producers were dumping cereals on world markets. Although the EEC made some 
trade concessions to ACP countries under the Lome Conventions, protection remained 
high against food imports from many other poor countries. EEC apologists claimed 
their food mountains were a buffer against world shortages, but the EEC was seen by 
potential cereals and dairy exporters among LDCs and the Cairns Group as a 
hypocritical player robbing the poor of export opporttmities - even depressing their 
domestic agriculture. 
Anderson & Tyers argue fiirther that periodic EEC dimiping led to price fluctuations 
that harmed poorer farm exporters, and contributed to a long-term downward trend on 
real prices: 
[All of this was] of serious concern to the majority of the world's poor, namely farmers in 
low-income countries who account for almost three-quarters of the world's farm workers 
and over a third of the world's workforce. 
It is this view, shared by many non-EEC (EU) countries, that fuelled widespread 
demands for reform and brought agriculture under the aegis of the GATT for the first 
9^  Anderson & Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products: p 1. 
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time in 1994. Table 2 below shows how dramatically the distribution of world food 
trade shifted against LDCs and Eastbloc countries between 1961-64 and 1983-86. 
Table 2 
Anderson & Tyers''' research shows: Industrial Market Economies (ICs) 
eroded world market share of Centrally-planned Eastern European 
Countries & Developing Economies (Eastbloc & LDC). 
ICs LDCs & Eastbloc 
1961-64 food exports <50% >50% 
1983-86 food exports 70% 30% 
J961-64 food imports <50% 
1983-86 food imports 40% 60% 
Source: Anderson & Tyers (1991) 
Agrostat/FAO data support Anderson & Tvers 
Agrostat^AO/1994 statistics on agricultural products trade** support the viewpoint of 
Anderson & Tyers. Leaving aside the matter of Centrally-planned Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC, also losing market share), several conclusions can be drawn fiom the 
horizontal bar graph and two tables drawn from Agrostat'', below. First of all, poor 
country (LDC) value of all agricultural product exports did not lag very fer behind rich 
country (IC) exports, 1961-64. Thence, trends worsened. Minuscule LDC agricuhural 
imports in 1961-64 grew an enormous 8-times by 1983-84, supporting Anderson & 
Tyers' view that poor coimtry food imports grew dramatically. 
As for exports, Agrostat data show that while LDC exports grew nearly 5-times from 
1961-64 to 1983-86, they were (starting at a lower base than ICs) far outpaced by rich 
IC exports - probably owing greatly to the export subsidies criticisai by Anderson & 
Tyers. The fact that IC agricultural imports grew 5-times from 1961-64 to 1983-86 can 
probably be explained by increases in speciaUsation of labour, and horizontal links in 
agriculture between rich countries - most notably countries comprising the EEC. In 
^ Anderson & Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products. This is a revised 
account of research prepared by the authors for the World Bank's World Development Report for 1986. 
Agrostat PC (1994) FAO/1994/Trade/VaIue/Economic Groups/Agricultural Products. 
99 Agrostat PC (1994) FAO N.B. m bar graph, 1961 stands for mean $US in 1961-64; 1986 stands for 
mean $US values 1983-86. 
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Other words, rich countries increased their agricultural imports from each other more 
than from poor countries. 
Figure 1 
LDCs outpaced by ICs in Wortd Agricultural 
Products Traflg 
1,600 
1,400 
• ICS BLDCs 
19«1>exp 1986~exp 1961~imp 196«>imp 
Trade values x $1 billion. Source: Agrostat/FAO/1994 
The table immediately below shows the value of food imports to poor coimtries 
increasing much faster than their exports. 
Tables 
Agrostat/FAO supports Anderson «& Tyers'*"' claim that Industrial Market 
Economies (ICs) eroded world agricultural products market share of 
Developing Economies (LDCs) (x US$ 100,000) 
ICs Developed LDCs Developing 
1961-64 food exports $212,842 $144,066 
1983-86 food exports $1,456,100 $715,294 
1961-64 food imports $309,440 $75,580 
1983-86 food imports $1,755,921 $639,251 
Source: Agrostat/FAO/1994/TradeA(^ alue/Economic Groups/Agricultural Products 
It is also possible that IC food import figures are somewhat inflated. Agribusinesses, like other MNCs, 
sometimes pass the same commodity back and forth among their company divisions in rich countries, with 
a small portion of "value-added" accruing at each stage of processing, between farm and market - resulting 
in inflated import statistics. Needless to say, this makes accounting difficult for tax purposes, etc. 
Anderson & Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products. 
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Table 4 suggests that developing countries (LDCs) also had more difficulty in 
recovering from the early-1980s recession induced by oil price rises than did rich 
developed countries (ICs). 
Table 4 
Agrostat shows TCs OBtpMing T DCs in food trade. (19794i*-i00) 
Unit Value (u/v) Unit Value (u/v) Unit Value (u/v ) 
ICs developed 
countries all 
30.1 101.1 134.9 
LDCs developing 
(not Eastbloc) 
30.8 75.8 (u/v imports 
peaked 1981: 108.8) 
91.9 
19^ 1-64 Export 
(u/v) mean Unit 
Value 
19S3-86 Export 
(u/v) mean Unit 
Value 
198»«t IRtfftti 
(u/v) mean I7ait 
Value -M 
ICs developed 
countries all 
34.0 90.0 123.3 
LDCs developing 
countries 
28.6 84.9 94.8 
1961 bBpert Value 19t6Ia«MtrtV«iMs IMlImHtVriM 
ICs developed 
countries all 
13.0 101.5 159.6 
LDCs developing 
countries 
10.2 82.5 126.5 
1961-64 mean 
Export Value 
1983-86 mean 
Export Value 
1989-92 mea* 
Export Value 
ICs developed 
countries all 
12.8 90.8 140,1 
LDCs developing 
countries 
16.7 102.1 131.4 
1961 Import 
Volume 
1986 Tmport 
Volume Volume 
ICs developed all 43.2 100.4 118.3 
LDCs developing 33.4 109.5 138.6 
1961 Export 
Volume 
1986 Expm'-
Volume mm >^ -
Volume ICs developed all 34.6 98.3 117.7 
LDCs developing 55.9 123.8 126.5 
Source-. Agrostat/FAO/1994/Trade, Index, Economic Groups, Food 
Because low-value-added food exports are the chief means by which poor countries can 
purchase high-value-added (HVA) rich country exports like 747 Jumbo-Jets, machine 
tools, books and computers, this trend has disturbing imphcations for poor and rich 
countries alike. The already inequitable distribution of world income was likely to be 
skewed further unless the terms of trade for poor countries were improved. Moreover, 
in enlightened self-interest, some rich country exporters expected that if farm trade 
were reformed, the Third World could afford more of their HVA exports. This was one 
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of the most compelling reasons for the liberalisation of worid agricultural trade in 
GATT-1994. 
1980s; The US adopts CAIRNS stance on GATT farm trade liberalisation 
Despite protests from some domestic farm lobbyists, the US government agreed with 
the Cairns position that agriculture should be on the agenda in the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT. In language dating back to Smith and Ricardo, the Cairns Group wished to 
"liberalise" agriculture. This meant that all forms of assistance to all of the world's 
farmers and food exporters (including explicit subsidies, hidden income subsidies, tax 
relief, export subsidies and tariffs on imports) ought to be clarified in a process 
eponymously dubbed "tariffication". The Cairns Group demanded that - like industrial 
goods - food exports should have all their erstwhile hidden tariffs made explicit. 
Of course. Cairns countries argued that nontariff (NTBs) barriers could be as effective 
constraints on trade as are high import duties. By this time, many of the guises 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s as non-tariff barriers to non-agricultural goods were 
well known. For autos, they were typified by voluntary export restraint (VER) 
agreements between Japan and the US, or Japan and France and Italy. These so-called 
voluntary agreements were (and are) generally agreed via strong-arm diplomacy. 
Ironically, they often benefited exporters who could charge more for the limited 
quantity of their exports on offer. Before the Uruguay Round of GATT, agricultural 
trade found its equivalent of automobile VERs in bilateral trade deals.'''^ 
Another nontariff barrier was typified by bureaucratic bottlenecks, even within the so-
called Single Market of the European Community after 1986. A typical example from 
the late 1980s comes again from France. Inspection of fresh tomatoes and other 
produce conducted on France's Pyrenees border with Spain was at times done in such a 
desultory manner as to ensure the spoilage of much produce before it reached market. 
Dan Morgan (1979) Merchants of Grain: p 292-294, The reputation of the US as a reliable exporter 
was damaged when it unilaterally reneged on a deal selling nitrogen-rich soyabeans to Japan in 1973. This 
was one ramification of the US-Soviet grain deal of 1973 that boosted world prices for many commodities. 
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Nevertheless, the principal nontariff barriers to agricultural trade were invisible 
government subsidies to domestic farmers, resulting in price differentials that were 
insurmountable to outside goods. Harder to identify than price support programmes, 
agricultural protection often took the form of hidden income subsidies or tax relief 
which, like explicit tariffs or customs duties, effectively raised the price of imported 
food. Formerly, plaintiff countries had asked, simply and rather naively, that others 
lower their import tariffs. In the Uruguay round, the Cairns group and others demanded 
more substantive measures: that all hidden subsidies and non-tariff barriers be laid 
plainly on the table ("tariffied", as mentioned above), to make trading costs more 
calculable. Cairns demands met with much success. Pending ratification by all (107 to 
116, depending on how they are counted) signatories to the 1994 Uruguay GATT 
agreement, most international food trade is now - for the first time - being brought 
under the aegis of the new World Trade Organisation (WTO). Although the GATT 
itself "wi l l cease to exist and wil l be replaced by" the WTO, common parlance 
continues to equate GATT and WTO as synonyms, 
After January 1995, the WTO became the principal forum for conflict resolution within 
the continuing GATT process. A new Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is being 
established to distinguish legitimate phytosanitary rules on trade from covert trade 
barriers!^, and this promises to be an enduring focus of activity as biotechnologically-
enhanced products, e.g. milk from cows injected with BST^o ,^ soyabeans, tomatoes and 
other exports enter the world market from the US. In brief, the WTO promises to be "a 
far more powerful mechanism for resolving disputes" such as dumping and non-tariff 
barriers than was the GATT, with according to The Economists with signatories making 
an "implicit surrender of sovereignty". The magazine claims it is a small surrender 
that could "permanently raise global welfare by $100 billion a year."i06 . but it is 
fiercely contested by Eurosceptics in Britain and other pockets of resistance in Europe. 
'03 NFU/Intermtional 1/94 (January 5, 1994) "NFU Briefing. GATT settlement in agriculture": pp 9-10. 
Contact: Martin Haworth (Part I); NFU Economics Dept. (Part U). This 34 page briefing is a practical 
guide to the Uruguay agreement's eflFect upon agricultural trade. N.B.: "As a result of this Agreement 
GATT itself will cease to exist and will be replaced by a Worid Trade organisation (WTO) [Cf p 10] ." 
NFU/Intemational 1/94 (January 5, 1994) "NFU Briefing": p 10. 
B.A. Scholten (June/July 1993) "Europeans may extend EST ban" in Dairy Today. 
Economist (October 17,1992) Editorial. 
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Dairy comes under G A T T 
International dairy trade is also being freed up. The 1994 Uruguay GATT agreement 
was a landmark for international dairy product trade, with possible ramifications for 
dairy commodity aid i f - as expected - trade rules changes reduce subsidies and 
protection of dairying in countries (primarily in North America and Europe) that have 
been the main sources of surplus commodities for dairy aid. According to David R. 
Harvey^o^ the South has a comparative advantage in production of fhiit, some 
vegetables and (due to composition of the labour force, i f not climate) dairying, while 
the chief Northern comparative advantages is in cereals (due to climate and soil 
composition). It is difficult to predict the global effects of a complete liberalisation of 
world dairy trade, but this thesis expects countries in the South, such as Mexico, to 
further develop its potential for dairy exports. I f the North is to respond, its dairists^^^ 
must take full advantage of temperate climates, cost-effective inputs, and efficient 
technology in order to produce dairy commodities at or below world price levels. 
GATT-1994's winners & losers 
The results of the agricultural liberalisations agreed in the 1994 GATT accords will not 
be clear for some time. The international situation is complex, and in some respects, 
changing faster than in previous decades. Prosperity in China and other emerging 
economies (now reaching income "thresholds" where national demands for grain 
imports to feed farm animals follows increased consumer demand for livestock 
products) is already affecting world food stocks and price levels. 
It is also important to bear in mind that the ultimate liberalisations, e.g. cuts to farm 
subsidies, etc. were ultimately watered down by deft negotiations, on the exact time-
periods to be used as bases for cuts, as well as wording of the agreements. Chief 
beneficiaries of these sophisticated negotiating delays and tactics were France and the 
EU (formerly EEC). Of course, developing countries that are potential food exporters, 
continue to be critical of such protectionist tactics by what they call "Fortress Europa". 
Observers generally agree that any positive or negative results derived from GATT 
107 Personal communication: Prof David R. Harvey, Department of Agricultural Economics and Food 
Marketing, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
108 ] ^ V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien Style: The Story of the White Revolution. M.V. Kamath 
and some other writers on Indian dairying use the graceful word "dairists" for dairymen and dairywomen. 
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liberalisation also depend upon the extent to which liberalisation is carried out among 
OECD and/or developing countries. 
Because subsidy cuts can generally be expected to lower national food stocks (and 
probably reserves held by the WFP, etc.), upward pressure can be expected upon worid 
food commodities prices. In the long run, this may not be as detrimental as it sounds 
because, as Anderson and Tyers point out real international prices now are 
approximately 25-50% lower than in the year 1900."° Indeed, there seems to be scope 
for farmers to recover some net percentage of a more prosperous worid's income -
particularly since subsidies in rich countries have been a chief factor in keeping world 
market prices artificially low. Such price rises will naturally favour LDCs who happen 
to be food exporters (leaving aside for now the ongoing "cash crop v. food crop 
debate"). 
On the downside, most observers expect countries listed as "food-deficit-low-income" 
countries (e.g. Peru), to suffer economically from agricultural liberalisation. These 
countries provide the best case (as advocated by food aid advocates from Hans Singer, 
to James Ingram of the WFP) for an expanded role for food aid in the world economy, 
albeit with more sensitive "early-warning" field reports to minimise market price 
distortions, or disincentives to domestic farmers. Low-income-food-deficit countries 
such as Peru could, according to Singer and Ingram, receive food aid to improve their 
balance-of-payments accounts, similarly to how India "monetised" dairy aid in the 
White Revolution, and as African countries are now doing to alleviate (SAPs). 
G A T T scenarios; bad TRIPs for LDCs? 
Although this thesis is sanguine on the prospects of GATT-1994 liberalisation, the case 
for pessimistic outcomes remains uncomfortably strong. The table below gives "Three 
Scenarios for liberalisation Effects on LDCs". Although patents and intellectual 
copyrights are not the focus of this thesis, it is worth noting that Third World coimtries 
(including India and China) resisted GATT extension of protection for Trade-Related 
'0^ Raymond F. Hopkins (1993) "Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round: Bargaining Under 
Uncertainty and Inequality" in World Agriculture and the GATT. edited by William P. Avery: pp 143-163. 
''0 Anderson & Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products: pp 2, 63, 
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Intellectual Property Rigjits ("miPS) on, e.g. hi^yidd-vahety (HYV) seeds and 
iMOtechnological ]»-oducts such as BST f<x incr^ing miUc yield. LDCs wary of TRIPs 
see diem as a wedge by vAddh MNCs (e g. Oeigy, Monsanto) from rich countries can 
entrench diemselves in poor coiratiy agriculture in a i»ocess w4iich Ben Fine et al term: 
appropriationian...^ tiaamu^bmesA by c^MtiffiA {S^ o&cts and |»tx:esses witlm) 
agriculture itself'1' 
In assessng GATT-1994, evai The Ecxmaimst magaane - a bastion of free agricuhoral 
trade since abolition of die Com Laws over 150 years ago - admitted after die signing of 
GATT-1994 that UMid Worid countries fears on the cqi^gjrt and p a t ^ pro^aons 
(i.e. TRIPs) might jH-ove to have SOTae basis in fact. Two writers fluent in the 
technicalities of GATT-1994, Bemaid Hoekman and Nfichel Kostecki write: 
There are no d^nitive empincd estimates of the impact of the TRIPs agreement cm 
devdoping countries (see maskus and El^-Konan, 1994). Nfoch depends in this 
G(»nectkm (m die dynamw dSects of UBS i^ reement... .Mailcet stnictwe 
very impcatant. 
OdiCT observers are not so equivocal. A USDA study (TaUe 5) found diat GATT 
liberalisation by OECD countries alone would have a negative effect on UDCs, 
iddiou^ L£)Cs would gain if they also com^detely liberalised d^ir trade. More 
ominous (but in some respects less Ihwou^) was an UNCTAD repoti ]»edicting losses 
for develc^ing coimtries in (MID-alone, or in complete global libexalisatiQn of wwld 
agricultural trade. 
.1"!:.: 
Anderson a ^ Tyos UNCTAD SWOPSM (by 
ERS of die USDA) 
Gl(*al QECD(fflIy <^CDonly Global 
Net change in wdifiire 
(iRJSbffitmts) 
U.5 56.3 -0.6 -4.5 2.6 
Ben Fine, Nfichael Hea3man «ledith Wi%ht ( 1 ^ ) Consumptkm in the A^ of Affluence: the World 
ofFoed pp 47-54. 48. 
112 Bernard Hoekman&MididKoiaedd (199S) The Political Ecmauni afOie WarM Tradtae Svstaa: 
fhtm GATT lo WTO: pp 144-15«, 156-157. Hodoaan (SeiwM- Econoamst at the World Bank) & Kostecki 
^hx^asor, thava^ty <tf Naidirtd) are dticg K. M a ^ & D. ay-Ktman (1994X "Trade-Related 
btteltectual Property Rights: Issues md Exploratory Rea^" k A. Deardoaff mi R Stons (eds.). 
Aaalvtical and Negotiating Isiaies m Ae GbSa/ Tra^ Svstm (Umv. MkUgan Aim Aifatv). 
1 " RaymcMid F. Hopkins (1993) T>evdopffig Cojaifaies m Ae Uruguay R<»ffld" in W.P. Avery (1993). 
Ik^kins cites Anderson & Tyers <1990aX UNCTAD (1990X and tl^ EccMunBC Research Service 
{mS/USBA 1989a) SWOPSIM <» GATT Mboi^s^ ^ the USBA. Hondas notes 1M 
K n i ^ , SfMt md VMa (19S&) dso p r < ^ weS^e ^ i s to LDCs if Oey fibo:^ thev own 
ec(M)Offiies. {A. Krueger, M. SdufiT, «id A ViMez <198%) "Meaaakg die b^act <^ Sect<M--apecific and 
<2 
Looking at the GATT-1994 agreement in toto, this thesis gives more credence to the 
work of Anderson & Tyers, about whom Raymond F. Hopkins explains: 
They disagree that «&ets of OEGD liberalisation would have a net negative effect [on 
LDCs). The difference may be explained, posably, by noting that the other models were 
based on immediate effects, whereas the Anderson and Tyers model runs over several 
years to 1995. Further, there were differences in base years, commodity coverage, and 
elasticity estimates among the models.' 
Likely faenefieiaries of GATT-1994 
In sum, this thesis sees evidence that, in the long- and perhaps medium-term, the 1994 
Uruguay GATT agreement could benefit: 
(1) Third World, and former-Eastbloc farmers who have a comparative advantage in 
agriculture. Raymond F. Hopkins points out that LDC members of Cairns, e.g. Chile 
and Fij i , would be expected to gain. Anderson & Tyers (1991) expect liberalising 
agricultural trade to go far in recti^ng imbalances in the terms of trade suffered by 
most poor countries since rich countries began dumping surpluses on world markets. 
(2) Some farmers in rich countries which enjoy comparative advantages, e.g. the US in 
wheat"^, and perhaps Argentina in beef and wheat. 
(3) QECD dairy farmers who specialise in high-tech, efficient dairying, e.g. some in the 
US and perhaps Britain and Ireland. This is not to say that the future is clear. For 
instance, i f GATT-1994 (and NAFTA) rules are ever fully enforced, Mexican dairy 
exports could make inroads into the US and Canadian markets, as well as throughout 
Latin America. 
Svaepsis of GATT-1994 
Irrespective of uncertain future benefits, some changes mandated by GATT-1994 are 
known. A synopsis of the Uruguay GATT/WTO settlement from the NFU (of Great 
Britain) gives the salient points the GATT/WTO agreement, which came into effect in 
Economy-wide Policies on A^cultural Incentives in Developing Countries." WatiA^rnkjEcoriomic 
gey/Of (September 2): pp 255-272.] 
H'* Raymond F. Hopkins (1993) "Developing Countries m the Umguay Round" in W, P. Avery (1993), 
' ^ 5 Andrae & Beckmann (1985) The Wheat Trap: p 146. 
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1995, and is to last for six years. The accords address the important areas of {!) 
internal support (i.e. domestic farm subsidies), (2) export subsidies and (3) 
'^tariffication" making explicit the hitherto hidden forms of protection against foreign 
farm imports"': 
(1) Internal support: Al l industrialised countries (iCs) including the EU (European 
Union, as the EEC was officially known after 1992) and US must reduce their internal 
support (i.e. domestic subsidies) of farmers by 20% over six years, on a base period of 
1986-1988. Some highlights: 
• These subsidies are assessed by a calculation called the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) 
which seeks to quantify the value of all non-trade-distorting support given directly or indirectly to 
fanners. (See footnotes) 
• Special concessions have been made to developing, or less developed countries (LDCs) in the 
Third World. Preferential agreements were negotiated with Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) as well as North Afiica. 
• The least developed countries (LLDCs) are not obligated by the Uruguay agreement to make 
any farm support cuts whatsoever. 
(2) Export subsidies: The same NFU report also admits what Third Worid and Cairns 
group countries had charged: "Effectively only the European Union and the USA 
subsidise their exports." Therefore, the EU and US are the only blocs affected by new 
rules mandating reduction of export subsidies - although the US, whose internal (i.e. 
domestic) prices were closer to world prices, would find it easier to comply. (The rice 
industry of Japan, the third trade bloc in question - with prices around seven-times 
world levels, seemed more vulnerable to cuts on domestic subsidies and tariffication 
rules than, say, cuts of subsidies of food exports, which were of minuscule importance 
compared to its automotive and electronic exports.) Generally speaking, the agreement 
requires that, in regard to export subsidies: 
• ICs must reduce subsidies on farm exports by 36% over six years, on a 1986-90 base. ICs 
ttiust cut 21% of their volume of subsidised exports over six years on the same base. These cuts 
m MFUBriefing Internatioml 1/94 (1994) Thirty-four pages: pp 2,17. 
"•^ NFU Briefing Memational 1/94: pp 2-8. The NFU report addresses the WTO issues in sli^tly 
different order from this thesis, but is in accordance with my views, which have been informed by regular 
press releases and seminars by Britain's NFU among other sources. The AMS calculation is a global one 
made for the whole of a country' s agriculture - not sector by sector. The AMS includes a wide variety of 
government farm subsidies (i.e. internal supports) inchiding: advisory services, all CAP reform 
compensaition (e.g. suckler cow premium, but not HLCA payments to farmers in disadvantaged hillside 
regions in the EU), environmental programmes, and early retirement for farmers. 
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must be to each line of dairy products, e g, 36% of butter, 36% of milk powder and 36% of 
cheese - not simply a 36% cut in aggregate dairy products. (The cuts on volume exports were 
expected to hurt EU farming worse than "tariffication".) 
• Non-subsidised exports are not subject to volume reduction. 
Food aid is not subject to any cuts. ' 
While direct export subsidies are outlawed under the WTO, trade boosterism, in the 
form of trade fairs and high-profile trade missions coordinated according to information 
gathering by government agencies remains legal continues to be vigorously pursued by 
Britain, France and the US. The US food lobby ensures that approximately two-thirds 
($ 186m) of the $250 million expiart promotion budget is allocated to food. 
(3) Tariffication; A l l barriers to foreign agricultural imports (e;g. variable levies in the 
EU or import quotas in the US and Canada) must be "tariffied" into tariffs of equivalent 
effect (See also above). Here are highlights from the NFU synopsis; 
• In the aggregate, tariffs on imports must be reduced by 36% over six years, with no tariff on 
individual items being cut by less than 15%. Tariffs will be cut in six equal steps. 
• Because the base period (1986-1988) for many agricultural commodities was marked by low worid 
price (FOB) levels, it was expected that tariffication would leave the EU with a high remaining level of 
external protection (lending some credence to critics of "Fortress Europe"). However, minimum 
access rules would ensure that if import volumes of meat, SMP, butter and cheese do not rise by 3% to 
5% of internal ELf consumption by the year 2000, tariffs on these imported commodities must be cut 
by up to 32%. (See below fbf payraUel effects upon North America.) 
• The EU would cut tariffs on beef and pig liver 100%, cut those on SMP 20%, and cut tariffs on 
products with sugar or SMP components 20%. 
• The EU would cut tariffs on beef and pig liver 100%, cut those on skimmed milk powder (SMP) 
20%, and cut tariffs on products with sugar or SMP components 20i%. '20 
118 fjF^j BriefittgInternational 1/94; p 8, 
^^'^Economist (February 1, 1997): pp 23, 58. Powerfid MNC processors like RJR Nabisco and General 
Mills probably have as much - or more - clout than farmers in lobbying for promotion of US food exports. 
Examples of ample spending include ANUGA, a food trade fair held in seven buildings in Bonn in 1989 
when the US promoters occupied an entire building. 
120 ffpu Briefing^ International (1994); pp; 4--6, 9. Another article in The Economist (February 1, 1997); 
p 23, 58, shows that the EU had already cut most CAP intervention prices (and as mentioned, worid prices 
in the 1986'^ 1988 base period were low), the EU considered the OATT tariffication agreement to be an 
economic victory for its still^protected farmers. Nevertheless, admission of Central & Eastern European 
countries to the EU was expected to threaten remaining subsidies protecting fkrmers in western Europe. A 
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The Uruguay agreement allows more stringent measures (e.g. quotas^  tariffs, etc.) 
against fruit, vegetable and other farm exports from non-GATT members such as the 
People's Republic of China/i^i Although China has the largest domestic market in the 
world (and in the 1990s has again reverted to status as a net food importer), making it 
somewhat immune to international trade pressures, China's desire for foreign exchange 
will be a factor motivating it to join the new WTQ, i f other issues can be negotiated. 
Within the purview of this thesis^  it is easier to envision a prosperous^  populous China 
in the 21st century as a dairy product importer, rather than a top exporter. 
Before the GATT agreement in 1994, domestic milk (and sugar) producers in the 
(sparsely populated, compared to China) US were protected by quotas on foreign 
imports. These quotas on imports were stipulated in Section 22 of US trade law, 
permitted in pre-Uruguay GATT agreements. Canada and Europe went beyond the US 
example of setting quotas on imports under Article XI of the pre-Uruguay GATT'22 by 
installing indigenous production quotas and pricing regimes. Similarly, Japan 
subsidised inefficient (but picturesque) small-scale rice production, and protected it 
from foreign imports, under similar GATT loopholes. 
After GATT-1994, dairy protection in Canada, Europe, the US and elsewhere must now 
be tariffied, i.e. made transparent to international traders. Canada's domestic milk 
quota regime is undergoing difficulty because of the extra 5% to 6% volume of imports 
it must accept under the GATT; furthermore, Canada was under pressure from the US 
under the NAFTA trade agreement. EU milk quotas may become financially 
untenable around the year 2000, as former Eastbloc countries with farm sectors 
providing ca. 27% of all employments^ * are admitted to the single market. The US is 
MAEF press release (January 8, 1997; 5/97: pp 1-6, p 2) "Baldry outlines the need for CAP Reform", 
emphasised the pressure that incorporating former EastWoc countries into the EU will put on the CAP. 
However, some reputable researchers (A. Swinbank (December, 1996) FaadPcficy) insist the pressure of 
EU «ilargranait is exaggerated and need not threaten the CAP status quo. 
' 2 ' MFC/Intermtioml (1994): p 34, This vulnerabiiity to constraints on its ag trade is surely an induce-
ment for Cliina to join the WTO - if it can accommodate itself to expectations on human rights, etc, 
'22 JagdishBhagwa:ti (1988) Protectimism: p 9. 
'23 Hoards Dairmcm April 25, 1995 "Nasty trade dispute threatens Canada's milk markets": p 311. 
NAFTA stands for North American Free Trade Agreement. 
'2'* Economist (July 29, 1995) "Farm follies": p. 36. Former Eastbloc countries desiring admission have 
farm sectors wath ca. 27% employment, compared to EU-15's ag. sector with ca. 6% of total employment. 
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relying upon its efficiency in milk production - even after agreeing to an additional 
2.5% equivalent of its domestic volimie in extra dairy imports'^^. IQ continue a major 
dairy export drive that may be questionable under GATTAVTO rules. 
The US share of world dairy exports had nearly doubled from 4.4% in 1990 to 7.9% in 
1992. Under congressional pressure to cut dairy surplus storage costs, the Clinton 
administration moved aggressively to expand exports further. Coming soon after the 
signing of the GATT, the exports may have risked going against the spirit of the 
Uruguay agreement in an effort to mollify those who criticised the Clinton government 
for championing the GATT. On January 20, 1995, USDA announcements of Dairy 
Export Incentive Program (DEIP) allocations of 335.3 million pounds for the first half 
of 1995 included more than 22,000 tons of first-time allocations for the Asian region, 
including 15,000 tons of non-fat dry milk, 7000 tons of milkfat and 300 tons of cheese. 
'New Zealand and Australia, which have traditionally supplied the Asian region, 
strongly protested this vigorous new export wave. The DEIP shipments included 17.8 
million pounds of non-fat diy milk to Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, and they 
were reflected in stronger domestic dairy prices for US dairy farmers.'^ 6 
To what extent the US could extend a dairy export offensive around the Pacific Rim is 
questionable. It depends on: (1) its legality under the GATTAVTG and (2) trade 
counter-measures or retaliation that New Zealand and Australia might take to maintain 
their markets in Asia, and that the EU might take to preserve its own traditional 
markets. International dairy trade appears ready to leap to higher levels of global 
activity, and it is likely that WTO rulings will affect the outcome of export activity. 
Summary and coBclusions of Chapter 1 
This section discussed the motivation for trade, as it has been perceived since pre-
history, and how various governing groups responded to it. The mercantilists' view of 
trade as a weapon in a zero-sum international competition has given way to an 
'2* Hoard's (April 25, 1995): p 311, US dairymen in their National Milk Producers Federfrtion claim 
NAFTA rules go beyond WTO rules on tariflBeation, and thus Canada should be importing an additional 
$1 billion US milk annually. Portraying this as a classic "beggar-thy-neighbof" scenario Hami's 
Dairyman editors urged US farmers to increase their profits through cost-cutting and higher productivity, 
rather than trying to overturn Canada's "supply-nianagement" (milk quota) system. 
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acknowledgement that the wealth of nations can be maximised by free trade according 
to each nation's comparative advantage; attempts at autarky, irrational protection of 
infant or strategic industries, overvaluation of currency and neglect of farming and rural 
development have been repudiated. Since the end of the Cold War, what Bauer called 
"the spurious consensus" of development economists influences international trade 
policy less than neo-classical trade theory. 
The recent signing of the Uruguay GATT agreement demonstrated a world consensus 
that free trade benefits all nations in the aggregate, and that IC obstacles (e.g. internal 
farm supports, export subsidies and unfair tariffs) to LDC agriculture should be phased 
out by the end of the millennium. Notwithstanding recent reforms in international farm 
trade, the uncomfortable truth is that a large portion of the world remains in poverty. 
What Amartya Sen termed "entitlements" to food security are not enjoyed fully by 
hundreds of millions of people. it is true that in the spirit of free trade, China began 
liberalising its agriculture in the 1970s, and that India began liberalising its agriculture 
in the 1990s. But these processes are far from complete, and the fact that grain reserves 
dwindled for a few years before 1996, as worid grain production temporarily lagged 
behind population, obscures the future of the GATT-1994 accords on grain and dairy 
trade even further. 
William Greider'^ s sees evidence that China, with its large market, is in a position to 
flout GATTAVTO conventions such as the Most-Favoured-Nations (MFN) rule on 
non-discrimination in trade i f it wishes to do so. That is problematic for the world 
trading system because, as Hoekman & Kostecki say, "MFN is one of the pillars of the 
GATT."'29 It follows then that I f Greider is correct, China could wreck the 
GATTAVTO eariy in the next millennium. 
Hoard's Dairyman (May 25, 1995) Washington Dairygrams, 
'27 Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, eds. (199Q) The PoMcal Economy of Hunger - Vohime 1 - Entitlement 
and Weft-Being. 
128 William Greider (199?) One World. Ready or Not. According to Greider, China's large market is so 
attractive that potential trading partners could be enticed into bilateral deals violating the MFN principle. 
Hoekman & Kostecki (1995) PMMcaLEcommy of theJi^orldJIradins.Svstem: From GATT to WTO. 
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Complaints that the tenns of international trade still favour ICs over LDCs (especially 
in regard to patents held by IC agribusiness interests, on the biotechnological agents of 
the Green and White Revolutions) will bring calls for exemptions to "intellectual 
property" provisions of the GATT, and persuasive calls from LDCs for constraints 
against agri-business in trade. The "tariffication" of barriers will probably motivate 
increased dairy trade.'^ o International dairy trade is probably headed for on-going 
battles between the US and Europe in the WTO, over hormones in beef and dairy 
agriculture'^', and between various competitors over export schemes. Depending upon 
the clout that tlie new WTO can exert upon competing dairy exporters, it may be some 
time before the long-term picture of international dairy trade stabilises. 
'^ 0 It must be borne in mind that expansion of trade in dairy products and livestock is contingent on the 
containment of natural constraints, i,e, diseases, e g, BSE, BSE, Chron's disease, Ecoli, Salmonella, TB, 
etc, - presently a cause of concern, (See Table 7.) 
s^ ' Reuter dispatch (via NFU) (January 23, 1996) "Fischler says no backing down on meat hormone" by 
Peter Blackburn; also many similar references in Kennedy (1993) Twenty-First Century (e.g. pages: 279-
282) indicating that because of its demographics, Europe will resist the biotech revolution. 
Tabled 
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MOTIVATOR EFFECT LEGACY 
Age of MercaatiliMn 
(16th-18th Century) 
NatiosMl gov'ts encour-
aged rationalisations (e.g. 
Speeded nationhood. 
Now repudiated for 
zero-Sim eamomics 
& beggar-thy-neigh-
bor trade policies. 
enclosures) raising agnc. 
f^ oductivity. Peasants 
became indust fvoletariat. 
Adam Smithes Wealth of 
Nations (1776). 
Showed invisible hand of 
individual ambition in 
Attacked as pass6 by 
Marxists in Ind-
ustrial Rev. K^kab-
ilitated by CPE fail-
ures of 1970s-90s. 
free markets mottvated 
national ectmomic output 
more than mercantilism. 
David Ricardo's Principies & 
tiieory of cotr^forative 
advantage (C2i. 1817). 
Showed that even if Eng-
land was more efficient 
tiian Spain in all i»^ oduc> 
tion, trading specialities 
raised oatpat for both. 
Blunted argimiaits 
that national power 
depended on import 
tariffs. Inspire free 
intemati<H)al trade. 
1 Ittdustiy forces repeal of English 
[Com Laws (1846). 
British political power 
shifted fr(Hn landed gentry 
to industn i^sts. 
Showed free trade 
raises nat'l power 
better tban autarky. 
1 Bretton Woods (1944-71-) Reformed post-WW-D fi-
nance & trade relations. 
Gold std. left (1971). 
IMF,WBaiddev't 
ECSC (1951), EEC-6 (1957), 
EC-12 & Sngl. Eur. Act (1986) 
BU-15(1995). 
Cut war threat & helped 
recovery. EEC GDP over-
shadows Eas^loc in 1970s. 
Success ^wns 1992 
Single Market, 
NAFTA pact, etc. 
GATT process (1947-94) 
follows defunct ITO. 
Fram^ int'l itddt princ-
iples, e.g. MFN. Barred 
quotas 'cept milk, sugar. 
LDCs d e m ^ dev't 
& trade reform in 
UNCTAD(1964). 
USSR joins GATT (ca. 1987). 
China considers membership. 
Debunked bipolar social-
ist vs. GATT trade blocs. 
Most ICs & LDCs 
accept GATT. 
Uruguay GATT agre^nrat 
ushers in WTO era (1994-) 
1992 EC refonns enable 
WTO to govern ag- to US 
& Cairns approval. 
LDCs. China fear 
copyr't & patent 
rules (e.g biotech). 
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Table 7 
N.R: Fhytosanitary & ecO'issues coidd be misused as nontari ff barrriers to trade. 
ISSUE STATUS OUTLOOK ^ 
Foot & mouth disease (FMD) Chronic; c<MJtained by Same fw foreseeable 
slaughter & compensation. 
Brucellosis Same as above. Same as above. 
Tuberculosis (TB) W(W8eiiing? Researdi. Curtail 
antibiotics misuse? I 
Chron's disease Milk-borne link to human Same as above. 
Johne's disease? 
Rabies Improving - but endemic 
worldwide (UK free via 
quarantine). Contained by 
<HUlisg, vacanaticm. 
Vaccinated bait may 
control in wildlife. 
Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) 
Beeflink to human CTD? 
"Mad Cow" disease drops, 
as human CJD reports rise. 
Unknown. Slaughter 
& compensation, saf-
rendering needed. 
Over-/Misuse of antibiotics Increasing virulence of 
many diseases, including 
most of the above. 
Limit over-/misuse & 
use different drugs in 
animals & humans. 
Refrigerants (e.g. CFCs) Montreal Protocol (1987) 
CFC ban probably ameli-
orates greenhouse effect. 
Must develop sub-
stitutes for CFCs & 
refrigeration itself. 
1 Bovine somatotropin (BST) Legal in US (1994) & 
many non-EU countries. 
Bellwether of radical 
biotech, e.g. cloning. 
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CHAPTER 2: POST-WW-H ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL 
FOOD & DAIRY AID 
Introduction 
After tracing the expansion of international food trade in recent centuries, the last 
chapter examined the ti-emendous expansion of trade since WW-II and the attempts of 
less developed coimtries (LDCs) to make economic progress during the Cold War. This 
chapter focuses on food and dairy aid programmes which became part and parcel of 
bilateral (coimtry-to-coimtry) and multilateral {via institutions such as FAO and WFP of 
the UN) initiatives to stimulate development in poor countries. 
Just as food aid is a subset of overall international food trade, dairy aid is a subset of 
overall food aid. Both food and dairy aid are relatively recent phenomena, and dairy aid 
in particular was not viable until the advent of modem processing technology. 
Centuries ago, international dairy trade was virtually limited to bulky. cheeses, 
commodities that seldom carried enough value to make their transport profitable. The 
introduction of fine quality dry milk powder sprayers revolutionised the dairy trade and 
made the use of milk in aid programmes to remote areas possible. 
Although international grain trade reached massive levels around the time of the repeal 
of the British Com Laws (1846), large flows of food aid began much more recently. 
John Shaw and Edward Clay define food aid as, "aid supplied as food commodities on 
grant or concessional terms."^  Studies of food aid are divided on its origins. Some 
historians identify the earliest instances of food aid as small shipments of grain, from 
the US to friendly governments in South America, a century ago. But regardless of 
details, all observers agree that it was not until after WW-II that large-scale, global, 
formally-established systems of food aid began. Dan Morgan remarks that after WW-II: 
dozens of countries that had once fed themselves began to depend on a distant source -
John Shaw & Edward Clay (1993) World Food Aid: Experiences of Recipients & Donors, p 1. 
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the United States - for a substantial part of their food supply.^  
The US did more than simply dominate commercial trade in grain in this new era. It is 
no exaggeration to say that the US was progenitor of the means and philosophy of post-
war cereals aid. Shaw & Clay write that India, then the largest recipient, but later a 
net food exporter after the Green Revolution, was the focus of early discussion and that: 
Until the early 1960s, food aid was (correctly) seen as almost synonymous with US food aid.^  
Selections from a review of the literature 
This thesis draws from sources with conflicting views on the most salient issues of 
international dairy aid and trade. Most sources are recognised experts owing to their 
contribution to academic research or work with institutions such as the FAO, WFP, 
IFPRI, IMF, World Bank, etc. Hans Singer, Edward Clay, John Shaw, John Cathie 
inter alia are eminent advocates of food aid. As noted in Chapter 1, Peter T. Bauer is a 
Right-wing iconoclast toward post-WW-H aid and development paradigms, and he is 
supported by free frade advocate (and scourge of protectionism) Jagdish Bhagwati, as 
well as Jeffrey Sachs, in his opinion that even in instances where external aid can help 
development, it is crucial that countries adopt market-oriented policies. 
The literature on daiiy aid per se is not immense, but a significant body of work was 
inspired by the White Revolution in India, both pro and con, which is a reason why its 
chief programme Operation Flood (OF) was selected as the case study for this thesis. 
Sources tending toward acceptance (if not blanket approval) of dairy aid as it has been 
used in India include Harold Alderman, Peter J. Atkins, John Empson, and John W. 
Mellor. Among what might be called impartial observers of Operation Flood, Martin 
Doombos et al of the Indo-Dutch Programme on Development Alternatives (EDPAD) 
confributed one of the largest bodies of work on OF, and are cited frequently. 
Acting as iconoclasts from the Left are Susan George on food aid in general, and iShanti 
George and Claude Alvarez on Operation Flood in particular. Joining them in a recent 
(1995) radical indictment of world food systems is Arturo Escobar, noteworthy for the 
ferocity and scope of his "postmodern" attack on the post-WW-H aid and trade regime. 
Because the viewpoint of this thesis is that (echoing Bauer, Bhagwati and Sachs) aid 
'Dan Morgan (1979) Merchants of Grain: pl3. 
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programmes are subordinate to "getting the prices right" for poor countries, this thesis 
also is concemed with the question of how liberalisation of agricultural development in 
the GATT process will affect their food security. Thus reference is made to 
GATTAVTO experts such as Kym Anderson & Rodney Tyers, and Bernard Hoekman & 
Michel Kostecki. 
Also cited is journalist/researcher William Greider who, while accepting most market-
oriented principles, joins Paul Ketmedy in concem that unfettered capital movements 
threaten worid prosperity and stability. Books by M.V. Kamath on Operation Flood, 
and Dan Morgan and Anthony Sampson concemed with the grain trade, as well as 
publications such as Hoard's Dairyman (est. 1885) and The Economist (est. 1843) were 
among many sources of valuable informatioa Historical sources are also cited to 
establish the weighty role played by food aid in the Cold War. 
Reference is made to Geeta Somjee & A.S. Somjee, Dilip R. Shah and others who 
investigated the microeconomic effects of dairy cooperativisation upon mral dwellers 
including women, children and tribals in India. But because of space constraints (and 
the opportunity to pursue empirical evidence on macroeconomic dairy performance in 
the Agrostat-PC database) this thesis concentrates on the aggregate dairy performance 
of India relative to other countries, in an attempt to reach some conclusions on the 
interrelationship between international dairy aid and trade. 
Because writers such as Andrae & Beckman, Stephen Hellinger et al, Stephane Jost and 
John Tarrant point out ways in which food aid systems must be improved, they are 
important points of reference. Without the reforms suggested by their research (e.g. 
decentralisation of programmes and the need for "early-warning networks" to speed 
emergency response), food aid might continue as just a panacea for rich country 
consciences - instead of timely relief to disasters, and the boon to development that it 
can be. Now let us turn to a breakdown of the forms food aid has taken in its evolution. 
' John Shaw & Edward Clay (1993) World Food Aid: Experiences of Recipients & Donors: p 5. 
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Organisation of food aid 
Food aid has generally taken three forms. 
(1) Emergencv aid; provided on an ad hoc basis for relief of food shortages due to war, 
drought, flood, disease or other disasters. NGOs such as the CARE, Catholic Relief 
Services and Oxfam have long been active in emergency food aid.'' 
(2) Programme food aid: began in post-WW-U surplus disposal policies of the US. 
Later formalised under PL 480, programme aid was granted on a bilateral basis to 
foreign governments as a gift or on concessional rates. Ideally, it was sold at prices that 
did not unduly discourage domestic farmers. Its purpose was to displace commercial 
imports that would otherwise be a macroeconomic burden on the economy in the form 
of external balance-of-payments problems, or internal inflation. Resources saved in this 
manner could be reinvested in the economy, eventually "trickling down" into rural 
development. Such ideal results were not always forthcoming from these "top-down" 
schemes, and too often programme aid acted as a disincentive to domestic farmers - as 
it is to Egyptian wheat farmers today. Shaw and Clay say programme aid is "always 
supplied on a bilateral govemment-to-govemment basis."^  However, as James Ingram, 
Hans Singer and others continue to urge the use of food aid for "attenuating the costs of 
structural adjustment programmes" (SAPs) of poor governments, presumably managed 
by the World Food programme (WFP) on a multilateral basis - the precise definition of 
programme aid seems rather amorphous, and Shaw and Clay acknowledge: 
the division between progranmie and project food aid has become increasingly blurred.^  
(3) Project food aid: is a sort of magic bullet aimed to transfer additional nutrition 
income to target groups such as the rural poor, women and pre-school children, school 
lunches, and workers in Food-For-Work (FFW) projects, etc.^  that too often were 
missed by programme food aid. Principal provider of project aid is the WFP, although 
* Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid, p 61. 
' Shaw & Clay (1993). p 2, etc. Commodities were frequently sold on concessionary rates, i.e. "soft 
loans" often repayable at moderate rates in local currency. In the 1960s the US "forgave" a large amount 
of such food aid loans payable in Indian rupees on the condition that they were reinvested in Indian 
development. 
* Shaw & Clay (1993): p 2. 
Shaw & Clay (1993): pp 2, 11-12. Successful FFW projects include road building in Turkey. 
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other multilateral ^ and NGO efforts are significant. As John Cathie points out, food aid 
is not limited to commodities, e.g. the NGO Oxfam assisted the FAO in funding 50% of 
a feed mixing plant five miles from Anand ,^ which soon was to become headquarters 
for India's White Revolution. 
In the case of India project food aid totally supplanted programme aid in 1978, when 
the last such agreement was signed. India, which had been an eariy focus of 
programme aid, next served as a testing ground for project aid. Such project food aid 
now accounts for about 10% of official development assistance.'° Ram Saran and 
Panos Konandreas note that project aid can also alleviate macroeconomic government 
"foreign exchange burdens" and allow "additional domestic resources" for domestic 
development" just as outmoded programme aid has done. As it gained experience the 
WFP has concentrated on refining project aid to assist local microeconomic 
development in schools, health centres and in dairy development, such as Operation 
Flood in India. 
After WW-n, food aid flows began almost entirely as cereals shipments from the US to 
Europe. Once European recovery was assured, India became one of the main 
recipients. Cereals will probably always constitute most of the aid basket. Dairy aid 
took longer to develop. It took time for milk surpluses and technology (e.g. 
sophisticated powder-spraying techniques developed in Scandinavia) to reach levels 
where dairy aid became more than a trickle in post-WW-II aid streams. The leading 
role taken by Europe in dairy aid will be recounted in detail below. But the background 
of the overall post-WW-II trade and aid picture is essential to bring dairy aid into focus. 
Susan George and Anderson & Tvers on Population & Poverty 
Of prime interest is the question of the interrelationship between trade and aid. Some 
theorists claim that the use of food aid as enticements or "loss leaders" helped 
^ Food Aid Works and Food Aid (1990s) Information and teaching materials from Australian Int. 
Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB). Published in Canberra in mid-1990s. Australia provides 
50,000 tonnes of wheat annually for FFW projects in Bangladesh, fimding tree planting, schools, etc. 
' M.V.Kamath (1989) Management Kurien Style: p 173. Dr. V. Kurien hosted PM Shastri, who 
inaugurated the plant, on October 31, 1964. 
Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid: p 61-62, It appears that the late-1970s were a watershed for 
India which was beginning to enjoy the fruits of food security fostered by the Green Revolution. 
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precipitate the decline in the terms of trade for the developing worid, and even food aid 
proponent Hans Singer acknowledges instances where food aid has been 
counterproductive. But Susan George's charge that "the relative and absolute numbers 
of hungry and destitute people have vastly increased"'^  since the propagation of aid 
programmes after WW-II is increasingly questionable. Even i f she was correct when 
making the claim, as drought devastated SSA in the 1980s, is the claim still valid? 
Thirteen years later, George's charge that the numbers of malnourished people relative 
to total worid population^^ is increasing is doubtful. It is difficult to be certain. Also, 
basic nutritional needs in calories and dietary composition vary among people, 
occupation and climate. Although reproduction rates have moderated, world population 
is still growing, and it is possible that the absolute numbers of people living in poverty 
are increasing. The best albeit hazy estimates to emerge from the Worid Food Summit 
held in Rome were of 500 million malnourished people in the world - perhaps 8% to 
9% of the worid population - an appalling statistic, but rather less than even more 
alarming estimates. 
Be that as it may, Susan George has served as an invaluable gadfly on the shortcomings 
of international food systems, especially in her warnings that food aid must not be 
allowed to corrupt Third World agriculture either through common kickbacks to 
bureaucrats, or skewing a country's technical progress by forcing aid recipients to buy 
inappropriate technology. All reputable experts join George in pointing out the pitfalls 
of "tied aid", i.e. food commodities granted on the basis that the recipient reciprocates 
by buying other goods (e.g. HYV seeds; dairy processing equipment) from the "donor" 
coimtry. Phillip C. Abbot and F. Desmond McCarthy conclude their study on tied aid: 
Hence one should not assume that aid with conditions attached will benefit a recipient, 
and even if there is benefit, the real value of the aid to a recipient may well be less than 
its nominal value.''* 
" Ram Saran & Panos Konandreas (1991) "An Additional Resource? A Global Perspective on Food Aid 
Flows in Relation to Development Assistance" in Clay & Stokke (1991) Food Aid Reconsidered. 
Susan George (1984) III Fares the Land. p 102 
" Agrostat/FAO/1994 estimated world population at 5.572 billion people in 1993. Over half the world's 
population was listed as "low-income" comprising 3.458 billion persons. At the time of the World Food 
Summit held November 1986 at the FAO in Rome, world population was reported to be 5.7 billion. 
"* Phillip C. Abbot & F. Desmond McCarthy (Nferch 31, 1983) "Potential Welfare Losses Due to Tied 
Food Aid" in Canadian Journal Of Agricultural Economics: pp 45-58, p 57. 
77 
Like Susan George, Anderson & Tyers are critical of inequities (via rich country food 
export subsidies, etc.) that have worsened the terms of trade for the Third Worid.But 
operating from a standpoint comparatively more accepting of capitalism than George, 
Anderson & Tyers seek reform of the worid trading system through the GATTAVTO, 
and also blame mistakes by poor countiy governments for much of their economic 
malaise. These policies include over-valued exchange rates, over-investment in heavy 
industry, over-taxation of the raral sector and price controls on domestic produce. 
However, like George, they cite aggressive marketing strategies - especially export 
subsidies and dumping - for Europe's encroachment of developing countries' worid 
market share. Anderson & Tyers' view on the food trade somewhat ignores food aid, 
probably because they perceive aid as less harmful in trade relations than European 
subsidies on commercial exports on the world markets, where they gradually displaced 
Third World (and CAIRNS) competitors. Anderson & Tyers point out that since WW-
II , the grey area has widened between commercial sales and outright grants of food 
commodities with no strings attached. It is ironic that, while Anderson and Tyers share 
most of Susan George's concerns on Third World development, their remedy is not 
dismantlement but reform of the GATT - one of the institutions intrinsic to Third World 
hunger according to George. 
The detractors of food aid are correct that post-WW-II aid in grain, etc., had its origins 
in surplus disposal, and that there have been instances where food aid has served merely 
as an inducement to later commercial sales'^  Raymond Hopkins (1983) has foimd that 
the US and many other countries continue to utilise surplus disposal in food aid 
programmes.^ ' Surplus disposal of EEC dairy aid was the original compulsion behind 
Operation Flood in India. Martin Doombos et al assess it thus: 
From the donor side, while the compulsion of surplus disposal and the interests of export 
promotion through aid were certainly the basis of EC dairy aid, other motivation became 
mcreasmgly miportant. 
Kym Anderson & Rodney Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products. 
Shaw & Clay (1993) WorldFoodAid ix. 
" Raymond F. Hopkins (1983) "Food Aid and Development: Evolution of Regime Principles and 
Practices" in Report of the WFP. Hopkins found surplus disposal is employed after bumper harvests in 
ICs, e.g.: Canada (rapeseed oil), Sweden (wheat), Norway (fish), Germany (egg powder), Australia and 
Argentina (wheat), Japan (rice) and the US (wheat and many other products). 
Doombos, Gertsch & Terhal (1991) cited in Clay & Stokke Food Aid Reconsidered: p 118. 
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I f we imagine ourselves in the role of past policy makers, acting without the benefit of 
lessons learned since WW-II, the overall story of food aid in general, and dairy aid in 
particular, is neither so venal nor so simple as its detractors have portrayed it. 
Post-WW-n History 
There are many reasons why food aid became part of the post-WW-H scene. First and 
foremost among them is: because it could. North American agricultural production had 
increased during WW-II. Lend Lease, which comprised mostly war materiel, had been 
cancelled in August 1945, but it was soon apparent that Europe required continued 
assistance. Fear of communism was intrinsic to US policy but Secretary of State George 
Marshall carefully played it down, stating: 
Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, 
poverty, desperation and chaos.'' 
Loans and aid for European recovery became known as the Marshall Plan, running from 
ca. 1947 to the mid-1950s. Much of Western Europe suffered continuing food 
shortages, as the bad harvest of 1947 preceded a bitterly cold winter. '^ It was not until 
a decade after the Treaty of Rome established the EEC in 1957 (and owing much to the 
intensifications of agriculture spurred by Sicco Mansholt) that the EEC regained food 
self-sufficiency. After WW-E, countries that had lost farm machinery - and labour - in 
the conflict needed time and assistance, before they could resume normal production. 
It would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the US farm lobby in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, and this thesis argues that it helped shape US foreign policy. The US 
farm lobby pressured presidential administiations to keep agriculture off the agenda of 
the original GATT-1947 negotiations (thus maintaining their protections), and to extend 
food aid first in European recovery and then in programmes around the world 
(stabilising US farmgate prices by surplus disposal). 
While the country as a whole enjoyed a sense of victory, hearing frequent hubristic 
assertions of an "American Century", excess farm production amounted to a "farm 
problem" that was to muddy American political waters for decades. In any event post-
A W. DePorte (1986) Europe Between the Superpowers: the Enduring Balance: p 135. DePorte cites 
The Department of State Btdletin 16 (June 15, 1947), 1160. 
William R. Keylor (1984) The Twentieth Century World: p 275. 
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WW-n euphoria ebbed into a sober realisation that Allied victory had not healed all the 
hurts of the world. Most ominous were communist movements^ ^ promising peace and 
bread and threatening governments such as Greece that the US and Great Britain 
recognised as legitimate. Against this propaganda the US, (along witii Britain and 
France, still clinging to empire) found itself on the ideological defensive against the 
socialist world. Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in March 1946 had a long-mnning 
effect both on public opinion, and the policies of new President Harry Truman.^ ^ 
On March 12, 1947, the President gave his "Truman Doctrine" speech resolving "to 
assist free peoples"^ '* beyond the western hemisphere, departing from the 
geographically narrower Monroe Doctrine. This identification of faraway Greece and 
Turkey with the freedom of American citizens set the rationale for the peacetime use of 
US military power and materiel around the world. Besides military aid, the US was to 
help restore, "Livestock, poultry and draft animals..." as well as railways, ports and 
other infrastmcture destroyed by the Germans, and now threatened by Greek communist 
partisans. In short, the stage was set for programme food aid, i.e. long-running 
shipments as opposed to short-term disaster relief 
NSC-68; bread and arms to fight the Cold War 
At a high-level meeting in early 1950, US leaders produced a top secret document of 
principles that was to guide Cold War strategy for decades.^ ^ Earlier complacency over 
US security had been jarted by the communist victory in China in 1949, and the 
Kremlin's unexpectedly early development of an atomic bomb. Labelled "NSC 68", 
the 70-page document was the definitive policy statement on the multi-pronged 
political, economic and military means deployed by the US in the Cold War. 
Although the document reckoned that the US could triple military expenditure without 
incurring grievous inflation, it realised that the US and its Westem allies lacked 
manpower, materiel and most of all public support to "contain" Russian and Chinese 
Charles L. Mee, Jr. (1984) The Marshall Plan: The Lccunching of the Pax Americana: p 261. 
Food was a theme of all parties m the Cold War. 
Wolfram F. Hanrieder & Graeme P. Auton (1980) The Foreign Policy of West Germany. France & 
Britain: p 186. 
Harry Truman (1947) "The Policy of Containment" in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States pp 176-80. 
'^Dean Acheson (1988) Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 
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revolutionaries by arms alone. NSC 68 described a subtler approach: (1) while 
maintaining pressure on communist expansion through a diplomatic, trade and military 
stiategy of "containment", (2) "an affirmative programme" of "political and economic 
measures" would wrest the ideological initiative from the Soviet Union and China : 
by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world... .[NSC 
68 concluded that]... the cold war is a real war in which the survival of the free world is 
at stake.^ * 
The outbreak of the Korean War in the spring of 1950 prompted Truman to sign the 
steely document that guided the pro-active, military-economic strategies thereafter 
followed by the US government in concert (usually) with its allies. When NSC 68 was 
made public, decades later, it was clear that food aid was one of the principal weapons 
used by the US in the Cold War. Of course, making food aid part of the westem arsenal 
also neatly disposed of the farm surplus problem: Truman could assuage his farmers 
and fight communism in one fell swoop. And twenty years later, the EEC put a noble 
front on its not dissimilar efforts at surplus disposal of food mountains, when it became 
the main provider of dairy aid to India."^ ^ 
PL 480 
The detractors of food aid claim accurately that, until 1954 or so, food aid was little 
more than a glorified surplus disposal policy administered in an erratic, ad hoc maimer. 
US food aid sometimes violated the conditions later established by John W. Mellor^^ 
prescribing "reliable" amounts, administered to minimise disincentives to indigenous 
farmers and to distribute welfare effects "evenly" through recipient societies.^ ' The 
immediate post-WW-II period of rather erratic shipments was followed by a more 
formal system of surplus disposal from 1954-66, beginning with the establishment of 
the PL 480 Food for Peace programme. (See Table 8.) Public displeasure at cases 
where food aid disrupted societies it was supposed to help forced US policy makers to 
Thomas H. Etzold & John Lewis Gaddis (1978) "NSC 68: Strategic Reassessment of 1950" in 
Cofitainment: Documents on American Policy and Stategv. 1945-1950: pp383-441, 438-442. In the 
original the words "cold war" are not capitalised. 
" Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid: p 21. 
Clay & Shaw (1987) Poverty. Development and Food: pp 187-88. John W. Mellor's Rx for conditions 
on donors and recipients of food aid will be referred to throughout this thesis. 
Hans Singer, John Wood & Tony Jennings (1987) Food Aid: The Challenge and the Opportunity: 
pp 177-178, 177-192. One classic account of counterproductive food aid is Tony Jackson & T. Eade's 
(1982) Against the Grain: The Dilemma of Project Food 
PL 480 is the common term for the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. 
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Table 8 
A Brief History of the P L 480 Era 
• Spring 1950: President Traman signs NSC-68 after outbreak of the Korean War. 
• Establishment of the original PL 480 Food for Peace programme, 1954-66. 
• As the complexity of food aid effects (both pro and con) was better understood, the 
US revised the original PL 480 with a refined "surplus utilisation policy", calculated 
to raise reliability of shipments and cut disincentives to recipient country agriculture 
• According to Edward Clay, the period from 1971 through the 1980s could be termed 
a "residual policy" further fine-tuning PL 480 not just to improve welfare effects in 
recipient countries, but also to minimise costs to the US which was suffering serious 
budget deficits, partly due to the Vietnam War. 
In 1990 the US completely rewrote PL 480 legislation.^^ Principal changes 
established direct management responsibilities, new bilateral grant programmes 
(some using local currencies) and debt forgiveness. A greater delineation was made 
between agencies responsible for the new PL 480: USDA was to be responsible for 
Title I and AID was to administer both title I I (donations) and the new Title I I , the 
government to government grants programme. Formerly, Titles I/HI and n were 
managed by interagency committees headed by USDA and AID - clearly a 
troublesome arrangement. 
the PL 480 Food for Peace programme, which reformed some (but not all) of the 
shortcomings of the previous surplus disposal policy. 
'^ Title X V of the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conversion and Trade Act was written by Mark E . Smith, 
Karen Z. Ackerman and Nydia R. Suarez. The manner in which the US administered food aid remained as 
before, continuing export credit guarantees (especially for "emerging democracies"), and the Export 
Enhancement Programme (EEP) - a tool the US employed in its fight against E U encroachment of its 
world market share was retained. (EEP was a great boon to US dairy farmers.) However, priorities of PL 
480 objectives and management were rewritten to emphasise the use of food aid to "promote US foreign 
policy by enhancing the food security of the developing world." Point 2 made a specific commitment to 
"promote broad-base, equitable, and sustainable development (including agriculture)" among food aid 
recipients. 
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"Problematisation of poverty^ 
President Harry Truman's deployment of food in the Cold War was not bereft of 
humanitarian concerns. In a major speech, Truman said that despite a great victory 
against Nazism many people around the world lived in conditions of hunger and 
material "misery". Truman's speech went on to portray poverty almost as an 
engineering problem, such as smashing the atom or building a dam, that could be solved 
by American ingenuity, resolve and the commitment of resources. 
Although it is a mistake to question Truman's himianitarian sentiments, it is now clear 
that eradicating worid hunger and poverty is a fundamentally more complex problem 
than building an atomic bomb. Critics of western development programmes such as 
Arturo Escobar mock Truman's "problematisation of poverty" as the epitome of 
Western hubris - as i f the US suddenly awoke, looked around, and realised the rest of 
the world was there; seeing poverty, the US quickly scribbled a prescription for its 
eradication, proud of its contribution to the "development discourse". 
Drawing mostly from the history of development efforts in Colombia, Escobar argues 
strongly that, not only was the Western (i.e. First Worid) response to poverty in the so-
called Third World ludicrous in many ways, it was actually harmful to the 
"developmenf of poor countries. With hindsight, it is clear that Escobar's analysis of 
the faults of Western policy is correct on many counts. But its weakness is that he 
scarcely holds the Second World (i.e. the Eastbloc including the USSR and China) to 
account for their own meddling in the Third World during the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, there is some justification for Escobar's scorn for the arrogant, positivist 
approach taken by the US and its allies in its "construction" of a poverty-stricken Third 
World. What Escobar calls the "problematisation of poverty" led to many top-down 
programmes devised by First Worid "lords of poverty" and their client Third World 
"elites" that frustrated rather than aided people's efforts to devise their own solutions to 
hunger and want. Before returning to Escobar's view on Western development and 
food aid efforts, a brief overview of Western activities is helpful. 
32 Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
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Distilling decades of development paradigms 
At the end of WW-U, the US led its allies Britain, France and initially the USSR in the 
establishment of several international institutions which continue to function today. 
One of these was the GATT. Another, the International Monetary Fund" was a global 
lending institution established at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944. The IMF 
was designed to avoid or mitigate future depressions, by acting as the "lender-of-last-
resort" '^^  - a role borne by Britain before its financial depletion in WW-I, Part of the 
reason for the new activist foreign policy after WW-II was recognition that the 1930s' 
Depression and 1940s' world war were partly the result of the US refusal to pick up the 
financial and military burdens Britain had bom before WW-I. 
Another institution envisaged at Bretton Woods was the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO). One of its goals (a forerunner of the similariy doomed New 
International Economic Order or NEEO) was to stabilise worid prices of an array of 
commodity exports from Africa, Asia and Latin America, to ensure "fair" prices to 
these producers. In any event, the ITO was scuttled a few years later, when the US 
Congress rejected the institution as an infringement on US "sovereignty" - the same 
type of argument heard in Washington and London today, from opponents of 
GATT/WTO, NAFTA and the CAP. 
But scuttling the ITO did not mean an utter dearth of international institutions 
concerned with countries outside Europe, North America or the USSR. The United 
Nations was to serve as chief forum for Third World interests, and a nimiber of 
subordinate bodies were created to put UN policy into effect. 
Among bodies that have evolved imder the UN is IFAD, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. Chief UN agency concerned with rural poverty, IFAD has 
approved over 300 development programmes in nearly 100 countries. Although great 
disagreement remains over many aspects of hunger and economic development, a 
surprising degree of consensus exists over the relative success or failure of policies 
William R. Keylor (1984) The Twentieth Century World: pp 276-77. 
Charles P. Kindleberger (1973, 1986) The World in Depression. 1929-1939: pp xv, 289. 
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initiated since aid flows began in earnest after WW-II. According to an IFAD report in 
1992: 
For the past 40 years, development thinking has been dominated by a paradigm in which the 
growth of the overall economy is believed to lead automatically to wealth "trickling down" to the 
poor. 
So extensive was the change in policies from decade to decade, it could be said that 
there was a post-WW-H succession of development paradigms. IFAD^^ depicts the 
parade of development polices or paradigms thus: 
• 1950-early 1960s: "emphasised growth alone as defined by the rate of growth of 
GNP - not GNP per capita, which caught on later." 
• 1950s: Lewis and others "defined the problem as how to achieve growth with an 
unlimited supply of labour". 
• Early 1960s: W.W. Rostow argued that traditional societies needed to acquire 
surplus savings to finance an economic "take-off' into modernity. 
1980s: Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) mandated by the IMF and Worid 
Bank. The 1980s were a "decade lost to developmenf' in Africa, simultaneously hit 
by drought, debt and SAPs - endangering human capital. According to Shaw & Clay 
unanticipated needs in the former-USSR meant, "Food aid is therefore more needed 
now than it was three decades ago when the WFP first began operations."" Hans 
Singer, sometimes called the father of food aid, certainly agrees with the assessment 
of IFAD (1992: p 10) that, "food aid is being viewed by recipients as an important 
source of development finance."^^ 
Lana Hall claims that proceeds from PL 480 wheat sold in Brazil were used effectively 
in supporting indigenous wheat price supports in Brazil. Hall says this increased farmer 
and consumer welfare in Brazil; the chief downside was displacement of commercial 
^'IFAD (1992) IFAD: The State of Rural Poverty: An Inquiry into Its Causes and Consequences. 
By Idriss Jazairy, Mohiuddin Alamgir and Theresa Panuccio. 
IFAD (1992): The State of Rural Poverty, pp 5-25. 36 
" Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid, p 7) 
^*IFAD (1992). 
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imports.^^ In contrast, Arme Thomson shows the disincentive effects to farmers, and 
the sporadic nature of PL 480 wheat shipments to Egypt, until they were doubled in the 
Carter administration, as a political precondition to Egypt's peace agreement with Israel 
in 1979.'*° It seems likely that Hans Singer and IFAD would approve of specific PL 
480 effects in Brazil more than in Egypt. 
More generally, IFAD criticised outmoded western prescriptions that expected all so-
called traditional societies to follow the same development path - regardless of their 
starting point. This notion is particularly galling to critics like Arturo Escobar, with 
their concern for the sanctity of the cultural heritage of developing countries. 
Variants on domiiiant paradigms 
In the section below, citations from IFAD and Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs 
demonstrate a marked consensus on what were the variants on the dominant paradigm. 
• 1950s and 1960s: "import substitution": rapid industrialisation with infant 
industries protected by high tariffs, popular in Latin America, Pakistan, etc.'" 
Unfortunately, not only did many of these inefficient industries produce negative 
value-added''^, but they also sacrificed rural development and exacerbated rural-to-
urban migration, which reached 3-4% annually during the 1970s in Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia, and nearly 4% in Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Although "mega-cities" 
such as Calcutta grew in India, the country's relative success in the rural Green and 
White Revolutions may have mitigated such urban cancer. Countries employing 
import substitution almost to the point of autarky include China until the 1970s and 
Albania until recently. (See previous chapter) 
• 1960s and 1970s: "export-led growth": successfully followed by the "Asian tigers" 
such as Taiwan, Korea (ROK), Singapore, Hong Kong and to some extent, Indonesia 
and Malaysia. William Greider'^ ^ and Robert Gilpin'*'* note that most Asian Tigers 
Lana L , Hall (1980) "Evaluating effects of PL 480 wheat imports on Brazil's grain sector" in American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 62; pp 19-28. 
'^ Anne Thomson (August, 1985) "Egypt: Food security and food diA" m Food Policy, pp 178-186. 
"'Lewis (1968);Dorosh& Valdes (1990). 
Soligo & Stem (1965) 
William Greider (1997) One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism, p 199. 
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benefited from US Cold War strategy, which opened American markets to their 
goods, and supplied them with generous aid of all kinds. IFAD'*^ agrees that massive 
aid helped, although this international institution naturally avoids explicit references 
to Cold War politics, concentrating on successful policies such as land reform, in its 
assessment of aid paradigms. Interestingly, most of these "tigers" adopted, led by 
Japan (the chief US client in the region), capitalist economies. Several were 
characterised by a strong "overseas-Chinese" business class that was instrumental in 
their growth and, perhaps, international trade connections. Land reform (along with 
US aid) was crucial to political stability and rapid economic development in the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan. 
• 1950s-1980s: "state-led growth": As mentioned in the previous chapter, Nehru's 
fixation on central planning in the USSR led to a similar development paradigm in 
India and the region. The IFAD report notes: "India's second five-year plan was 
famous for its emphasis on heavy industries under public sector management. 
Pakistan's second, third and fourth five year plans were [marked by]...a low 
allocation for agriculture and...the private sector."^^ 
In 1978-81 just before the Reaganite-Thatcherite doctrine of privatisation swept the 
world many countries in "the South" had preponderant public sectors: Algeria (68%), 
Burma (Myanmar) (61%), Zambia (61%), Bangladesh (41%), Ivory Coast (40%), 
Ethiopia (37%), India (33%), Pakistan (45%) and Venezuela (36%).*^ The burden of 
state-led policies upon the rural population is illustrated by the case of Ghana where 
direct and indirect taxes accounted for nearly two-thirds of value added in the 1970s.'** 
Over time, the negative effect of state-led growth policies became apparent, but fears of 
rising urban unemployment kept many of them in place. It was not until the early 1990s 
that Indian Prime Minister Rao began to reverse policy, and privatise some state 
industries - an important landmark in Third World economic trends. 
Robert Gilpin (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. 
IFAD (1992) The State of Rural Poverty: p 11. 
'^IFAD (1992): p 11. 
World Bank (1983). 
"^IFAD (1992): p 12. 
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• 1970s: Basic needs: Jeffrey Sachs writes: 
In the 1960s, the fad at the World Bank and among many donors was "development 
planning". In the 1970s, this gave way to "basic needs", a doctrine which led the Worid 
Bank to back the socialist strategies of soon-to-be bankrupt Tanzania and other non-
market economies.'*^ 
F A D calls basic needs one of the "challenges to the dominant paradigm"^° whose 
assumption that poverty would be ameliorated by top-down growth of GNP was in 
disrepute. The basic needs approach added some social engineering aspects to earlier 
approaches that put all their trust in economic growth without regard to distribution. As 
popularised by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), basic needs plans taxed the 
rich above certain income levels, and redistributed it in food, clothing, etc. to the poor. 
It was partly successful in India, where about 3% of rural employment came to be 
funded by the Employment Guarantee Scheme of Maharashtra in 1984-85. But basic 
needs plans were not the final answer for any country. According to IFAD: 
For all its merits, this strategy emphasises the consumption needs of the poor, rather 
than their productivity and their capacity to generate a surplus.'' 
This criticism of the neglect of the productive potential of the rural sector by the "basic 
needs" school, would be echoed by sources as far apart as ultra-capitalist Jeffrey Sachs 
and ethnic socialist (for want of a better description) Arturo Escobar. Anderson and 
Tyers^^ criticise basic needs policies i f and when governments set artificially low price 
controls on domestic sales of food, or allow the rural farm sector to stagnate simply 
because cheaper food aid is available. Belying their humanitarian priorities, basic 
needs policies sometimes did more harm than good, by relying upon food aid to meet 
human needs, instead of correcting root economic problems in defective structures or 
prices. 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s 
A return to the basics of neoclassical economics (with a reemphasis, at least, upon the 
importance of minimising both government budget deficits and inflation) became the 
dominant paradigm of the 1980s. By 1982 many i f not most Third Worid countries 
Jeffirey Sachs (June 29, 1996) "Growth in Afiica: it can be done" in The Economist: pp 25-27; fi-om 
Sachs and Andrew Warner "Sources of Slow Growth in the African Economies" (February, 1996). 
Harvard Institute for Economic Development. 
'" IFAD (1992) JTie State of Rural Poverty: p 12. 
" I F A D (1992): p 12. 
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could no longer avoid debt problems that had been mounting over the years.^ ^ The 
largess that followed the first and second OPEC oil embargoes had spawned billions of 
petrodollars in loans from OPEC countries to developing nations, and even though 
many of these loans were on "soft" terms, they added to the already burdensome debt of 
many. More to the point, the conservative economic philosophies of the Reagan and 
Thatcher administrations - essentially hostile to socialist planning - had a ripple effect 
that spread to the Worid Bank, the IMF and eventually the to UN itself This 
culminated in the replacement of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali of Egypt by 
Gen. Kofi Annan of Ghana whose management record was more acceptable to the US. 
The realisation that decades of top-down, state-managed economic plans had failed, 
meant that more governments of poor countries were ready to "bite the bullet" when the 
World Bank and IMF unveiled the painful SAPs they demanded before they would "roll 
over" these countries' debt. In most instances these involved free market oriented 
policies, such as privatisation of state-owned industries, downsizing of the civil service 
and cuts in subsidised services to citizens. 
Needless to say, these austerity measures were politically unpopular. But few 
governments during the 1980s had the v^ill to resist. Many had to adopt SAPs that 
entailed painful levels of unemployment and underemployment, loss of subsidised food 
and health programmes for women and children and cutbacks in education. While 
many LDCs in Latin America and Asia made halting progress Africa seemed in stasis. 
Good Governance in the 1990s 
The dominant paradigm of the current decade has extended the strict financial 
accounting of SAPs to political accountability. Jeffrey Sachs writes that fhistration 
with earlier paradigms from "development planning", "basic needs" and 1980s-era 
"structural adjustment" has led to an insistence by the IMF and World Bank upon 
goverrmient reform in debtor countries. This is not an abandonment of SAPs, but rather 
an intensification of SAPs, which probably would have been politically impossible to 
impose before the end of the Cold War. 
Anderson & Tyers (1991) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products, pp 2-4. 
" IFAD (1992) The State of Rural Poverty, p 13. 
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Sachs says the 1990s' paradigm shift to "good governance"^'' is well intentioned, but 
remains "deeply flawed." It is too burdensome on poor economies. For example, the 
World Bank set 111 conditions upon Kenya, before granting a recent loan. Under 
1990s-era SAPs, debtor governments are urged to reduce external debt and domestic 
budget deficits. This is being done through yet more cuts in subsidised services, the 
imposition of new taxes and user fees and greater transparency in customs 
administration (thus becoming more receptive to imports) - along with the privatisation 
of state enterprises and civil service reforms which were already underway. 
The IMF's obsession with price stability blinds it to all else, according to Sachs. Poor 
economies that could be growing at 5% a year, are held to only 1-2% annually because 
of the bank's unreasonable fear of inflation. Of 53 countries in Africa, only Botswana, 
Mauritius and Uganda have enjoyed such healthy growth, since the end of the Cold 
War. In the years 1980-88, Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole suffered with GDP growth 
of just 1.5% - compared to the healthy GDP growth of 5.7% enjoyed by India, despite 
its own serious drought in 1987.^ ^ Although Sachs believes SAPs have a purging effect 
on some governments, he urged debt relief for the poorest countries to mitigate hunger 
to the "human capital" of women, children, etc. Fortunately, an interim package of debt 
relief for several poor countries, in and out of Africa, was agreed in late 1996. 
Hans Singer and food aid for SAPs 
Before we go on, it is worth noting again that SAPs may rehabilitate the somewhat 
tarnished role of food aid. Hans Singer continues as figurehead for a group of 
practitioners (including Shaw and Clay and James Ingram of the WFP) who advocate 
the use of food aid to ease the plight of poor countries vmdergoing structural adjustment. 
Invoking the concept of "additionality"^^ developed in his 1978 WFP study. Singer is in 
full agreement with John W. Mellor that "donors must supply large amounts", entailing 
a net supply larger than before aid began - while recipients must give priority to their 
own farmers and minimise disincentives to them.^ ^ 
Sachs & Warner (1996) "Sources of Slow Growth in the Afiican Economies" in The Economist. 
" Economist Book of Vital World Statistics (1990): pp 44-45. 
Hans Singer (1978) WFP study. 
" Clay & Shaw (1987) Poverty. Development and Food: pp 187-88. More on John Mellor's conditions 
for programme aid below. 
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In the case of SSA, Singer identified nine different ways that food aid could help ease 
SAPs.^ * Recognising the danger of food aid, as a disincentive to indigenous farmers. 
Singer nevertheless claims that, "the real limit is not aid capacity, but absorptive 
capacity. Further, Singer maintains there is a need: 
for additional food aid, subject to assurance that food aid helps to provide incentives for 
increased local production and physical and human investment in recipient countries." 
The food (obtained from western donors, or triangular transactions from other Third 
World countries in surplus) can be sold by recipient governments to supplement their 
budgets, or simply to fight hunger among their citizens. Triangular transactions do 
evaporate suspicion that food aid is just a cover-up for western surplus disposal; 
unfortunately, triangular transactions in Africa foundered during the 1980s droughts. 
Clay and Benson write that, from 1983 to 1988, triangular cereals aid purchases or 
trilateral exchanges rose from under 500,000 tonnes to nearly 1.2 million tonnes - from 
4.5% to 8.9% of total cereals food aid.^ Triangular, local food aid operations can 
sometimes be more cost-efficient and timely that aid from the US or EU. However, 
even today, triangular trade still accounts for the minority of food aid sources although 
most experts agree world food security could be enhanced by expanding triangular 
operations among poor countries. 
That many debtor countries could utilise assistance seems plain, but always the 
doubters raise these questions about food aid: Will aid be a disincentive to local 
farmers? Will it disrupt previous trade arrangements? Will it create dependence ?^^ 
The pitfalls of food aid are in difficult balance with its potential. 
Susan George outlines three conflicting paradigms 
Susan George^^ identifies three main paradigms of hunger and development: (1) "trickle 
down" with benefits emanating from entrepreneurs and modernising elites which may 
correlate to the views of the IMF and Worid Bank; (2) "dependency theory" of a centre 
'*Hans Singer (1991) Food aid & structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa: p 127. 
" Hans Singer (1991): p 140. 
^ Edward Clay & Charlotte Benson (February 1990) "Aid for food - Acquisition of commodities in 
developing countries for food aid in the 1980s", in Food Policy . pp 27-43, 39. Several shipments 
promised by SSA countries (e.g. Zimbabwe to Mozambique) were cancelled due to drought. Their 
commitments were made up mostly by the US and E E C . 
Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid: p 1. 
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(or "core", as Wallerstein would call the US) and periphery of the Third World, that has 
been consistently exploited since colonial times. As George describes it, dependency 
theory seems fairly consistent with Arturo Escobar's view of the "development 
discourse". (3) Beyond the second model lies "class analysis" that appears more 
Marxist than Escobar's rather anthropological (or postmodern) woridview. 
George says that because the NIEO is incomplete, First-Third World relations (in which 
IC elites support LDC elites, aka compradores) will be characterised by conflict, not 
harmony. George calls for economic independence and "empowermenf' rather than 
interdependence or integration of LDCs into the global economy. She is not alone in 
calling for fairer pricing of food commodities through formation of a new international 
economic order for food. Indeed, a "fair trade" arrangement between companies in the 
US and Europe and consortia of coffee coops in Latin America and Africa, are helping 
some small growers. But, prospects for an effective global food cartel (or NEMO) 
seem nil when, as William Greider points out, the OPEC oil cartel, a similar 
organisation (but with far fewer suppliers) "struggles constantly" to enforce production 
and price controls for oil - a commodity much scarcer than food.^ 
Upshot of the paradigm parade 
Summing up the cornucopia of aid and development paradigms from WW-EI until the 
end of the Cold War, and examples of national development plans spawned by them, it 
seems apparent that, whatever the particular emphasis of each country's economic plan, 
a common assumption of most planners was that the benefits of centrally-planned, 
urban-based, heavy industries would "trickle down" through all economic quintiles of 
their societies, eventually helping even the rural poor. Virtually all these plans could be 
characterised as "top down". The dominance of this top down philosophy had become 
thoroughly passe by the 1990s. With its greater emphasis on rural development, 
including the alleviation of poverty, education and empowerment of women, the new 
Susan George (1984) III Fares the Land: p 100. 
Economist (February 1, 1997) "Coffee: green as in greenbacks": p 62. Companies like CafeDirect in 
the UK, Max Havelaar in Europe and Equal Exchange in the US guarantee a premium over worid prices 
to, e.g. Coocafe, a consortium of small coops in Costa Rica. Fairer prices help growers shift to organic 
coffee, favoured by customers of the quickly growing chain (8 to 1050 shops in a decade) of Seattle-based 
Starbucks coffee-houses. N.B. Most trendy customers demand real milk in their cappuccinos. 
^William Greider (1997) One World Ready or Not: p 185. 
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paradigm might be called "trickle up".^ ^ This thesis argues that India's White 
Revolution programme Operation Flood bears such positive "trickle-up" characteristics. 
It is my opinion that many countries which suffered under the colonial rule of capitalist 
European powers, further blamed laissez-faire capitalism along with an attendant, 
inimical imperialism, for their laggard development. This is understandable. Many 
were influenced by Lenin's identification of imperialism as the last logical stage of 
capitalism and expected that capitalism would naturally give way to socialism upon 
national independence. In short. Third World planners generally did not reckon with 
the variety of capitalistic economies that dotted the world, from near-/amez faire US to 
socially-democratic Sweden, nor did they (or anyone else) apprehend the versatility 
capitalism could manifest in reforming itself Up until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 and successive dismantling of the USSR and Eastbloc Comecon coimtries, such 
remarks may have seemed extreme. No more. Denis MacShane, a British labour MP 
and metalworkers union official summed up the post-Cold War outlook: 
For years socialists used to argue among ourselves about what kind of socialism we 
wanted. The choice of the left is no longer what kind of sociaUsm it wants, but what 
kind of capitalism it can support.^ 
In any event, the rejection of the capitalist model fostered an over-reliance upon central 
platming. It could be argued, in hindsight, that this retarded economic growth. 
However, there is more to development than simple economics. Politics - and 
development - is the art of the possible. In fact, putting a certain ideological face upon 
policies, which may in fact be quite different, may be the most politically palatable 
means to bring about possible development. 
Examples that spring to mind include Lenin's adoption of the new Economic Policy 
(NEP), to boost Russian food production in the 1920s, and Deng Xiaoping's 
liberalisation of small plot food production in post-Mao China. Both of these market-
oriented policies were portrayed as helping to build socialism. In the capitalist camp, 
examples of socialistic measures portrayed as augmenting capitalistic free enterprise 
include Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and John Kennedy's Medicare plan. 
" IFAD (1992) The State of Rural Poverty: pp 22-23. 
^ WilUam Greider (1997) One World Ready or Not: p 36. 
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Many developing nations have been criticised for the extent they turned their backs on 
political and commercial relations with their former colonisers. However, it could 
equally be argued that a temporary rejection of capitalism, in favour of at least nominal 
self-reliance on central planning ( i f not state-led grov^^h) was a valuable periods of 
nation-building. This may have fulfilled a collective desire to punish foreign 
companies that were identified with colonialism as infant industries took their place, 
sfrengthening national identity and morale. Some economic output was probably lost, 
but may have been justified by the purging process accorded the political system. 
However, the dramatic extent to which this anti-capitalist, anti-foreign trade attitude has 
evolved is well-illustrated by post-apartheid South Afiica, whose President Nelson 
Mandela has been actively campaigning for the return of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by multinationals (MNCs) such as Ford Motor Company. Greider writes that 
today, developing countries from Malaysia to Paraguay are clamouring for investment 
from MNCs like Motorola. (In fact, one of Greider's chief concerns is that MNCs are 
able to blackmail countries into the same sort of concessions, e.g. on labour and tax 
law, that Third World plarmers spumed when they exiled such firms, shortly after 
independence.) 
But, whatever the various faces that Third World countries put upon their policies, the 
ubiquity of one factor in their development equations is remarkable: food aid. The 
post-WW-II legacy of food aid is, along with Western influence and technical advice in 
poor country economic planning, excoriated by Arturo Escobar. Let us now turn to 
Escobar's analysis. 
Escobar's radical repudiation of Northern development efforts 
Arturo Escobar's book^' does for post-WW n development in toto what Shanti 
George's eponymous volume^^ did for the Operation Flood dairy programme in India. 
Although they freat different levels (global versus national), both books are thorough 
critiques of "First Worid" development strategy, which had such questionable influence 
in the "Third Worid". 
Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World.. 
Shanti George (1985) Operation Flood. 
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While George was concerned primarily with the mismanagement of dairy development 
in India, Escobar addresses mismanagement of "development" by the First Worid in the 
Third World, drawing evidence for his claims from the post-WW n to present 
experience of Colombia. What distinguishes the approach of Escobar, is his attempt to 
assess the North's policies in the South in terms of anthropology and postmodernism. 
Although this approach is not alien to Shanti George's book of a decade before, 
Escobar goes even further. He argues against the very term "sustainable development". 
Like George, Escobar spares no effort in criticising misjudgements of the North (e.g. 
overlooking the fact that White or Green Revolution programmes founder when the cost 
of inputs is too high, peasants have inadequate access to credit, or irrigation systems are 
in disrepair). But it seems to me that such issues (whether in Colombia or elsewhere) 
are in fact everyday, empirical questions resolvable by "rational decision makers", i.e. 
peasants fully capable of assessing probable cost-benefit outcomes of new initiatives. 
Escobar's blanket criticism of the Green Revolution is as flawed as saying fractors are 
worthless - simply because someone forgot to put oil in the motor. The shortcomings of 
poor country development invite practical solutions such as the introduction of a 
Grameen Bank system^', or the fraining of tractor mechanics in preventive 
maintenance, rather than a blanket repudiation of hybrid seeds. On the other hand, 
Escobar is correct to point out the rational decision making of Colombian peasants' 
refusal to comply with ill-conceived development schemes, etc. This is reminiscent of 
the reluctance of Indian small farmers to switch to Friesian cross-breds which as the 
farmers suspected were maladapted to climate, fodder and disease conditions of India. 
Like Shanti George, Escobar properly deplores Northern hubris of the post-WW-H era 
which discounted the local knowledge and value of the traditional sector of Third 
World societies attempting to develop into modernity. This was a basic flaw of 1950s' 
paradigm top-down, capital-reliant models spawned by Arthur Lewis and Walt W. 
Sue Wheat (January 29, 1997) 'Banking on a better future" in The Guardian. Since the Grameen 
("village") Bank was formally established by economist Prof Mohammad Yunus in 1983, its "micro-
financing" has spread to 1.8 m poor borrowers in 22,000 out of 68,000 villages in Bangladesh, lending 
$30m monthly. When the Grameen concept was discussed at the World Microcredit Summit in 
Washington, DC, in January 1997, experts warned that NGOs manage microcredit better than the public 
sector where political elites often co-opt credit. The Worid Bank estimates a $2.5b portfolio of 16 million 
borrowers in LDCs. 
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Rostow. This contrasts with the "new" 1990s paradigm extolling the bottom-up 
development potential of rural sectors as promulgated by IFAD. As incriminating 
evidence of the North's blithe disregard for non-western creeds, institutions and 
philosophies, Escobar cites a 1951 UN document recommending that old relations 
between these factors must be "scrapped...to pay the full price of economic progress. 
In other words, to gain modem world status, the Third Worid must lose its own soul. 
Such neglect of Third World culture, and links to traditional agriculture, have now been 
soundly repudiated by development institutions such as the UN's International Fund for 
Agricdtural Development (IFAD).^' Four decades of evidence suggest that rural 
development is necessary not just to bring lower quintiles of Third World societies into 
so-called modernity, but the evidence also suggests that the overall national economic 
growth might actually be led by rural agriculture and non-farm small manufacturing, 
services, etc. This may be the best development option for countries that cannot depend 
on export-led growth (pursued by Korea, Taiwan, etc.) to launch them out of poverty. 
Escobar appears in agreement with such a "bottom-up" prescription - even though he 
thoroughly castigates the North's mismanaged efforts at "integrated rural development" 
in Colombia (where it was known by its Spanish acronym DRI) and elsewhere. 
Obviously the North made sweeping errors in its analysis of poorer societies. In many 
cases it exacerbated economic problems by misdiagnosing them, misprescribing 
solutions and doing actual harm to suffering economies. As mentioned above, where 
Escobar goes further than Shanti George, or Edward Said'^ is in his use of 
anthropological and post-modem analysis of the post-WW-II development era. Escobar 
employs the jargon of postmodernism, e.g.: construct, deconstruct, discourse, 
reconstruct, representation, text, etc.^ ^ Unfortimately, Escobar's "poststmcturalist" 
lexicon serves better to obfuscate than illuminate the facts of post-WW-H development 
history. 
™ UN Deptartment of Social & Economic Affairs (1951) Measures for the Economic Development of 
Underdeveloped Countries. 
IFAD (1992) The State of Rural Poverty: pp 5-25. 
''^  Edward Said (1993) Culture and Imperialism. 
Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: p vii). 
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Escobar is correct that during the structural adjustments of the 1980s, many poor 
coimtries suffered negative growth. But in his zeal to apply postmodern analysis to the 
post-WW-II era, he ignores empirical evidence that important basic indicators, such as 
life expectancy at birth, infant and maternal mortality, and adult literacy and female 
literacy have improved measurably in the period 1970-1990.^ '* And Escobar invites the 
question as to whether he might better suggest reforms of the current paradigm of 
"sustainable developmenf, rather than abandoning such efforts altogether - or just 
changing the lexicon. 
This is not to say that Escobar's approach is totally fhiitless. Deconstructing the 
mindset of the North as it "problematisised" the poverty of the South is empowering for 
Southern peoples emerging from the chains of a colonialist mindset. Divesting 
Northerners of false, preening ethnocentrism is equally worthwhile. In Escobar's most 
promising use of the tools of postmodernism, he invokes James Ferguson. It is useful to 
quote both Escobar and his citation of Ferguson at length here: 
The Instrument-Effects of Development Projects 
In his study of the development apparatus in Lesotho, James Ferguson (1990: pp 251-
77) retakes [Michel] Foucault's question of the "instrument-effects" of political 
technologies such as the prison or, in our case, rural development. Ferguson's basic 
contention is that even if rural development projects in Lesotho were for the most part a 
failure, their side effects - or better, instrument-effects - nevertheless had far-reaching 
consequences for the communities involved. Like the prison in Foucault's case - which 
fails in terms of its explicit objective of reforming the criminal and yet succeeds in 
producing a normalised, discipUned society - the development apparatus shows remark-
able productivity: not only does it contribute to the further entrenchment of the state, it 
also depoliticises the problems of poverty that it is supposed to solve." 
It may be that what is most important about a "development" project is not so much 
what it fails to do but what it does do...The "instrument-effect," then, is two-fold: 
alongside the institutional effect of expanding bureaucratic state power is the 
conceptual or ideological effect of depoliticising both poverty and the state, .ff the 
"instrument-effects" of a "development" project end up forming any kind of 
strategically coherent or intelligible whole, this it: the anti-politics machine.^ ^ 
(James Ferguson 1990. The Anti-Politics Machine: p 256) 
Foucault's insight into the practical utility of prisons is useful - even i f it ignores the 
empirical fact that citizens generally demand incarceration of criminals, regardless of 
74 
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World Bank Development Report (1993): pp 300-301; 238-239; 294-295. 
Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: p 143. 
James Ferguson (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development. Depolitization. and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho: p 256. 
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whether or not criminologists insist that the purpose of prison is rehabihtation, not 
punishment. 
Escobar is probably correct that the "instrument-effects" of Integrated Rural 
Development strategies in Colombia (known by the acronym DRI) succeeded somewhat 
in depoliticising the economically subordinate position of Colombian peasants to their 
government, and to the development practitioners from the North. In plain words, this 
amounts to convincing peasants that their poverty is the result of their social or 
technical backwardness - not the fault of their government or rich country imperialism. 
In plainer words, it amounts to "blaming the victim". Escobar argues that this served 
Northern interests by defusing Colombia's resentment at its subordinate economic and 
political relationship to the North, while relieving Northern guilt or responsibility for 
the South's unhappy position.) Escobar makes much of the perception that First- and 
Third World development matrix entailed role-playing, similar to the construction of a 
doctor-patient relationship. 
But this is not to deny that Colombia suffered economic ills that could be helped by 
Northern intervention - or at least aid. After all, an egotistical doctor can be just as 
helpful as an egalitarian doctor during a plague. In fact, this thesis argues that some 
development programmes such as Operation Flood in India, likely had positive 
"instrument effects". Such development initiatives, whatever the flaws in their design 
and execution, improved morale of target groups, while suppressing some obstacles to 
development (e.g. perhaps by removing rent-seeking middlemen from the Indian milk 
trade, while improving dairy farmer profits and long-term economic security), and 
generally increased chances that the rural economy improved. 
What is most disappointing about Escobar's book is that, after committing page after 
page to the deconstruction of the Weltanshauung and motives behind First World 
"development" constructs in the Third World, Escobar barely hints at the fundamental 
reasons why Colombia did not vault into modernity as fast as naive planners hoped in 
the 1950s. (Escobar ignores empirical evidence suggesting relative success in 
Colombia: according to IFAD, the percentage of the rural population in poverty fell 
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from 54% in 1965 to 45% in 1980.^' I suspect the pace of rural development in 
Colombia would have been even faster, i f direct and indirect taxation of the agriculture 
sector in the 1970s not been as high as 40%.^* Some might argue that this high tax rate 
was justified if it was levied on foreign- MNC- owned coffee plantations that funnelled 
profits overseas instead of reinvesting in Colombia. That is a good argument, but it 
might also be argued that more profits from coffee growing would have been reinvested 
in Colombia i f the tax rate were lower. 
Unlike South Korea (ROK) and Taiwan, whose post-WW-II development benefited 
from land reform (as well as open US markets for their "export led growth") Colombia 
never underwent meaningfiil land redistribution. Absence of land reform may well be 
the most fimdamental reason for Colombia's halting, sectorally-skewed progress. 
Escobar writes that by the second phase of Colombia's development efforts (DRI: 1982-
89): 
...the focus shifted...to commercialisation of peasant food crops...//?e surrogate for 
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land redistribution." 
The implication is that all the stages of Colombia's development programmes including 
the incorporation and new "visibility" of peasants, women and the environment into 
what began as a top-down "big push" development strategy were just so much window 
dressing. 
What Escobar admits but does not dwell on is that Colombia's development was still-
bom because land reform was never achieved. On the contrary, the 1970s in Colombia 
on 
witnessed, " Increased displacement of the peasantry from their land..." Instead of 
assigning blame for Colombia's malaise on the lack of land reform, Escobar confiises 
the development debate, by belabouring flaws in the constructed world-views of the 
North. 
Escobar's book could have been more successful i f it had concentrated on Foucault's 
concept of instrument-effects of the post-WW n aid and development regime. Akin to 
IF AD (1992) The State of Rural Poverty, p 6-7. 
IF AD (1992). p 10. 
^ Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: p 140. 
^"Arturo Escobar (1995); p 130. 
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Foucault's examination of prisons, Escobar might better have asked the following 
questions: 
Was the post-WW-II "problematisation of poverty by the First World simply an 
attempt to lock the newly-constructed Third World into powerlessness, while it 
waged Cold War against the socialist Second World? 
To the extent that the North held back the South, were all the instruments of the First 
World/North equally culpable? What were the roles of the UN, FAO, WFO, 
UNCTAD & UNICEF, IFAD and other institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, 
churches and NGOs? Were any heroes among the villains? Does Escobar see any 
hope for reform of North-South relations in recent admissions by officials in the 
World Bank^', IFAD, etc. that many previous programmes were flawed? 
• In what ways has the recent Uruguay GATT settlement exacerbated or ameliorated 
Third World prospects? 
Escobar is loath to acknowledge the benefits to Third World agricultural exporters from 
EU and US cuts to internal farm subsidies and export subsidies that were mandated by 
GATT-1994. His claim that First World import barriers to Third World commodity 
imports remain too high is probably correct. Fortunately, GATT-1994 specifies that the 
tariffs on food imports by even "Fortress Europe" will be gradually lowered in coming 
years. Published the year after the historic agreement, Escobar's book Encounterins 
Development failed to reckon with the most important potential boon to Third World 
terms of trade in decades. 
Escobar is on firmer ground when he criticises the harm that the multi-fibre agreement 
(MFA) does to textile exporters like Bangladesh. Even free marketeers like Jeffrey 
Sachs advocate special tariff reductions for the poorest exporters in Africa and 
elsewhere, through extension of agreements like the MFA and Lome Conventions.^^ 
Geoffrey Lamb, head of UK branch of the World Bank, freely admitted to past mistakes, in a talk at 
Durham University Geography Dept. in 1994. But Lamb (just days before a debate with Susan George at 
the London School of Economics) restated that the World Bank could positively affect poor country 
development, and resolved to improve Bank performance in future. 
*^  Jeffrey Sachs (June 29, 1996) Economist: pp 25-27. 
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As was discussed in the section on biotechnology and TRIPs in Chapter 1, Escobar's 
wariness over First World intellectual and patent rights on new hybrid seeds, etc., under 
new GATTAVTO rules may have some basis. Clearly, agribusiness should be a focus 
of GATTAVTO monitoring to ensure that Northern biotech does not subtract from 
Southern development. But on the whole. Encountering Development misses such real-
world caveats. Escobar prefaces his book, by explaining that. 
it grew out of a sense of puzzlement that for many years the industrialised nations of 
North America and Europe were supposed to be the indubitable models for the societies 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the so-called Third World, and that those societies 
must catch up with the industrialised countries, perhaps even become like them. 
This 1940s-vintage paradigm is now as outdated as the idea that the sun revolves 
around the earth. It is a paper tiger, a straw man, demolished by Escobar as effortlessly 
as some of the mistaken practices (e.g. the use of frail Northern cattle breeds unsuited 
to hostile Southern climes) exposed by Shanti George in Operation Flood. As noted 
above, even the World Bank admits to many failures, e.g. environmentally harmful 
dams and other misplaced infrastructure p r o j e c t s . B u t Escobar's tirades on the 
semiotics of terms like "Third World" and "sustainable development" in Latin America, 
seem irrelevant in the context of rising growth - with equitable distribution - in many 
Asian economies. He seeks more to assign blame than to uncover solutions - surely a 
destructive approach. What brings ultimate consternation with Escobar is his admission 
that that, "there are no grand alternatives"^ to the present paradigm of sustainable 
development. Nor does he see an alternative to Castells and Lasema's assertion that 
the answer to Third Worid stasis is: 
. . .a policy capable of articulating social reform with technological modernisation in the 
context of democracy and competitive participation in the worid economy.*' 
Furthermore, Escobar admits to widespread desire for the fruits of modernity (e.g. 
improved communications) among people in the South. Not only do indigenous people 
avail themselves of its information and entertainment, but it can also be put to practical 
use. Escobar is forced to admit that "cyberculture" has, ironically, helped some Indians 
stave o f f commercial encroachment in the Amazon rain forest. 
Geoffrey Lamb (1994) Of the World Bank, in aforementioned talk at Durham University. 
" Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development p 222. 
^' Castells and Lasema (1989); p 16. 
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Escobar's next book would be more fruitful i f it explored such examples of "hybrid 
cultures and postdevelopment" infroduced late in this book.^ ^ That process is already in 
ful l swing. It is the natural state of humanity. Just as the Third World has accepted 
transistor radios (invented in the First World, developed and marketed from Asia), the 
First World increasingly accepts Third World foods (curries, salsas, etc.), fashions 
(clothes, dance and music) and new technology (e.g. the Walkman from Japan; banking 
computer software, and patents in two-sfroke engine design from India). In fact the 
new mini-car from German-Anglo firm Rover will be built in Britain - with motors 
from South America.*^ It makes less and less sense to talk about First, Second and 
Third Worlds in such a dynamic international frading milieu. As William Greider 
points out it is increasingly international capital (not governments) that determines 
where and how development takes place, under present GATTAVTO rules.^ ^ 
Summing up Escobar's analysis 
In Encountering Development Escobar infroduced Foucaultian analysis to the 
succession of post-WW I I development paradigms. He deconstructs the First World's 
development apparatus as freely as an anthropologist analyses a "primitive" society far 
from the metropole (but he does not even intimate that development in the so-called 
rich countries of Europe and North America has also come at a cost to tradition and 
cultural heritage). Escobar breaks no new grotmd when he argues that the First 
World/North/core dominates the Third Worid/South/periphery. Nor does he prove that 
the "instrument-effects" of the development regime, including food aid, are either 
consciously planned, ill-intentioned - or always harmful to development. 
One hopes that, given the new post-Uruguay GATT world, Escobar will switch his 
attention from the mistakes of the last four decades, to critiquing the articles of the 
Uruguay accords, and monitoring the judgements of the WTO. 
Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development: pp 217-222. 
BBC Radio 2 (October 1, 1996). 
William Greider (1997) One World Ready or Not: pp 256-265, 257. Greider is persuasive in his 
portrayal of the subordination of MNCs such as GM and IBM - and even governments - to uninhibited 
capital movements permitted by the GATT/WTO. But Grieder says that if governments acted in concert 
they could improve their situation. Few economists believe international ought to be as strictly controlled 
as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, but there is scope for reforms under the WTO, e.g. a minuscule "exit-
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Because Escobar is too narrow in his approach to development issues, his analysis is 
unduly pessimistic. This thesis expects that truly fair trade (along with the outlawing of 
unfair labour practises and, perhaps, scurrilous manipulation of capital flows) - would 
assist construction of an equitable hybrid world culture that enriches the poor along 
with the rich. Of course the road to development will not be smooth for many poor 
countries, just as it was not smooth for others in the past. 
Because Arturo Escobar's critique of post-WW-H development efforts is so utterly 
disdainful, it is apt to elicit the maximum amount of consensus from those who have 
been let down by the institutions of development. Because Escobar carries the banner 
for such widespread disgruntlement, this thesis is forced to respond to his analysis. 
In the end, Escobar's viewpoint offers little of concrete value to the nuts and bolts 
practicalities of dairy development. Faced with a real worid choice between, say 
buying high-tech refrigerated railway cars for milk transport to city dairies, or medium-
tech feeder plants for local processing of milk, Escobar seems likely to postpone the 
decision while brooding on the Western fixation on stainless steel equipment, instead. 
The useful critiques of Cathie, Clay & Stokke, Marchione, Hellinger and others 
While Cathie's arguments for "untied financial aid" are persuasive in some respects, 
they may be impractical for several reasons overall^'. Cathie is certainly correct that 
food aid can interfere with recipient country agriculture. However, rich country food 
surpluses were a fact of Cold War politics, and the art of the matter was to dispose of 
this aid in kind in as utilitarian a manner as possible. This is not to say that Cathie's 
analysis of the shortcomings of food aid was not valuable. I f his suggestions were 
faithfully executed. Third World growth would reach "take o f f ' in short order. 
However, the likelihood is that cash aid is even more apt than commodity aid to be 
misdirected, except in the best of conditions and controls. 
and-entry toll" (p 257) of far less than 1% as proposed by Yale economist James Tobin, to act as a 
moderator on sudden capital flight as seen recently in Mexico. 
^ John Cathie (1982) ne Political Economy of Food Aid 
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On the other hand, the truths pointed out by Cathie (or food aid practitioners of his 
knowledge and influence) have spawned reform of food aid institutions. It was not long 
after the publication of Cathie's piece that the WFP reacted to the faults of many long-
term programmes, by switching its emphasis to emergency disaster and refugee relief 
Clay & Stokke agree with Cathie that aid "tied to procurement in the donor country"^ 
can compotmd the negative effects on the overall economies of recipient countries. 
Doombos et al acknowledge that EEC dairy aid to Operation Flood might possibly be 
some evidence that purchases of equipment from Europe are tied to dairy aid.^' But 
M.V. Kamath indicates the high degree of autonomy used by OF officials in selecting 
equipment for the programme.: Kamath writes that early aid from New Zealand came 
with "no strings"'^, and that Denmark provided India with the world's first SMP dryer 
for buffalo milk - thus raising potential for Indian dairy self-sufficiency. In brief, 
although this thesis is aware of some government and commercial attempts to sway 
Indian dairy policies in their own favour, there is little evidence that tied-aid 
arrangements held back India's dairy economy. On the contrary; diligent OF officials 
usually drove a hard bargain in favour of their country. Operation Flood manager Dr. 
V. Kurien in fact claimed that it was possible to manufacture all processing equipment 
in I n d i a . M . V . Kamath notes that Operation Flood was responsible for the flowering 
of several domestic companies to produce and install dairy plants, and as for cattle feed 
plants, he writes: 
Indeed, the import content in total machinery value of cattle feed plants was reduced 
from 100% in 1965 to zero in 1980! 
The same cannot be easily said about the role of wheat and attendant purchases of 
milling machinery in Nigeria."* Thus on at least some development counts, OF 
measures up rather well - in this case generating vertical linkages, all the way from rural 
producers to the makers of capital-intensive urban-biased milk processing equipment in 
India. 
Clay & Stokke (1991) Food Aid Reconsidered, p 6, pp 1-36. 
Martin Doombos et al (1990) Dairy Aid and Development, p 71. 
M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien-Style: the Story of the White Revolution: p 95. 
M.V. Kamath (1989): pp 168, 321. Other sources have conjectured that Indian manufacturers copied 
imports, with scant regard for patent law. 
Gunilla Andra; & Bjom Beckman (1985) The Wheat Trap: Bread and Underdevelopment in Nigeria. 
This book strengthens my opinion that although it was a stroke of convenience (owing to the EEC butter 
mountain). Operation Flood was designed from the outset to avoid mistakes made in other food aid 
programmes that were just polite terms for surplus disposal. 
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Returning to the subject of types of aid, certainly cash aid increases recipient autonomy 
in selecting appropriate technology or food commodities for use in development. But, 
Cathie's suggestion that cash aid is superior to food aid may be naive. Cash would 
interfere with domestic farming less than food aid, but there is a greater chance that 
cash aid could be lost to recipient government corruption. This viewpoint is seconded 
by Hellinger et a/" who warn that too much aid can skew development of LDCs whose 
governments lack capacity "to absorb" it. Hellinger prefers small, tailored doses of aid, 
preferably administered by on-the-ground NGOs, rather than "top-down" large-scale 
programmes characteristic of the World Bank's McNamara era (1968-81)."'* 
The sensitive issue of corruption began to be seriously ( i f indirectly) addressed during 
the 1980s. Then the IMF and Worid bank mandated structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPS) upon many LDC governments as a precondition for "rolling over" debts which 
were in arrears. Marchione'" agrees that SAPs stimulated some needed government 
fiscal reforms, but he maintains that net deficit of currency flows from African debtor 
nations establishes the case for debt relief Jeffrey Sachs is one of many agreeing with 
Marchione that the necessary but bitter medicine of SAPs should be followed by a 
panacea of debt relief* Fortunately, progress toward LDC debt relief was made by the 
G-7 in the summer of 1996. 
In contrast to Africa, it must be said that India (especially in the post-Indira Ghandi era) 
has already profited more from SAP-like reforms (e.g. lowering budget deficits and 
inflation; cutting subsidies to state industries), and is better placed to take part in worid 
trade. Partly because India further liberalised its economy under Rao, it can do without 
the debt relief accorded poorer nations. Unlike poorer nations such as Bangladesh, 
India is more autonomous in its development course - partly because India is (by most 
definitions) now a net food exporter. Aid programmes play a smaller part in India's 
" Stephen Hellinger, Douglas Hellinger & Fred M. ©"Regan (1988) Aidfor Just Development: Report on 
the Future of Foreign Assistance. 
Stephen Hellinger (1981): p 25. Hellinger argues persuasively on behalf of NGOs like his own - the 
Development GAP 
Thomas J. Marchione (March, 1996) "The right to food in the post-Cold War era" in Food Policy. 
Marchione was on sabbatical from USAID when this was written for a special issue on nutrition and 
human rights. 
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economy than in many LLDCs. India now has less concern for the illicit largess 
frittered away from large top-down aid programmes typical of the past, than the 
persistent, endemic corruption, that continues to sap all levels of its economy. 
On balance, the outlook for India is not unduly pessimistic. Al l societies have 
problems; most problems are susceptible to reform. Thirty years ago, the US suffered 
corruption (endemic in regional and city governments, e.g. Tennessee and Chicago) of 
the kind that still afflicts politics in India. Today the US situation is not perfect, but 
much improved. The increasing vibrancy of Indian democratic politics (with BJP and 
other parties currently prevailing against the long-ensconced Congress Party) could 
continue to weed out corruption and sfrengthen government institutions. Also, 
compared to the famine scares" and of the 1960s, the outlook for India has improved. 
Much of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was left with less infrastructure (e.g. roads, civil 
service), and more aversion to liberalised domestic markets and free foreign frade, 
compared to India. Jeffrey Sachs says debt relief that helped Germany (1953) and 
Indonesia (1969), and recently extended to Egypt, Poland, etc. - now should be 
extended to SSA. On top of debt relief, Sachs urges America, Europe and Japan to 
make a "New Compact for Africa", involving road-building programmes and 
"guaranteeing open markets for African exports" in Lome-like concessions to "help 
reintegrate Afiica into the world economy. . "100 
As he implores donors to bolster science and technology (especially in public health 
and agro-industry), Sachs sounds firmly on the side of Right-wing development 
theorists such as Peter Bauer who contend that cash crops (not the "basic needs" 
doctrine of now-bankrupt Tanzania) are the way forward for the poorest countries. But 
given current economic problems the opinion is being voiced loudly from Hans Singer 
and other sources that SAPs are in danger of sacrificing too much of the "human 
capital" in developing debtor countries, and that food aid, at least should be deployed to 
safeguard the nutrition and health of their populations. 
Jeffrey Sachs in "Growth in Africa: it can be done" June 29, 1996 Economist: pp 25-27. Sachs, the 
architcect of economic liberalisation in the ex-USSR, was invited to write this article on on Africa. 
^ Paul Ehrlich (1968) The Population Bomh. This book caused much alarm. It did not reckon with 
demographic patterns in which birth rates generally decline as societies develop. 
Jeffrey Sachs (June 29, 1996) Economist. 
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It is understandable that it has taken decades for former colonies (both inside and 
outside Africa) to disentangle the resentments of a colonial past from economic truths. 
Autarky is dead; long live free trade. Countries like India coming to grips with the 
reality of the post-Uruguay GATT era, appear to be on the growth path at last. Jeffrey 
Sachs is not the only writer to believe that Africa need not be far behind. 
Agrostat/FAO & aspects of food aid statistics 
Edward Clay's 1983 article referred to above was complimentary on the reliability of 
EC dairy aid shipments, over time, one of the demands made on donors by John 
Mellor'"' In-line with his general critique of food aid, Cathie's appreciation was 
grudging, but measured: 
The EC commitment since 1980 of 1.65 million tonnes is shared between the bilateral 
aid programmes of member states (730,000 tonnes) and the programme of 'Community 
Action' organized by the Commission (920,000 t). The Commission also administers 
virtually all dairy aid. Informal administrative practice has fixed commodity 
commitments since 1978 at 150,000 t of SMP & 45,000 t of butter oil. These levels 
have no developmental rationale, but represent an approximate balance of processed 
dairy products in terms of fresh milk equivalent earmarked for export as aid. Such 
practice is, however, more satisfactory than commitments fluctuating with the short-run 
surplus position.'"^ 
Of course, the need to avoid the damaging effects on recipient countries of erratic food 
aid donations was one of the early lessons learned by aid practitioners back in the 
1950s. It can be useful to compare the baseline EC commitments to the figures 
recorded in the Agrostat-PC 1994 database. The statistics from Agrostat presented in 
Table 9 are consistent with Cathie's 1983 figures on EEC {aka EC) commitments. It is 
true that the EC-India dairy aid deliveries are smaller than might be expected from the 
fact that EC butter mountain was such an awkward problem, before the 1984 
imposition of European milk quotas. Possible explanations for the downward statistical 
discrepancy include: (1) the possibility that EC milk surplus predictions were too high, 
(2) that other recipients required emergency dairy aid, or (3) that the Agrostat statistics 
are slightly inaccurate. 
John W. Mellor (1987) in Clay & Shaw, Poverty. Development and Food: pp 187-88. John MeUor 
(IFPRI, Wash. DC) said donors must: (1) "provide reliable amounts", (2) "provide large amounts" and 
(3) "recognise the conditions of effective aid." Mellor says recipients must: (1) give priority to 
agricultural development. ..to minimise the disincentive effects of food aid"; and (2) "pursue policies that 
spread capital supplies as evenly as possible over the labour force." Mellor's prescription for healthy food 
aid programmes has informed my investigation of the topic. 
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Table 9 
Period & Commodity 
— ——J 
EC Commitment Agrostat/94 data 
1978-80 SMP 150,000 MX 134,934 MT (mean) 
1978-83 SMP same as above 129,634 MT 
1978-80 BO 45,0001 39,756 MT 
1978-83 BO same as above 37,294 MT 
Source: Agrostat/FAO/1994 
These figures remind us that planning such large-scale food aid flows is no simple 
matter. As St6phane Jost points out, monitoring agencies such as GIEWS and 
INTERFAIS need to be improved, to better anticipate shortfalls and ensure that food aid 
reaches those who need it promptly. 
Jost reflects the view of this thesis that food aid statistics should be rationalised under 
unified, simplified rules. Jost cites three principal aspects that could benefit from 
simplification: (a) the calendar year for records (calendar, fiscal, split or marketing 
year?), (b) conversion factors (e.g. rough rice or milled rice), (c) date of record (i.e. on 
date of pledge or delivery?). In closing, Jost proposes that the WFP and FAO oversee 
collaboration on food aid statistics, in order to develop a database that is usable world-
wide, and to avoid duplication of effort."^ (Not to mention occasional double-entering 
of food aid donations that benefits donor prestige but not recipients.) 
In my own estimation, prospects of statistics reform are favourable because: (1) it is a 
necessary precaution as worid food trade enters the post-Uruguay GATT era; (2) the 
1984 expansion of the African database into INTERFAIS offers a successful precedent; 
(3) MNCs and TNCs currently are engaged in developing internationally-recognised 
accoimting systems for businesses, and this concept can be expected to spread from 
business to the aid community; (4) continued use of GIS and comparison of trade 
figures from ever more countries is bound to reveal discrepancies in present records. 
Edward Clay (August 1983) "Is European food aid refonnaWe?" in FoodPolicv: p 175. 
St^hane Jost (1991) "An Introduction to the Sources of Data for Food Aid Analysis with Spedal 
Reference to Sub-Saharan Afiica" in Clay & Stokke (1991) ": pp 191-201. GIEWS: Global Information 
& Eariy Warning System; INTERFAIS: International Food Aid Information System (WFP). 
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and hopefully result in more transparent statistics that better guard food security for all 
the world's people. At the same time, it is heartening to realise that whatever the 
origins and motivations of the post-WW-E food and dairy aid regime, donors have tried 
to improve their performance. 
John Tarrant's view on food aid 
Although John Tarrant's 1985 paper could not anticipate all aspects of the mid-1990s 
Uruguay GATT agreement, several of his points apply to the current situation, as 
emerging economies such as China pass economic thresholds where their consumption 
patterns become more demanding on world food supplies. 
The "irony of development"^"^ is that rising income in LDCs (e.g. income elasticity of 
demand for food in India is 0.80 - compared to 0.15 in the US and UK) can exacerbate 
food shortages, due to (1) increased demand for food and (2) rising demand for 
products high on the food chain, e.g. poultry and meat, which increases cereals demand. 
This concept is not new (Greens repeat it daily), and is reflected dramatically by 
changing demand patterns in today's more prosperous China. 
Citing Sen (1981) on famines in Ethiopia and Bangladesh, Tarrant writes: 
Food self-sufficiency is widely misunderstood....at least as it is defined by most 
governments. It is important to make a distinction between imports which resuh from 
failure of domestic supply to meet commercial demand for food and the total need for 
food by the population. 
Tarrant's reiteration of this truth is valuable. (And echoes Amartya Sen's point that a 
good harvest means little to a starving person i f (s)he has no "entitlement" to a share of 
it.) Terming a country self-sufficient in food simply because it exports more food than 
it imports can be just as disingenuous as lowering official unemployment statistics, 
when the jobless become so discouraged that they stop actively seeking work. 
Stephane Jost (1991) in Clay & Stokke (1991): pp 199-201. 
John Tarrant (1985) "A review of international food trade" PIHG 9: pp 235-254, 237. 
106 ' John Tarrant (1985): p 248. 
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Gunilla Andrae & Biorn Beckman on dangers of food "aid" 
Some points in Gunilla Andrx & Bjdm Beckman's'°^ book tally with and reinforce this 
thesis' analysis of Operation Flood in India. In fact, what they call the Wheat Trap in 
Nigeria would perfectly reflect Operation Flood in India i f input-dependent dairying 
using Holstein-Friesians, instead of indigenous Zebu cattle and buffalo had not 
prevailed. Andrae^ & Beckman decry cheap North American wheat imports and food 
aid as contributing to "underdevelopment" in Nigeria - and this it would have been in 
India, had not dairy leaders not "monetised" imported dairy aid to invest in needed 
infrastructure. 
Andrae & Beckman call wheat "a commodity that cannot be effectively produced 
domestically." The authors point out that wheat is the only major crop that cannot be 
grown in Nigeria's rainy season, and thus has become a raison d'etre for capital-
intensive irrigation projects, as well as the western-devised technology of flour mills in 
the new "forward linkages" of the new Nigerian wheat economy." 
In her critique of the White Revolution in India, Operation Flood (1985)'°^, Shanti 
George used arguments paralleling those of Andrae & Beckman on wheat in Nigeria. 
George deplores reliance on Friesian cross-breds dependent on concentrates and 
speciality fodder that, in turn, increased reliance upon the products of Western 
agribusiness, e.g. pumps in irrigation, or imported processing machinery. Against the 
argument of inappropriate technology in the "forward linkages" of milk production in 
India, are contentions by OF director Verghese Kurien, that most i f not all equipment 
used in the programme is, or can be, manufactured in India.''° 
Andres & Beckman admit that for centuries wheat had significance in "festive 
occasions""\ and while a speciality food, was by no means foreign to Nigeria's 
culture. Similarly, Shanti George acknowledges that milk is part of India's heritage. 
Both critics decry reliance upon western technology in "forward linkages", such as flour 
GuniUa Andrs & Bjdm Beckman (1985) The Wheat Trap, p 143-144. 
GuniUa Andrs & Bjom Beckman (1985): PP 144,180. 
htdian Experience. 
Andrae & Beckman (1985): p 79. 
no 
milling. However, there are crucial differences between the two situations of 
importance to this thesis. 
Given the present state of irrigation and growing patterns in Nigeria, major wheat 
imports are likely to continue. Now that the Nigerian taste for wheat has been 
intensified (i.e. become more inelastic), future wheat shortages are likely to worsen the 
Nigerian frade balance. Nigeria's net wheat imports were 847 thousand Metiic tons 
(MT) in 1992, compared to just 100 thousand MT in 1961. In the period 1961-1992 
Nigeria's highest domestic wheat production was 60 thousand MT in 1989 - minuscule 
compared to an import high of 1444 thousand MT wheat imports in 1985."^. Low 
Nigerian wheat imports were 40 thousand MT in 1964. Exponential growth of 
Nigeria's "wheat" imports was positive 1961-92, at 3.6%. It is this scale of foreign 
food dependence that India succeeded in escaping. 
In the early 1990s, EU dairy aid to India virtually halted. India's net imports of "milk 
ex. butter" imports were 267 thousand Metric Tonnes (MT) in 1992, compared to 
almost double imports of 462 thousand MT in 1961. (Low Indian "milk ex. butter" 
imports was only 8 thousand MT in 1964.) 
In the period 1961-1992 India's highest domestic "milk ex. butter" production was 
60,850 thousand MT in 1992 - more than three-times larger than "milk ex. butter" 
domestic production in 1961. Domestic production was gigantic compared to an import 
high of just 683 thousand MT "milk ex. butter" in 1982. (Exponential growth of India's 
"milk ex. butter" imports was negative 1961-92, at -5.1%.)"' 
Apparently, Operation Flood has been successful at: (1) keeping intact and 
sfrengthening "backward linkages" to rural producers, by improving infrastructure 
through the National Milk Grid, etc.; (2) increasing urban consimiers' inelasticity of 
demand for milk, resulting not only in higher incomes for rural milk producers, but 
greater potential credit-worthiness as well; and (3) not leaving urban milk consumption 
dependent upon imported commodities (e.g. SMP) whose price volatility could 
endanger India's foreign exchange reserves. These articles offer evidence that, when 
Agrostat/1994/FAO. 
I l l 
compared to Green Revolution practises in Nigeria, the management of the White 
Revolution in India has avoided the imderdevelopment trap, entailing probable 
aggregate and widely-distributed gains from Operation Flood. 
Harsh lessons about food aid since WW-II 
Recognition that large-scale programme or project food aid can disrupt poor economies 
has caused the WFP to reverse the traditional 2:1 menu of its activities of 2/3 
programme/project aid-to-1/3 emergency aid. Since about 1990, about two-thirds of 
WFP shipments are now allotted to emergency relief, and remaining food programmes 
are monitored more closely in order to avoid disincentive effects in recipient countries. 
To an extent, this reversal of policy emphasis reflects success in WFP activities, in that 
improvements in food security in India and other coimtries have lessened the call for 
programme aid. 
Meanwhile, there continues to be universal support for emergency food relief efforts 
(reminiscent of post-WW-U aid to Europe) as seen recently in Bosnia, Eritrea, Ethiopia 
and Somalia. Support remains strong despite tragic anomalies. Many problems stem 
from bureaucratic inertia (rectifiable through decentralisation as Hellinger argues) or 
inadequate information systems (as Jost argues for the improvement of GIEWS and 
INTERFAIS). I f Hellinger's suggestion that field personnel and NGOs are granted 
greater responsibility is followe4 it is also likely that information about local 
conditions and food supplies wil l be more accurate, thus speeding deployment of all 
shipments, and avoiding price disincentives to local farmers. 
All-too-recent events have demonstrated the need for improvements. For instance: (1) 
It is now known that as thousands starved during the mid-1980s drought and civil war in 
Ethiopia, warehouses of hidden stockpiles of food were being shipped out of Ethiopia 
in commercial sales - once again underscoring the principle acknowledged by Michael 
Glantz among many others that famine is a problem of politics and distribution, not 
production"'*; (2) US food aid to Somalia arrived just as a better harvest reached the 
market - a textbook example of disincentives to indigenous agriculture. The Somalia 
113 Agrostat/1994/FAO. 
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case also supports Jost's reminder that timely data is needed to accelerate WFP 
performance through "early warning systems", etc. 
Meanwhile, Hans Singer, James Ingram, Edward Clay, John Shaw and John W. Mellor 
make convincing arguments for the expanded use of "monetised" food aid to ameliorate 
the effects of SAPs on developing economies. 
Conclusion of Chapter 2 
It is the viewpoint of this thesis that where food aid has been tmsuccessful, its delivery 
was erratic or poorly timed and acted as disincentives to local farmers. (Or conttol of 
aid may have been lost to unauthorised groups, as happened in Afghanistan, Somalia, 
etc.) However, this thesis argues that EEC dairy aid in Operation Flood generally 
avoided these pitfalls. To support these contentions Chapter 3 compares the dairy 
production and consumption of India to other countries from the 1960s to the 1990s , in 
a series of charts and world maps. Chapter 4, following, focuses on Operation Flood. 
Personal communication: Dr. Michael Glantz of the National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR) in Colorado. Dr. Glantz made this point to me during an interview at the November 7-10, 1988 
UN (CSTD) World Congress on Climate and Development in Hamburg. 
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T A B L E 10 
Landmarks in food aid & development 
' 1954: US reorganises its bilateral food aid doanations with PL 480. 
' Till early 1960s: food aid synonymous with US food aid. 
' 1956-76: US 59m tonnes programme food aid to India (1993 value = $4.8 b). 
1961: World Food Programme (WFP) created as multilateral food aid agency. 
1967: Food Aid Convention (FAC) consolidates donor commitments. 
ca. 1968: Indian famine in Rajasthan. 
1969-81: Afghanistan receives dairy assistance from WFP. Plans for 
"monetised" dairy aid dropped due to poor project control, 
ca. 1970-71: Nigerian Civil War and famine in Biafra. 
1971 (independence) to late-1970s: food aid critical in Bangladesh. 
November 1974: UN World Food Conference called for improved food policy 
Minimum target of 10 million tons of cereals annually set. WFP was 
restructured, creating a Committee on Food Aid (CFA) to govern the WFP. 
Goal is to co-ordinate multilateral, bilateral and NGO aid programmes. The 
CFA became "world focus for discussion on all aspects of food aid." (James 
Ingram in Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid: p x) 
August, 1982: Mexico cannot service debt, triggering Third World debt crisis. 
1987: India withstands worst drought this century in all regions. 
1988: Increased rice production brings Bangladesh close to self-sufficiency. 
1988: dairy products comprise ca. 340 thousand tonnes total food aid. 
1989: dairy products comprise ca. 156 thousand tonnes aid. 
1990: dairy products comprise ca. 137 thousand tonnes aid 
1991: dairy products comprise ca. 234 thousand tonnes aid. 
Early-1990s: ex-Eastbloc receives more food aid than Africa. But Gulf War-
spawned oil price rises increase need for food aid in India, etc. 
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CHAPTER 3: DAIRY PERFORMANCE OF INDIA & OTHER 
COUNTRIES FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s 
I 
Introduction 
In previous chapters we examined the broad sweep of international agricultural trade, 
and the symbiotic evolutions of post-WW-II trade and aid regimes during the Cold War. 
It was noted that although large-scale international grain trade was established centuries 
agoi food aid is a relatively recent phenomenon, almost peculiar to the twentieth 
century, and has been promulgated out of commercial, geopolitical and ideological 
imperatives as well as humanitarian concerns. The vulnerability of milk products to 
spoilage makes them a special sub-set of food, markedly more perishable than most 
internationally traded commodities, which is dominated by cereals trade. The 
expansion of international dairy trade and aid was, and is, contingent upon the invention 
of new technologies, some of them (e.g. fine sprayers suitable for buffalo milk) created 
as recently as the 1950s2 and still (e.g. UHT milk) being developed. 
In this chapter we shall look at changes in dairy production, trade and other aspects of 
its development on the global, continental, and regional scales, frequently making 
reference to changes in India, primarily from 1961 to the early 1990s. Meanwhile, a 
brief discussion of India's quality-of-life indicators in the post-Rajiv Gandhi mid-1990s 
can help illuminate the previous decades that are the time-frame of this study. ^  India is 
a natural touchstone for this thesis, not just because that coimtry's White Revolution 
programme Operation Flood (OF) will be the focus of the following chapters, but 
because this large, populous country has been a crucible of post-colonial development 
paradigms - a focus of trade and development theorists around the world. India was the 
largest "non-aligned" nation of the Third World, resisting the tug-of-war between the 
•Dan Morgan (1979) Merchants of Grain. 
2 M,V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien-Style: pp4, 94, 120. 
3 Clive Crook (February 22, 1997) "A Survey of India: time to let go" . Crook draws from IMF, World 
Bank and other authoritative sources, including Jeflfrey Sachs, Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, Charles 
CoUyns of the IMF, Robert Zagha of the World Bank and Adit Jain of the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIS) based in India. 
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First and the Second Worlds and - a point to be developed in Chapter 4 - adept at 
turning foreign trade or aid initiatives to its own advancement. 
Selections for our Country Comparison Group 
The principals in our comparison group are Bangladesh", Egypt, Pakistan and 
Zimbabwe - like India, all listed by Agrostat/FAO as "low-income" countries. 
Bangladesh and Pakistan were selected also because they neighbour India and share 
some of its heritage. Egypt was selected because it has been the largest recipient of 
dairy aid besides India. ^  Zimbabwe was chosen because like India, it has been the 
object of cooperative dairy development programmes studied by Shanti George, one of 
the principal sources to this thesis. Occasionally we also refer to Turkey, long a 
recipient of food aid in Food-for-Work programmes. Located on the right periphery of 
our maps - but increasingly at the centre of dairy marketing efforts - are South Korea 
and China which are becoming more important players in the international dairy trade. 
Many of the misconceptions, failures - and successes - experienced by India shed light 
on experiences of other developing countries. In any event, India's cultural affinity for 
bovines, milk and dairying, provides a natural theatre for dairy development. We shall 
begin by looking at the general, somewhat disappointing backdrop of post-WW-II 
Indian economic development. 
India's profile in LDC development 
Status as the worid's largest democracy has been a source of pride to India, in the five 
decades since independence in 1947. Of more dubious merit is "the Hindu rate of 
growth", a phrase frequently used by observers both inside and outside India, in 
attempts to explain the country's slow rate of development. Democracy has sometimes 
been blamed for India's failure to maximise its productive potential. For example, 
India boasts more infrastructure per capita than countries with quite autocratic regimes, 
such as China and Indonesia, yet lags behind them in recent output.^  
" Agrostat/FAO also lists Bangladesh on its "least-developed" category. 
5 Martin Doombos et al (1990) Dairy Aid and Development: India's Operation Flood, p 67. In 1980 
for example, Egypt imported 7000 tonnes of SMP from the US, in a trend that has continued. 
6 Crook (February 22, 1997) "A Survey of India" in The Economist, p 22. 
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On the other hand, democratic checks and balances (along with the limited powers 
delegated to the states, in India's federal system) may have saved India from costly 
misadventures of autocratic systems, such as misconceived initiatives in steel and 
agricultural sectors, and the political upheavals of the Mao era in China, or the political 
purges that followed the demise of socialist Indonesian leader Sukarno in the mid-
1960s. Many observers would insist that, while India's economic development was not 
as rapid as some "Asian tigers", the country has retained a cultural heritage of great 
richness and diversity. William Greider^  and also Robert Gilpin^ point out that 
economically successful "Asian tigers" functioned as clients of the West in the Cold 
War, unlike India which preferred its "non-aligned" stance. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, it now clear that - compared to many other LDCs -
India could do better. There had been sufficient time to pursue its individual path to 
prosperity, and emerged relatively poor. After independence, and the secession of 
Pakistan, India enjoyed relative tranquillity in its domestic and foreign affairs, aside 
from acute crises, e.g. the incursion by China in the early 1970s (which happened to 
stimulate the milk industry), and chronic unrest by Kashmiri nationalists. One legacy 
from the British Empire era that the country continued to benefit from was the Indian 
Civil Service (ICS), an institution noted for accurate record-keeping, (a distinct 
advantage in pursuits such as cattle breeding). India also developed world class 
universities - but primary and secondary education languished. 
Tellingly, over 50% of India's adults remain illiterate in the 1990s - compared to just 
20% in China, or 10% in Thailand, according to the World Bank. Jean Dreze and 
Amartya Sen^  show that in the period 1986-87, 51% of females, and 26% of males, 
aged 12-14 and living in rural areas, had never enrolled in school. In rural Uttar 
Pradesh, fully 68% of females and 27% of males, aged 12-14, had never enrolled in 
school. According to Clive Crook: 
Between 1960 and 1990 India's GDP grew by an average of a little under 4% a year -
the "Hindu rate of growth", as it came to be known. In round numbers, Pakistan's GDP 
William Greider (1997) One World, Ready or Not: p 199. 
8 Robert Gilpin (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. 
^ Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, authors of "India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity". Cited 
by Crook in February 22, 1997 Economist "Survey of India": p 18. 
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over the same period grew by 5% a year, Indonesia's by 6%, Thailand's by 7%, 
Taiwan's by 8% and South Korea's by 9%."* 
Blaming a "Nehruvian socialism" that he says had to be abandoned after oil price rises 
prompted a balance-of-payments crisis in 1991-93, Crook continues: 
India's planners had laid great emphasis on rapid industrialisation, the ostensible reason 
for interfering with a more market-driven course of development. Yet in India between 
1960 and 1990 industrial output grew on average by only 6% a year. In Pakistan it grew 
by 8% a year, in Indonesia by 9%, in Thailand by 9%, in South Korea by 10% and in 
Taiwan by 12%. In 1960 South Korea's income per head was roughly four times bigger 
than India's - $800 at 1990 prices, compared with $200. By 1990 South Korean income 
was 20 times bigger - $8000 against $400.'' 
In what amounts to a repudiation of the development paradigms of previous decades, 
market-oriented observers and economists in the mainstream of the current IMF and 
World Bank paradigm such as Crook, Jeffrey Sachs'^ , and Kazimierz Z. Poznanski'^  
blame laggard development of the Indian economy (like the demise of Eastbloc 
economies) on isolation from foreign competition,, dirigist central planning, and failure 
to incorporate market disciplines - particularly before the reforms (albeit half-hearted, 
according to Crook) begun under PM Rao in 1991-93. More germane to this thesis. 
Crook claims India's "agricultural output has risen markedly more slowly than in most 
other Asian economies, that the Green Revolution still has not been taken to its ultimate 
limits, and that there is a general need for agricultural reform, which it may be inferred, 
would in turn stimulate the White Revolution. Crook says that individual farmers - not 
fertiliser manufacturers - should be subsidised. Public Sector Electricity grids should 
be improved (PSEs suffer chronic blackouts; faltering voltage necessitates frequent, 
costly rewiring of pumps, leading to widespread reliance on petroleum powered 
generators). The irrigation departments of state governments, rife with corruption, call 
out for reform. 
Fortunately, reforms prompted by the early-1990s economic crisis (due to oil price rises 
in the Gulf War) have already stimulated internal investment in the agricultural sector. 
The Jain Group, which makes farm equipment, reported a 400% increase in turnover in 
the three years after reform began, and a rise in the number of its workers to 3000 
10 Crook (February 22, 1997) "A Survey of India" in Economist: p 3. 
" Crook (February 22, 1997) Economist: p 3. 
Personal observation: In decades before free-market philosophies became predominant, IMF employees 
were more likely to be called "planners" than "economists". 
1^  B^azimierz Z. Poznanski (1987) Technology. Competition. & the Soviet Bloc in the World Market. 
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people.''* External investment has also surged. Janairus Banaji details how India's new 
openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) has attracted large commitments by MNCs 
such as ITC which is diversifying from tobacco into food.'^ FDI will probably benefit 
both Green and White Revolutions. (See Chapter 4) 
OF mistake avoidance 
One example of reforms recommended by Crook, that could also benefit the White 
Revolution (see Chapter 4) is that of farm subsidies on fertiliser. Fertiliser and other 
inputs are critical factors in production of fodder - fodder being one of the chief 
limiting factors on Indian milk yield. There are obvious parallels between fertiliser 
plants and plants producing concentrated fodder pellets for milk production. 
Although GOI subsidies for fertilisers have been cut from a remarkably large 0.9% 
portion of GDP in 1991 to 0.6% of GDP since 199116, there is still too much waste. 
Why? Because the subsidies continue to flow to indigenous fertiliser manufacturers, 
rather than directly to rural farmers. They fimction as disincentives to cost-cutting by 
fertiliser makers, keeping inputs costs high for farmers. This "boondoggle" benefits the 
special interests of fertiliser manufacturers, rather than farmers and milk production. I f 
Crook's market-oriented reforms were put into effect, tariffs on fertiliser imports would 
be reduced (repudiating "import-substitution" policies long entertained by the GOI -
and the lobbying efforts of fertiliser manufacturers seeking subsidies) and fanners 
would receive tax credits, or perhaps vouchers, leaving them free to buy the most cost-
effective inputs for their farms - whether these inputs were of domestic or foreign 
manufacture.'^  Thence, competition would likely drive down input costs to individual 
farmers, leading to greater productivity in Indian agriculture. Lower tariffs on 
machinery used in fertiliser plants could allow recapitalisation of more efficient 
i'* Economist (January 21, 1995) Survey of India: p 8. Anil Jain says the firm could have done it without 
liberalisation, but it would have taken 4 to 5 years longer. 
Janairus Banaji (October 1996/January 1997) "Gobalisation and Restructuring in the Indian Food 
Industry" in Journal of Peasant Studies: pp 191-210. 
'6 Crook (February 22, 1997) "A Survey of India" in Economist: p 22. 
The reforms suggested by Clive Crook in The Economist could be said to fall generally within the free-
market-oriented "Chicago school" of economics, personified by Milton Friedman (see Jagdish Bhagwati 
1988 Protectionism: p 98), who maintained that government planning frequently limited the freedom of 
individuals to create wealth. It may also be said that Britain's Adam Smith Institute, which informed 
"Thatcherist economics" is philosophically similar to the "Chicago School". Ideologically, GOI economic 
policy probably retains more ties to "Nehruvian socialism" than to such free market philosophy. 
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domestic fertiliser plants - if this were necessary. But the chief advantage of pursuing 
Crook's recommendation is that it would reduce macroeconomic waste and raise 
productivity. 
Lessons learned from this analysis of waste in the fertiliser industry, and the benefits of 
liberalisation could be extended to the supply of inputs for the White Revolution. 
Crook and other free-marketeers would likely recommend that all aspects of dairy 
inputs (including breeding, feeding and training) be opened to foreign competition. 
The legions who criticise Operation Flood (see Chapter 4) would heartily agree that OF 
was sometimes guilty of waste, or price distortions, similar to the case of fertiliser, that 
Crook is properly critical of in the Green Revolution. On the other hand, serious 
charges of kickbacks and other malfeasance have been convincingly denied by OF 
officials.'^ 
At a later stage in the OF controversy, Edward Clay and Olav Stokke say studies of 
"the very expensive development programme" show "no dramatic nutritional impact, 
either negative, in the producing conmiunities, or positive in the consuming urban 
areas." They agree with critics that income benefits from OF were distributed 
"inequitably, following a pattern of other major Indian development programmes." 
Clay and Stokke add that: 
The increase in milk production achieved by the so-called white revolution seems to 
have been brought about by a combination of factors. Retail price controls.. Producers 
have been subsidised .None of the evaluations of Operation Flood taken from a donor 
perspective has been able to conclude unequivocally that the benefits have justified the 
considerable transfer of resources financed by European taxpayers through the Common 
Agricultural Policy and the European Community Aid Programme.^ " 
Defenders of Operation Flood would accept Clay and Stokke's grudging admission that 
Indian milk yield increased and retort that, of course OF was costly - after all, many 
crucial aspects of OF can be traced to dynamics (e.g. surplus disposal, market 
Although India's artificial insemination (AI) programmes, especially in the cross-breeding of indigenous 
Zebu cattle to European breeds like Friesians, are making some progress, free-marketeers would argue 
that competition from foreign AI organisations (e.g. Curtis) would stimulate cost savings in India. Cost 
savings might also be stimulated by further opening Indian markets to concentrates inputs (e.g. malt, whey, 
etc.) imports from other countries. The scope for foreign roles in dairy extension services and training is 
harder to state, because knowledge of indigenous conditions is crucial in appropriate dairy training. 
M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien-Style. In his lengthy profile of Operation Flood, Kamath 
indicates that OF sins, if any, generally were of omission not commission. 
20 Edward Clay & Olav Stokke (1991) "Food Aid: The State of the Art" in their edited book Food Aid 
Reconsidered: Assessing the Impact on Third World Countries: p 15. 
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penetration and export promotion) made inevitable from milk mountains that grew as 
the result of rich country subsidies within the EEC. This can hardly be stated too 
strongly. 
That OF did not meet all the optimal expectations is unsurprising. What must be borne 
in mind is how much happier the present state of Indian dairy development is compared 
to what it could be: continued milk rationing in the cities, no milk production increases 
in any region of India, and heightened dependence upon EEC or US dairy commodities. 
This scenario of dependency, amounting to neo-colonialism, could easily have become 
reality - had Indian dairy leaders not acted in the interests of their own dairy autonomy. 
Facing an EEC able to (given political compliance between Europe and India) devastate 
Indian dairy price structures with a mountain of "free" dairy aid, it is to their credit that 
India "looked this gift horse in the mouth", refused to be cowed, and negotiated terms 
with Europe that today reflect (at the least) some credit on both donor and recipient. 
This thesis contends that Indian dairy development benefited from important incidents 
of waste avoidance. These wise choices (ruiming contrary to official "import-
substitution" policies and allowing OF authorities more flexibility in procurement, etc.) 
eventually contributed to rises in Indian GDP, reductions in its balance-of-payments 
accounts - and long-term protection of its dairy autonomy. A prime example of this was 
the insistence by Operation Flood officials on the importation of the highest-level, most 
appropriate technology, for its dairy processing infrastructure. This was exhibited in 
the choice of milk powder spraying equipment bought from Denmark (see Chapter 4) 
which, like the case of fertiliser reform suggested above, runs counter to long-held 
policies of import substitution. Shattering pessimistic expectations, the exposure of 
Indian dairy equipment manufacturers to foreign competition actually seemed to spur 
their development even before early-1990s economic reforms. By the 1980s, most (if 
not all) dairy infrastructure could already be manufactured domestically. 
Testifying to the retarding effect of too much protection from imports, Rahul Bajaj, 
leader of a large family concern specialising in small motorbikes (reminiscent of the 
Agnelli family's activities in Fiat in Italy) now says publicly that previous central 
planning by GOI stifled innovation, leaving the Bajaj company free to make profits on 
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shoddy scooters. Jagdish Bhagwati compares the "proscriptive government" of India 
which - except in the case of OF stifled innovation and entrepreneurship - to the 
govenmient of Japan, whose MITI fostered innovation and export-led growth. 21 
Bear in mind that 65% of India's labour force remains on the land, compared to just 5% 
of Japan's.22 True, relatively few Indians have been engaged in the production of 
consumer durables such as scooters, until recently. But today India ranks as one of the 
world's largest "emerging economies" with a burgeoning middle class. Rural-to-urban 
migration can be expected to accelerate, and although India still enjoys what can be 
called a surplus pool of rural labour, pressure will increase to increase farm productivity 
to maintain present levels of farm production. Hence, the case for further opening the 
economy increases. Free-marketeers such as Crook and Sachs argue that opening 
economies to the importation of farm implements, e.g. generators, roto-tillers, small 
tractors, welding equipment, etc. can stimulate what a previous paradigm labelled 
"integrated rural development". Although such imports can worsen national balance-
of-payments accounts, recent experience of improvements in Indian car and motorbike 
production indicates that opening markets has a net benefit to the national economy, 
especially when foreign firms (e.g. Suzuki) set up joint ventures inside India. Certainly 
production of farm equipment, inside India, could raise agricultural productivity and 
benefit the entire economy. 
A free-market critique of India's capacity-licensing regime 
According to Crook, India's capacity-licensing regime, which was constructed to ensure 
that growing firms did not control an "unduly large share" of India's scarce resources, 
was disastrous, because it (explicitly) ignored the price signals necessary to raise 
market efficiency, and national productivity.2^ Crook's dour analysis of India's 
performance over the last 50 years, and his prescriptions for reform (reflecting IMF and 
World Bank-mandated SAPs in other developing countries, including, e.g.: 
abandonment of domestic price controls, tariff reductions, subsidy cuts to special 
interests such as fertiliser makers, etc.) is persuasive on many counts. However, some 
2' Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) Protectionism: p 100. Although OF was more of a QUANGO than a private 
firm, the autonomy granted its leadership allowed it to make wealth-maximising decisions denied more 
bureaucratic industries, including perhaps the steel industry. 
22 Agrostat/FAO/1994. 
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pomts ought to be made here in defence of Mdia's past efforts in agricultural 
development in general, and in dairy development in particular; 
(1) While it is true that India's agricultural output has not risen as fast as most Asian 
countries, it should be noted that several countries around the world (some with better 
factor endowments than India) have had comparatively worse records in both the Green 
and White Revolutions. 
(2) India is a vast country with a huge, heterogeneous population, so the fact that there 
has been any rise in Indian output is sufficient to improve world aggregate figures. 
(3) Although Indian agricultural growth has lagged behind China in the post-Mao era 
(and that this may point to the need for further liberalisation and reform of India's farm 
sector), it stands to the credit of the govenmient of India, and to the cooperation of the 
WFP, FAO and other multilateral, national and NGO actors in the world food trade and 
aid regimes, that post-independence India has not suffered to the extent of China, where 
an estimated 20-30m people died during famines in the Mao era. 
Indeed, it is deplorable that, by many development markers (measured by OECD 
statistics, etc.) such as infant mortality, female and overall literacy, India's performance 
is poor. However, in the case of dairy development, this thesis presents evidence that 
India has done rather better than many competing countries, owing in part to shrewd 
decisions on infrastructure investment, auspicious utilisation of what could have been 
problematic dairy aid, and practical attention to farmgate prices paid to rural farmers, as 
well as affordable prices for urban consumers. The White Revolution employed some 
realistic pricing and marketing policies more in line with Clive Crook's ideal state, than 
other sectors characterised by what he called: "India's insanely repressive system of 
domestic plarming and regulation. "^ ^ 
View of this thesis 
Against this portrait of a sub-continental-sized Third World country, complacent in its 
status as a democracy of great cultural richness - and against Crook's portrayal of a 
23 Crook (February 22, 1997) Economist Survey: p 4. 
2** Economist Survey: op. cit. 
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thrifty, hard-working population boimd in economic misery because of governmental 
dirigisme - this thesis argues that in the case of dairy development, India has done 
rather better than many competing countries. According to Alderman, Mergos & Slade 
Total milk production in India increased at a rate of 5.5% a year between 1970 and 
1985, yet only 6.0% of total milk production was handled through cooperatives at the 
end of this period. Thus it is clear that progress must be occurring throughout the 
sector.25 
At the least, this thesis holds that Indian dairy development would have been less 
advanced without Operation Flood. A plethora of ambitious attacks on India's attempts 
at making its dairying "vertically integrated from producer to consumer''^ ^ (in 
Doombos, Gertsch & Terhal's 1991 phrase) have identified shortcomings in the scheme 
- but caimot disprove evidence of improvements in India's overall dairy production or 
per capita consumption. 
In the next, concluding chapter, this thesis will further examine the varying degrees of 
success (e.g. increasing milk supply and guarding national "dairy autonomy"), or failure 
(e.g. to spur rural development and bring all minorities into the cash economy), by 
Operation Flood. 
Now, however, we shall examine empirical evidence generally supporting this view, 
from charts and maps representing international dairy production, trade, and 
consumption, from the 1960s to the 1990s, drawing freely from the Agrostat computer 
database disseminated by the UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in 1990 
and 1994. 
25 Harold Alderman, George Mergos & Roger Slade (1987) Cooperatives and the Commercialisation of 
Milk Production in India: A Literature Review. IFPRI. p 6. 
26 Martin Doombos et al (1991) "Dairy Aid and Development. Current Trends and Long-Term 
Implications of the Indian Case" in Clay & Stokke (1991) Food Aid Reconsidered. 
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Examination of Charts & Maps 
World charts 
The chart labelled World Milk & Population 1961-1990 (Figure 2, logarithmic Y-
axis) shows that world population was rising faster than milk production well into the 
1970s, when India's Operation Flood got underway. Immediately apparent is the 
dramatic rise in milk production of Asia, begitming at a low level but climbing to 
intersect the curve on North & Central America, and approaching that of the USSR. 27 
On the similarly labelled chart (Figure 3, standard Y-axis; see appendix), a drop in 
world milk production is apparent around 1963, roughly coinciding with the first major 
sale of US grain to the USSR, during the Kennedy administration. It is possible that 
this block-sale to the USSR (whose purpose was to increase beef and dairy production 
in that country) subtracted from fodder stocks available to daiiy producers in other 
countries. Another plateau in world production is discernible in the years ca. 1966-71. 
Although this period is also that of the famine in Rajasthan and other parts of India, 
about 1968, and also a period of milk rationing in Indian cities, the graph of Asian milk 
production shows little drop - probably because overall Asian production was still at a 
low base. The drop in aggregate world milk production around 1968 appears to be 
attributable more to a drop in North and Central American milk production, than to 
drops in India. 
These charts show, that as Indian production becomes an ever greater portion of the 
world share, it has a progressively greater effect on world dairy performance. To whit: 
India's worst drought in a century, about 1987, correlates with a dramatic dip in world 
milk production at that time. But it is important to note that the dip in world production 
at that time probably was a resuh also of production controls in rich countries, i.e. the 
cumulative effect of the herd-buyout programme in the US in 1986, and milk quotas 
imposed in the EC in 1984.28 
27 John Empson (September, 1992) "India Joins the Big League" Dairy Industries Interruitional: 
pp 21-23 Empson writes that India is responsible for much of the rise in Asian milk production. 
28 B.A. Scholten (July, 1990) "Europe's milk quotas... six years down the road", in Hoard's Dairyman: 
p 587. Original quota levels were further reduced, lowering E C / E E C butter and milk powder mountains. 
The refiisal of the more free market oriented US to countenance production controls like quotas, or 
renewed herd buy-outs, or slaughter-and-compensation schemes, led to the shattering of meaningful price-
supports for US dairying. This was in line with GATT aims, but accelerated the demise (ca. 7-15%) of 
marginal (often "family dairy") farms in the US, in the last decade. 
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In the top of two horizontally-grouped charts labelled Imports Selected Third World 
Milk (excluding butter)^^ 1961-1989 (Fig. 4) several Third Worid countries including 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and (especially) Nigeria increased milk excluding butter 
imports (i.e. mostly skimmed milk powder - SMP) during the 1970s. This was probably 
due to a variety of factors including oil price rises after the 1973-74 OPEC boycott, 
enabling petroleum producers like to import more SMP, as well as to finance "petro-
dollar" loans to other developing countries, whose deteriorating foreign reserves also 
increased their need for dairy aid. 
The surge in Indian imports through Operation Flood is also shown. By the late 1980s, 
OF officials were concertedly attempting to stop importation of foreign dairy 
commodities, but a resumption of imports was necessary because of the 1987-1988 
drought.'0 As Egyptian imports also show a steep rise at the same time (ca. 1988) as 
India's, it is likely that a burgeoning surplus in the US (the 1986 herd buy-out^ ^ etc. 
effectively managed the US surplus for only 2-3 years), and untamed production 
pressures in the EEC led to concessionary sales of milk powder, etc.^ 2 
On the bottom chart with its lower scale, the import curves of China (nearly 300 
thousand tonnes in 1988, from zero in 1977 lend credence to this analysis. 
Interestingly, these events around 1987, coincide with a softening of imports by 
Bangladesh, and a stabilisation of milk (ex. butter) imports by Nigeria following a sky-
rocketing of Nigerian milk imports 1976-84. 
2' Following Agrostat/FAO groupings, this thesis uses data from milk production in toto, and its two main 
sub-groups, i.e. (1) "milk excluding butter" and (2) "butter & ghee" to reflect various dairy performance 
indicators such as production quantities, exponential growth of production, and per capita intake or 
consumption. Although (1) and (2) do not add up to the sum of all milk production (due to diversions, 
e.g. whey and casein supplied to the chemical industry) these sub-groups are the principal sources of dairy 
intake by humans. 
(ca. 1988-89) Operation Flood: a Progress Report: p 12. 
^' Many of the dairy cattle purchased by the US government from its farmers in the 1986 herd buy-out 
were to be sent to China. Both the US and the E C / E E C were determined to cut their dairy surpluses. 
32 Willi Kampmann (September, 1988) "20 Jahre EG-Milchmarktordnung" in Deutsche Bauem-
Korrespondenz: pp 327-330. Dr. Kampmann of the Deutscher Bauemverband (DBV, Bonn, interviews 
1989-1991) told me that milk quotas were imposed partly to stabilise the world price of SMP which had 
plummeted during years of surplus. 
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As John Empson points out, India probably will be the world's number two dairy 
producer (behind the ex-USSR countries) within a few years. Thereafter, world 
production curves will echo the hiccups of Indian dairying even louder than at present. 
Continents Milk Production Charts 
The horizontal (Fig. 6 below) and vertical (Fig. 7 with statistics in appendix) bar 
charts labelled Continents Milk Production: 1961-70-80-90 show that production has 
stabilised in the mature milk markets of Europe, North & Central America and ex-
USSR/Russia compared to Asia (including India) as a whole, and Africa. Africa 
probably has much more scope for milk consumption and production than is seen at 
present, much due to the "lost decade" of the 1980s, when drought, lack of investment 
and debt depressed African development. South America, whose economic 
performance is rising after desultory output in the 1970s may, partly because of a 
cultural predisposition toward milk, continue to grow in a pattern not dissimilar to that 
of the US. 
Owing mostly to the surge in Indian national production, Asia as a continent has almost 
pulled apace ex-USSR/Russia production. I f the population of China, even greater than 
that of India, develops a taste for dairy ice cream or (less likely, given Chinese cultural 
predispositions, and the lactose-intolerance of many adults) liquid milk, Asian figures 
could dwarf those of other continents. 
Although it can be assumed that, especially since WW-II, the US has had much 
influence upon the diets and consumption habits of people on the island groups of 
Oceania^ ^ such as Samoa and Vanuatu, Agrostat's inclusion of strong dairy producers 
and exporters Australia and New Zealand in the continental group Oceania makes it 
difficult to discern the discrete effects of US marketing from the bar charts. 
33 Personal observation: a few islands became distinguished by so-called "cargo cults" after WW-n. The 
spread of US military supplies, such as milk powder, across the Pacific Rim changed diets. Now so-called 
American "hamburger culture" and the growing popularity of mozzarella-based cheese pizzas are 
increasing dairy product consumption in the urban centres of Oceania - and around the world. 
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Be that as it may, the big question for North American dairists is whether high-
technology and world market prices will cooperate to keep them as big exporters to 
Asia. 
The question for Europe is whether, after milk quotas expire around the year 2000, the 
EU Commission will elect to renew milk quotas, or abandon them and fight the US in 
North America, and Australia and New Zealand in Oceania - and perhaps even the 
Indian sub-continent - for world market share. Such a question also poses itself to 
Canada whose milk quota is being questioned under GATT/WTO rules, as well as the 
NAFTA trade agreement with the US and Mexico.. 
The group-of-four pie charts (Fig. 8) labelled Continents Milk 1961, 1970, 1980 and 
1990 show that after stasis of 11.7% to 11.8% shares of world production in the years 
1960s and 1970, Asian world production share rose significantly to 14.2% in 1980, and 
18.6% in 1990. (N.B.: Accompanying the pie slices are figures of gross world milk 
production, rising from 348m MT in 1961 to 533m MT in 1990.) Recall that the 
charts (Fig. 2) and (Fig. 3) labelled World Milk & Population 1961-1990 traced the 
steepening rise of Asian milk production. 
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134 Rich/Poor (DC/LDC) Milk Production Charts 
The group of four pie charts (Fig. 9) above labelled DC/LDC Milk 1961, 1970, 1980, 
1990 tell us nothing about per capita intake, but they do reflect significant growth of 
dairying among poorer countries. Production figures placed next to the pie slices show 
that LDC production rose little from 1961 (65m MT) to 1970 (77m MT), but climbed 
much faster thereafter. Coinciding with the main thrust of Operation Flood, LDC milk 
production reached impressive levels in 1990 (148 million MT). 
Between 1961 and 1990, LDC production more than doubled and LDC world milk 
production share rose from 18.6% to 27.8%. Because India is now producing high 
levels of milk, it is probable that Asia will soon account for one-third of world 
production - a remarkable rise from less than one-fifth in 1961. 
Continents, Countries & Economic Groups; Milk (ex. Butter) Intake Charts 
Of course production figures say little about food security. I f food production doubles 
in a period when population triples, there will be a net loss in per capita food 
availability. Much more indicative of a state of nutritional well-being are data on per 
capita intake (aka consumption), although it must not be forgotten that aggregate food 
supplies do not alone guarantee adequate "entitlements", in Amartya Sen's word, to 
food by all quintiles of a population. That said, per capita intake can be a valuable 
indicator of food security. The chart (Fig. 10) labelled World Milk (ex. Butter) Intake 
1961-1989 shows average Asian intake of milk excluding butter (in the Agrostat/FAO 
terminology) starting at a very low level compared to all other "continents" groups (in 
the Agrostat/FAO grouping), but climbing steadily. The Asia intake curve appeared 
ready to intersect that of Africa about 1990. 
More can be learned about intake per capita from the chart (Fig. 11) labelled Selected 
LDC, LLDC, LIFD Milk (ex. Butter) Intake: 1961-1989, because it disaggregates rich 
Asian countries such as Japan from poor ones such as Bangladesh. Although the idea 
can not be proven from this chart, an expectation of a positive relationship between 
income level and milk (ex. butter) intake is found to be true. This suggests that as 
income levels rise, the supposed cultural indifference of some Asian countries to milk 
could be overcome by a concerted marketing campaign. 
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As well as showing intake trends of special economic sub-groups among poor countries, 
Fig. 11 also shows intake trends of Bangladesh, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Pakistan and South 
Korea - in relation to India and the Worid as a whole. After a flat period in the 1960s, 
milk (ex. butter) intake is rising noticeably. This has important implications for future 
commodity flows, particularly cereals, which can be used as concentrated inputs in 
dairy fodder. As the caption (Fig. 11) notes, milk (ex. butter) intake rose dramatically 
in Pakistan and South Korea (ROK). The negative effects of trade embargo and civil 
war (1969-81), and regional drought (ca. 1982-late 1980s) are evident in Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe's milk (ex. butter) intake curves are roughly paralleled by that of Low-
Income-Food-Deficit LIFD) countries. About 1962, Zimbabwe had close to the average 
of about 27kg. of annual per capita intake averaged by LIFD countries, but thereafter 
fell below, probably owing to the aforementioned political and climatic difficulties. 
Intake in Turkey and the UK is shown in (Fig. 12 in appendix) labelled Selected DC, 
LDC, LLDC, UFD Milk (ex. Butter) Intake: 1961-1989. Turkish intake begins at ca. 
Double average world intake, at a level higher than that of rich countries (DCs) as a 
whole - but generally plunges thereafter except for a brief plateau 1979-81. 
Nevertheless, Turkish intake remains higher than Pakistan's, and also higher than that 
of India which, nevertheless, is rapidly approaching world levels. 
Continents, Countries & Economic Groups: Butter & Ghee Intake Charts 
Butter & ghee (in Agrostat/FAO terminology) are primary forms taken by dairy 
products in India and other countries with little access to electrically-powered 
refrigeration. The chart (Fig. 13) labelled Selected DC, LDC, LIFD Butter & Ghee 
Intake: 1961-1992 shows a chamatic drop (often 40%) in butter & ghee intake in rich, 
developed countries. (N.B. These data correlate with evidence in maps labelled Butter 
& Ghee kilograms per capita Intake 1961.) Increased consumption of cheese in burgers 
and pizzas, as well as a 1980s' increase in speciality "yuppie cheeses" have replaced 
butter in the diet of many Americans, in a pattern likely replicated in other rich 
countries.) Intake rises of butter & ghee in poorer countries generally rose, although 
not as fast as milk (ex. butter). 
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Of great interest to this thesis is India's 20% rise in intake of butter & ghee (one of the 
most important traditional dairy commodities in India) from 1.0 kg. per capita to 1.2 kg. 
per capita in 1991 and 1992 shown in Fig. 13. This rise is all the more impressive after 
intake plummeted to a depth of just 0.7 kg. per capita in 1973 and 1974. This shows 
that India surpassed average worid intake of butter & ghee in 1990 and i f trends 
continue, will reach levels of Egyptian intake in time. Except for the years 1973 and 
1981, India's butter & ghee intake seems to parallel that of the loftier level of Pakistan. 
The steady rise in India's butter & ghee intake since the depths of 1973-74 stands in 
sharp contrast to the slowly rising intake of low-income-food-deficit (LIFD) countries, 
and the declining butter & ghee intake of least-developed countries (LLDC) and 
Bangladesh. The fastest rising intake shown on Fig. 13 is that of South Korea, which 
rose from zero in 1970 to near-Indian levels in 1991, and surpassed world intake levels 
in 1991. 
MAPS 
Butter & Ghee per capita Consumption exp. gr. 1961-92 map 
These maps highlight India's success in dairy development since the decade of the 
1960s, characterised by milk rationing. Exponential growth of per capita consumption 
of milk excluding butter is shown in by the maps (Fig. 14 India focus) and (Fig. 15 all 
countries in appendix) labelled Butter & Ghee per capita Consumption exponential 
growth 1961-92. We see that despite the 1973-74 slump in consumption noted in chart 
(Fig. 13), India has managed 0.7% growth. While a figure under 1% might seem a 
modest, it represents an important achievement, in that production outpaced population 
growth. India's positive performance in this period stands out in contrast to Bangladesh 
(-2.4% exponential drop) which experienced difficulties after separation from Pakistan. 
India's performance also compares favourably to that of Zimbabwe, whose exponential 
drop in per capita consumption of butter & ghee was nearly as poor as that of 
Bangladesh. Fortunately, Zimbabwe's consumption improved after the settlement of 
the civil war in the early 1980s, and the establishment of dairy development 
Fig. 14 
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programmes there which Shanti George noted for their admirable aspects such as 
sensitivity to local conditions, compared to Operation Flood in India.^ '^  Pakistan's 
exponential growth in 1961-92 was just 0.2%, but should not be discounted because it 
began at a higher base and remained above Indian levels of intake of butter & ghee. 
Much the same could be said of Turkey, which began in 1961 with very high levels (3.3 
kg. per capita) of butter &. ghee intake, but experienced negative consumption growth 
of-1.9% thereafter, eventually plateauing at 2.2 kg. per capita in 1990-92, below the 
level of Turkey. Egypt, which began with butter & ghee per capita consumption (at 1.6 
kg.) barely over the world average (though 50% above India's intake: see chart Fig. 13) 
in 1961, has experienced a strong 2.2% exponential growth, likely due to petrodollar 
loans in the mid-1970s, and US concessionary sales under PL 480 since around the time 
of the Middle East peace settlement with Israel in the late-1970s. It is noteworthy that 
unlike consumption of butter & ghee in Egypt, more of India's consumption is 
produced domestically. 
Butter & Ghee kilograms per capita Intake maps for 1961 & 1992 
Two of these maps (Fig. 16/1961 and Fig. 18/1992) focusing on India's performance 
relative to comparable developing countries are found in adjoining pages. Two similar 
maps found in the appendix (Fig. 17/1961 and Fig. 19/1992 for all countries) feature 
intake statistics for most of the world's countries and could, along with companion 
maps on milk ex. butter, form the basis for other study: several interesting patterns can 
be found, e.g. the rise of dairy consumption in the Pacific Rim, probably owing to a 
combination of exports from Australia, New Zealand and the US. 
But here our focus is on India. Because ghee has always been one of the most 
important items in the national diet, the maps labelled Butter & Ghee kilograms per 
capita Intake for 1961 (Fig. 16 India focus) and for 1992 (Fig. 18/India focus) are 
some of the strongest evidence that Inchan dairy development increased the country's 
Shanti George (1994) A Matter of People: Co-operative Dairying in India and Zimbabwe, pp 511-
512, 516,-517, etc. George writes that Zimbabwe's programme is less rigid than India's which strictly 
adhered to the Kheda or Anand pattern. George found (p 516) that Zimbawe's Dairy Development 
programme (DDP) "encountered many of the same problems that Anand did" in trying to extend benefits 
to the very poor. George concluded that, as in India's OF, in Zimbabwe's DDP, "The benefits of dairy 
development have generally been proportionate to the resiurce bases of rural households, since cattle 
ownership characterises the more affluent." Nevertheless, George found that in the Chikwaka area ".. the 
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food security during the White Revolution. Of course these aggregate figures for per 
capita intake tell little of the consimiption rates for landless and marginal groups in the 
hinterlands, or the poorest urban dwellers. But higher per capita rates of intake (at 1.2 
kg. per person in 1992 compared to just 1.0 kg. in 1961) increase the likelihood that 
entitlements will increase for even the poorest quintiles. Once again, India's 
performance is enhanced by the less fortunate figures for comparable countries. Butter 
& ghee consumption in Turkey fell about one-third, while in Zimbabwe, suffering first 
trade embargo (when Rhodesian left the British Commonwealth in 1965) and then civil 
war, consumption fell about 40% to the low level of 0.3 kg. per capita butter & ghee 
intake. Even more disturbing is the fall in butter & ghee consumption in Bangladesh, 
from 0.19 kg. in 1961 to about half that, or 0.1 kg. in 1992. Fortunately for Bangladesh, 
food security for its rapidly growing population is increasing, as rice production in its 
own Green Revolution nears self-sufficiency, although Shaw & Clay note that there are 
"low levels of food intake among the poorest 60% of the population. "^ ^ 
These maps (Fig. 16/1961 and Fig. 18/1992) also reflect continuing high levels of 
intake in Pakistan, whose already high domestic production was probably augmented by 
food aid from the US in the decade after the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR.^ ^ 
Egypt's per capita intake of butter & ghee also jumped from 1.6 kg. in 1961 to 2.2 kg. 
in 1992, but as the horizontal chart (Fig. 4) shows, Egypt availed itself of a higher level 
of imports of milk excluding butter during this period, and a check of the 
Agrostat/FAO database shows that Egypt received dairy aid including SMP, butter oil 
and other dairy products from the US and the EEC through 1992. But perhaps the most 
historically significant shift of intake (Fig. 16 and Fig. 18) is shown by China. Just as a 
journey of a thousand miles begins with one step, it may be that China's acceptance of 
dairy products such as butter & ghee began with an intake rise from zero in 1961 to 
one-tenth kilogram per person in 1992. 
local sales of milk have increased dairy consumption among some of the poor." And the "milk centre and 
its activities" improved community morale at least in proportion to their nutritional contribution. 
35 Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid, pp 41-43. They write that food aid (with non-cereals aid of 
mostly "edible oils, with small quantities of dairy commodities" was "crucial" in the first decade of 
Bangladesh independence, but was playing a "more modest role" by 1988-90. 
36 Some of Pakistan's business leaders reportedly claim that martial law imposed by PM Zia helped 
increase economic growth, but their opponents ascribe all that growth to US aid during the Afghan War. 
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Milk ex. Butter per capita Consumption exp. gr. 1961-92 maps 
Exponential growth of per capita consumption of milk excluding butter is shown by 
maps (Fig. 20 India focus) and (Fig. 21 for all countries in the appendix) titled Milk 
ex. Butter per capita Consumption exp.gr. 1961-92. The overall world rate for 
consumption of milk ex. butter is positive (0.2%) unlike that for butter & ghee which 
was negative (-1.1%). 
One reason for this may be that health conscious consumers in rich countries have cut 
butter out of their diets while continuing to favour milk in liquid form as well as ice 
cream, etc. 
In our comparison group, India (1.9%) once again shows a high rate of per capita 
consumption growth compared to Bangladesh (0.4%), Egypt (0.8%), and Pakistan 
(0.1%) and Zimbabwe (-0.2%)." Turkey (-0.6%) is in the lowest quartile of colour 
shading shown on the map, reflecting the downward consumption exhibited in chart 
Fig. 13. Interestingly, Sri Lanka (1.9%) shows identical growth in consumption to India 
in Fig. 20. 
Although China (3.7%) and South Korea (9.9%) started from a low consumption base, 
their high rate of exponential growth is significant because of the large populations in 
these emerging economies, entailing large supplies needed to meet even a small change 
of taste in diets. 
The fact that Zimbabwe's figure for milk ex. butter is the same as for butter & ghee engenders 
speculation that, as Agrostat/FAO literature acknowledges, the difficult decades experienced by Zimbabwe 
have not made for easy data gathering. Thus, the figure for Zimbabwe - as for other countries where 
researchers depend on government estimates - may be somewhat of a "guesstimate". 
Fig. 20 
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Fig. 22/Map; Milk ex. Butter kilograms per capita Intake maps for 1961 & 1989 
These maps (based on the 1990 version of Agrostat/FAO) testify to progress in Indian 
food security. Two of them (Fig. 22/1961 and Fig. 24/1989) focusing on India's 
performance relative to the comparison group are found in nearby pages. Two similar 
maps found in the appendix (Fig. 23/1961 and Fig. 25/1989 for all countries) feature 
milk ex. butter intake statistics for most of the world's countries. India is again the star 
of our comparison group. While Pakistan suffers a slight drop in its high level of per 
capita consumption from 1961 (93.9 kg.) to 1989 (92.8 kg.), India increased its 
consumption nearly 40% from 1961 (38.7) to 1989 (54.1 kg.). Egypt rose slightly from 
1961 (32.5 kg.) to 36 kg.) in 1989, but Zimbabwe lost nutritional ground, from 1961 
(21.8 kg.) to 1989 (18.1). And India's neighbour Bangladesh fell from 1961 (9.6 kg.) to 
1989 (9.2 kg.). Agrostat/FAO shows that demographics were partly to blame for 
lessening dairy product availability in Bangladesh: the 1961-93 exponential growth of 
Bangladesh milk production (1.8%) lagged far behind population growth (2.7%). 
The 1994 version of Agrostat/FAO is in agreement with the 1990 version, and also 
reveals additional newer data: overall, Indian per capita milk ex. butter consumption 
increased dramatically from a steady ca. 35 kg. in 1961-77 right up to a high of nearly 
60 kg. a year in 1992. Other statistics point to a sharp improvement in India's dairy 
fortunes after the beginning of Operation Flood. India "total milk production" (in 
Agrostat phrasing) had poor exponential growth before OF began (i.e. just 1.0% in 
1961-71) which lagged behind population exponential growth (of 2.3% in 1961-71). It 
is no mystery why India suffered milk shortages in the 1960s. 
Agrostat/FAO/1990 shows rapid progress in India thereafter: exponential growth in total 
milk production of (5.2% in 1972-93) ruiming past population exponential growth 
(2.1% in 1972-93). Thus, even had Indian population growth not fallen slightly (from 
2.3% to 2.1%), the 5.2% exponential growth in total milk production would have 
increased per capita milk supplies - Thomas Malthus would be pleasantly surprised to 
have his dour predictions on food and polulation growth refiited. In the milk-deficit-
decade of the 1960s, Indian total milk production had held at about 20 thousand MT, 
but after OF began it rallied, and by 1993 it tripled at 63 thousand MT. India was 
winning its White Revolution. 
9 
148 
Fig. 24 
150 
Other developments of interest include a precipitous 42% drop in milk excluding butter 
per capita intake by Turkey from 1961 (94.2 kg.) to 1989 (55 kg.), due to cuts in all 
forms of dairy aid from all donors, including the EEC after its milk quotas began in 
1984. The maps (Fig. 22/1961 and Fig. 24/1989) focusing on India's performance (as 
well as Fig. 23 and Fig. 25 in the appendix) reveal much else. But even a short 
summary should note the jump in South Korean consumption 1961-89 by nearly 11-
times (from 2.4 kg. in 1961 to 24.9 kg. in 1989). However, in absolute quantities, 
China's doubling of milk excluding butter intake in 1961-89 (from 2.4 kg. to 5 kg.) 
invites speculation as to how far China's one billion people will develop their taste for 
dairy products. 
Conclusions of Chapter 3 
While China's small consumption rise might be the murmur of a waking dragon, there 
was no doubt that India roused its dairy industry from the torpor of the 1960s in a 
straightline rise to a leading role among world dairy producers. No doubt? Hardly. 
Critics of India's Operation Flood such as Claude Alvarez claimed the White 
Revolution was a "White Lie" and that consumption increases relied on EEC dairy aid. 
Shanti George was hardly less brutal in her comments, and Martin Doombos and his 
fellow researchers at The Hague called OF a failure, in which almost one-third of the 
throughput in formal cooperative processing plants was due to EEC dairy aid.^^ 
In retrospect these charges, made a decade before the Agrostat/FAO data were available 
(and presented in the charts and maps of this chapter) are understandable - but 
essentially mistaken. Chapter 4 relates additional details of how, despite problems 
and mistakes. Operation Flood made steady progress toward Indian dairy autonomy. 
38 M. Doombos, P. van Stuivenberg & P. Terhal (November, 1987) "Operation Flood: impacts and 
issues" m Food Policy. 
3^  P.J. Atkins (August, 1988) "Rejoinder. India's dairy development and Operation Flood" in Food 
Policy. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CASE HISTORY OF OPERATION FLOOD (OF) 
IN INDIA 
Introduction 
Although dairying is sometimes criticised for supposedly squandering the food value of 
plants in cattle fodder when plant matter theoretically could provide more nutrition to 
people than milk products, the suitability of dairying for many areas of the world is 
beyond dispute. In areas where arable farming is impossible, dairy animals can add to 
the net food security of people by transforming plants and crop wastes inedible to 
humans into milk.^ Harold Alderman notes: 
In regions which are hilly or semi-arid, a concentration on pastoralism is in keeping with 
the ecological resource base. In other, often more favoured regions, the proximity of 
urban markets provides a demand for dairy products and, hence, may encourage 
investment in dairying.^  
These are among the reasons why by 1988 the WFP had approved dairy development 
projects in 30 countries, and 16 of them were already being implemented in 1987 -
equal to about 8% of the total value of WFP efforts. The WFP admits dairy projects are 
among the "most challenging" of development projects because they take a long time to 
achieve their goals (e.g. improved genetics, fodder base, production and consumption 
rises) and whatever the indigenous soil, climate and social background: 
longer-term success... depends on a variety of technical, ecological, social, economic and 
political factors, at both the micro and macro levels.^  
WFP officials judged India to have many areas suitable for dairying, so it cooperated 
with the Government of India (GOI), the EEC and other bodies in Operation Flood 
(OF), the biggest dairy development programme in the world. OF has been attacked via 
all the factors noted in the above citation - plus feminist critiques - and more. 
Nevertheless, although some dairy efforts fell awry to changing political conditions 
(e.g. in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in 1979), or recognition that ecological, 
spatial {yis-a-vis marketing to urban centres) or political factors left them still-bom. 
' Hoard's Dairyman (January 10, 1995) "A world of feed for cows": p 14. 
^ Harold Alderman (1986) The Impact of Cooperative Dairy Development in Kamataka. 
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Operation Flood (OF) endured from the early 1970s into the 1990s. Although OF 
operations affected only about 1% of the total milk supply of India, the programme had 
far-reaching effects on dairy infrastructure, production and consumption. 
This chapter wi l l present additional evidence (from Agrostat/FAO/1990 & 1994, etc.) 
that, following the doldrums of the 1960s, the heavy capital investments made possible 
by OF, extending into the 1990s, contributed to growth in Indian dairying that (while 
not meeting all the demands of special interest groups) is impressive in comparison 
with the dairy performance of other developing countries. 
Martin Doombos, and his colleagues from the Indo-Dutch Studies on Alternative 
Development series were again a valuable resource for this chapter, as were many 
others including Harold Alderman, P.J. Atkins, John Empson, M.V. Kamath, and Shanti 
George. Analysis of OF can be valuable because, although each dairy project is unique 
and "country-specific", the WFP points out that all share factors that "can be addressed 
by a common policy perspective." As this chapter relates, one of the principal 
questions on dairy development (and on the Anand model in OF in particular) is how to 
discern which aspects are transferable from one locale to another. 
Whether or not dairy aid continues to be a major part of international food aid projects, 
insights from an analysis of Operation Flood also have implications for commercial 
development of dairying in other countries. 
In sections below, we shall summarise overall aid to India and the three phases of the 
implementation of OF. We wil l examine views supporting and opposing OF, both 
within and without India, and the interplay of these critiques on the evolution of OF. 
References wil l be made to Agrostat/FAO data, such as that presented in the last 
chapter, in which we compared the dairy performance of India to Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Pakistan, Zimbabwe and other countries. And in the light of recent data we shall draw 
some final conclusions on the role of dairy aid in India's White Revolution. 
^ WFP 25* Session, Rome (April 21, 1988) "Food aid & dairy development"; pp 1-16. 
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Origins of O F 
The model for the cooperative dairy structure characteristic of Operation Flood (OF) 
originated in the Kaira district of Gujarat, roughly equidistant between Delhi and 
Bombay in 1945-46. Dilip R. Shah calls the co-op the Anand-Kheda Milk Producers' 
Cooperative Union'*, but it is also widely known as the Kaira District Cooperative Milk 
Producers' Union and by the acronym KDCPMU. The biggest coop in the district is 
AMUL^ located at Anand, and by consensus became famous as "the Anand model". 
But there was to be little agreement about many other aspects of this historic 
cooperative. 
The appropriateness of the Anand model for replication in other areas became a chief 
point of controversy. P.J. Atkins notes that Gujarat already was one of India's main 
dairying areas, although not specialised to the extent of Cheshire in temperate England.^ 
7 8 
A.S. Patel as well as Shanti George note that dairy development proceeded 
spontaneously in Gujarat, benefiting from a railway link to Bombay built in the 19* 
century, before establishment of the Anand structure that became the basic model for 
OF. A geo-economic link with Bombay was undeniably a boon to Anand. As Clive 
Crook wrote about Bombay (officially renamed Mumbai in the early 1990s): 
Mumbai.. is to Delhi as Manhattan is to Washington, DC. ' 
Furthermore, critics like Shanti George and Claude Alvarez claimed OF was seldom 
successfijl at replicating the Anand model outside Gujarat; with some justice they 
condemned the single-mindedness with which OF proselytised the replication of the 
Anand model in parts of India that bore little resemblance to Anand. OF detractors like 
* Dilip R. Shah (1992) Dairy Cooperativization. p67. 
' M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien-Stvle: pp 113-114. Kamath claims that despite conjecture, 
"There was no such thing as Anand Milk Union Ltd." Because KDCMPU was too unwieldy, a name 
competition produced "Amul" - associated with the Sanskrit word Amulya meaning invaluable or priceless, 
* P.J. Atkins (1989) "Operation Flood: dairy development in India" Geography : p 259-262. My family 
home of Whatcom County, surrounding the SMP processing centre in Lynden, Washington, in the US is 
somewhat comparable to Cheshire. 
^ A.S. Patel (1983) "Cooperative Dairying and Rural Development: A Case Study of Amul" paper cited 
by H. Alderman a/ in (1987) Dairy Development in India. 
* Shanti George (1983) "Cooperatives and Indian Dairy Policy: More Anand than Pattern" in 
Cooperatives in World Development by D.W. Attwood and B.S. Baviskar (eds), Delhi, OUP. 
' Clive Crook February 22, 1997 "Survey of India: time to let go" in Economist: with contributions from 
Charles Collyns of the IMF, Robert Zagha of the Worid Bank, Jeffrey Sachs et al of the Harvard Institute 
for International Development, and Adit Jain of E I U in Delhi: p 10. 
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George and Alvarez also attributed (again with at least some justice) any apparent 
successes of OF to the advantage of government favour, sealed by PM Nehru's public 
embrace of Dr. V. Kurien at the opening of a SMP plant for buffalo milk in 1955, 
continuing under PM Shastri in 1964, and on with the patronage of the Congress party 
under Indira Gandhi. Critics both in and outside India complained of over-optimism - i f 
not outright dissembling - in official OF reports. 
Many components of OF are typical of "top-down" programmes, in that it was imposed 
by OF authorities under the auspices of the Indian federal goverrmient on a vast, 
heterogeneous country, sometimes taking over dairy programmes previously established 
by the states. Although the WFP officially called OF a project, it utilised amounts of 
donated (dairy product) food aid as impressive as in the surplus disposal programmes of 
the 1950s and 1960s, in international agreements often signed in the capital of Delhi. 
But OF also had components that could be described as "bottom-up". Harold Alderman 
says that, like most forms of dairy development favoured by the World Bank, OF 
promoted surplus rural milk "as i f it were a cash crop".'° I f rural production could be 
increased, and the logistics of transport to urban centres overcome, subsistence farmers 
could be integrated into the cash economy, while increasing nutritional supplies in both 
urban and rural sectors. 
A "top-down" programme to defend India's dairy autonomy? 
Many arguments have been and still are marshalled against the "top-down", centrally-
plarmed - inefficient Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs)" that dominate almost all 
production employing more than 100 workers in India. Operation Flood, by contrast, 
was one "top-down" programme that was fortunate to enjoy measures of flexibility and 
autonomy not always enjoyed by managers of highly regulated industries as steel. 
OF has always benefited from a vigorous team of managers guided by Tribhuvandas K. 
Patel and (most prominently) Dr. Verghese Kurien. As a cooperative representing 
private dairy farmers, Anand resembled what now in Britain is called a QUANGO - a 
Harold Alderman (1986) The impact of cooperative dairy development in Karmtaka: p iii. 
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quasi-non-govemment organisation. While farmer participation - indeed democracy -
were ideological themes in the promotion of OF in the field, and Kurien et al were 
constantly open to feedback from villagers, the project was led from the top by 
technocrats. P.J. Atkins described the Anand model as "a combination of top-down 
planning and bottom-up participation."'^ But detractors complained of too little 
participation of farmers in planning, charging, for example, that no small farmers 
served on the Indian Dairy Commission that oversaw OF. 
Although government pafronage remained sfrong until the demise of the Congress Party 
in the 1990s, much OF success can be traced to decisions made by Dr. Kurien, who was 
already a nationally-known leader of the Anand cooperative nearly two decades before 
OF-I began. OF supporters claim that Kurien, who came to personify OF, resisted the 
overmarming and waste that scuttled other top-down, govenmient sponsored 
programmes (e.g. speciality steels'^). But detractors in- and outside government were 
suspicious (or envious) of Kurien's autonomy, both in control of OF's impressive 
budget, and in the fact that he managed OF from Anand, far from Delhi. 
Because of the unique nature of (ultra-perishable) liquid drinking milk, micro- and 
macroeconomic efficiencies could be gained by a large-scale, top-down approach. 
Making and marketing milk is not like making tea kettles or shovels. Alden C. 
Manchester notes the essential differences between the dairy industry and other 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities: 
In many way, it is unique....The diflFerences must be understood because they play a 
significant role in determining the effects of different public policies towards the dairy 
industry.''' 
Compared to other activities - even growing potatoes - milk production requires 
specialised inputs, buildings, skilled and continuous management. Manchester also 
'' Clive Crook February 22, 1997 "A Survey of India: time to let go" in Economist, p 4. Crook cites 
India's well-intentioned capacity-licensing regime governing investment, production and labour relations 
as a chief culprit for laggard economic development. 
P.J. Atkins (August, 1988) "Rejoinder: India's dairy development and Operation Flood" in Food 
Policy 
(1989, 1990) Personal communication: Conversations (at IFMA exhibition, Cologne) with a bicycle 
manufacturer from India, who said he had to travel to Germany to purchase strong steel alloy fittings to 
complete bicycle frames because he claimed, "The subsidised steel industry in India has no incentive to 
produce them." 
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notes the difficulty of varying "the rate of output" of cow milk yield, the high costs of 
entry or exit from dairying, and the susceptibility of dairying to sanitation problems. 
Although Manchester was writing primarily about the modem US milk market, virtually 
all his points apply - albeit on a different scale - to milk production in rural India. 
Manchester could just as well be describing India when he writes: 
Instability is inherent in milk markets. Production varies seasonally largely for biological 
reasons and from day to day - neither type of variation is coordinated with changes in 
demand." 
Compared to medium-scale manufactures of, say, kitchen utensils or farm implements, 
where top-down, centrally-plarmed national management usually led to product 
stagnation (for example the demise of the electrical goods industry in the Eastbloc 
noted by Kazimierz Z. Poznanski'^) due to lack of competition, and inefficient use of 
resources, a top-down approach was the most expedient way for India to meet rising 
demand for milk in the cities. The "milk famines" of the late 1960s demonstrated the 
inability of the traditional system of dairy farms located inside or on the peripheries of 
cities to provide a stable supply of pure milk to India's urban population. Such isolated 
enterprises could not cope with erratic milk supply, depleted by drought and disease, 
and their small capital base was inadequate to finance processing infrastructure and 
fast, hygienic fransport to ship large quantities of milk from the countryside to cities. 
The vulnerability of isolated small-scale milk producers in dairy systems (not members 
of cooperatives) is according to Manchester, typified by a small number of processors 
(inviting monopolistic price-squeezes). Therefore, Manchester suggests the desirability 
of: 
Long-term commitments by producers and processors producer groups [which are] 
often able to reach more favourable terms than individual producers...a public 
agency...as an arbitrator between buyers and sellers, providing a measure of stability 
which they cannot provide for themselves. 
These suggestions for enhancing the welfare of the once poor and isolated dairy farmers 
of the US, strongly echo the rationale for Operation Flood in India. With a top-down 
^ Alden C. Manchester (1983) The Public Role in the Dairy Economy: pp 3-8. 
Alden C. Manchester (1983): p 5. 
'* Kazimierz Z. Poznanski (1987) Technology. Competition. & the Soviet Bloc: pp 87-89 
'^Manchester (1983): p 8. 
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scheme under the aegis of Delhi, working with a network of farmer-cooperatives, OF 
could hope to: 
(1) to raise the welfare of nu-al farmers by eliminating the confrol of the milk supply by 
village elites and petty dairy marketeers (who often doubled as moneylenders, but 
captured a disproportionate amount of the rents, or profits, from dairying); 
(2) to raise production throughout the country; 
(3) eliminate adulteration of milk, often with unsanitary water, that increased during the 
so-called milk famines of the 1960s; especially since, as Acharya & Yadav explain, 
"the prevailing market price of milk" was not "remunerative."'^ 
(4) ensure the stability of milk supply to cities, via an interlinked National Milk Grid 
System (NMGS) able to meet excess demand in some markets with surplus milk 
dravsTi from others, while topping up the milk supply from buffer stocks'' generated 
within India - as well as dairy commodities from the EEC and WFP; 
(5) defend India's milk autonomy, by preparing for the donation of massive quantities 
of EEC dairy aid with a consolidated national plan designed to (i) mitigate possible 
disincentives to Indian dairy farmers by (ii) investing the profits from donated 
commodities into the NMGS, which, in time would make it impossible for unadvised 
donations of dairy aid to ruin the price structures underpinning India's milk system. 
However difficult to prove, the last point (5) may be the most important. Certainly it 
was a point of unremitting controversy, for many OF defractors feared that the very 
presence of EEC dairy commodities on Indian soil was evidence of the country's 
dependence on the EEC. Nevertheless, evidence exists that OF was (at least in part) a 
prescient, pre-emptive initiative by Indian dairy planners to turn what they saw as the 
inevitable flow (probably impossible to stop, given political conditions in Europe and 
India) of EEC dairy aid into investment toward Indian dairy autonomy. OF planners 
realised that food aid had reduced the food autonomy of some coimtries such as 
'^ Acharya & Yadav (1992) Production and Marketing of Milk and Milk Products in India, p 83. This 
study in Rajasthan found that that especially in the "unorganised market" , i.e. non-OF areas of Rajasthan, 
(i) farmers did not believe the market price of milk remunerative, and (ii) many farmers believed that "milk 
price received from them has no relationship with its quality and hence increase the quantity of milk (by 
mixing water) to get higher total return." This is evidence of the harmfiil effects of the rigid price controls 
deplored by Clive Crook and Jeffrey Sachs, noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
" Martin Doombose/a/ (1990) Dairy Aid & Development: India's Operation Flood: p 124. Doombos 
et al use the acronym NMGS. 
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Nigeria, which turned from indigenous grains to American wheat. So OF authorities 
sought to preserve their independence by playing off one donor against another. 
Doombos et al write: 
At the time of negotiations of OF-III [Operation Flood, phase III], agmn, NDDB 
officials made it clear that if the E E C were reluctant to supply additional aid, India 
would switch to the USA, New Zealand or Australia for continued support to its dairy 
strategy. Thus, it would be incorrect to argue that in the case of Operation Flood, it is 
primarily the E E C which has been dictating any terms of incorporation.^ " 
Although the following citations are lengthy they are noteworthy for their evidence of 
the fundamental logic and cleverness of OF plans - and plarmers. According to 
Doombos et al: 
It has often been stressed that the basic motivation underlying Operation Flood has been 
precisely opposite to one that would have India surrender its autonomy in the field of 
dairy development in favour of an inclusion into an EEC-sponsored incorporation chain. 
Thus it can be argued that the programme's key objective has been to safeguard and 
strengthen autonomy in dairying vis-a-vis the incorporative designs of the E E C or other 
major dairy exporters, even if it had to be at the 'price' of the internal incorporation of 
India's organised dairy economy within the centralised Operation Flood framework. 
Doombos et al note the implicit threat that OF planners sought to defend against: 
The E E C , it has often been suggested by OF programme authorities, at one time had 
threatened to dump large quantities of surplus dairy commodities onto the Indian 
market. On the premise of a 'dumping threat', the safeguarding formula developed was 
that of an ingenious programme structure which, while accepting the E E C commodities 
as aid, would use them to finance the expansion of a national dairying infrastructure and 
keep Indian authorities firmly in control.^' 
Put another way: Europe offered India a lemon, and India made lemonade. By the time 
OF was established in 1970, the history of food aid was replete with instances where 
untimely food "donations" had benefited special interests in donor countries (by 
stabilising domestic prices, lowering storage costs, raising political prestige, etc.) - but 
harmed farmers, and ultimately consumers, in recipient coimtries by lowering market 
prices, and throwing indigenous food systems into disarray (from the loss of income, 
and uncertainty over future incomes, caused by superfluous food aid). Even i f we 
assume perfect good wil l by all members of EEC negotiating teams, OF officials would 
have been wise to employ strategies to close the opportunity for special interests (e.g. 
an individual or firm trying to comer the European milk powder market - or even well-
Martin Doombos et al (1990) Dairy Aid & Development: p 301 
'^ Martin Doombos et al (1990): p 301. OF leader Dr. Verghese Kurien alluded to this threat in his 
response to critics titled Black Lie. 
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Fig. 26 NMGS 1988 
National Milk Grid System (NMGS) 1988 
Source: National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) 
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Fig. 27 NMGS1990-91 (Source: NDDB) 
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meaning EEC officials who simply were unaware of the potential dangers that untimely 
food "donations" pose to a recipient country). OF officials knew that a large gift of 
about 20 million MT could demolish dairy market structures in even its healthiest 
states. Like a giant snakebite, 20 million MT of SMP arriving in Bombay harbour could 
have paralysed dairy structures throughout the state of Gujarat. So OF negotiated a plan 
with the EEC and the WFP to "monetise" the dairy aid. In other words, OF would 
invest sales of scheduled shipments of EEC dairy aid into the National Milk Grid 
System (See Maps: Fig. 26 NMG1988 and Fig. 27 NMG1990-91; Source: NDDB) 
which functioned as a metaphorical snakebite kit able to flush the initial entry point (or 
"wound" around Bombay and Gujarat), and disperse incoming dairy commodity gifts^^ 
throughout the Indian sub-continent, eventually making its price structures immune to 
future onslaughts of dairy aid. 
In respect to a threat that the EEC might dump dairy aid on India, ruining part of its 
dairy structures, we can conclude that such a threat need not have been made explicitly 
or in earnest. Why? Because, just as nature abhors a vacuum, so does international 
trade. (We can assume that various private, governmental and semi-governmental 
arbitrageurs participating in international dairy trade continually seek to affect world 
commodities markets in ways that increase their net profits. ^ )^ That is, simple 
recognition by special interests on either side, in the EEC or in India, was enough to 
establish the potential for such damaging dairy aid shipments to be sent to India. Their 
destructive potential for Indian dairy development was the reason Shanti George (1985) 
termed EEC dairy aid a "Trojan Horse".^ '* The best way to immunise the Indian dairy 
system against such threats was through administration of the NMGS. Semper paratus. 
Ending 1960s' "milk famines^ ' 
Of course India faced more immediate worries than ships full of SMP and BO steaming 
from the EEC. Its immediate concern was to end the so-called milk famine, in which 
Food aid sceptics would appreciate the irony in the facts that the German word Gift means poison, and 
that Germany was the largest contributor to EEC surpluses, aka the Butter Mountain, 
William Greider (1997) One World. Ready or Not: p 59, etc. Greider shows how arbitrage operates 
almost universally. 
Shanti George (1985) Operation Flood. 
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the traditional, unconsolidated supply systems failed to meet milk demand in India's 
urban centres in the 1960s. Meeting demand in growing urban markets with 
consistency over the waxing and waning of seasonal and annual supply (See Fig. 28 
Final form of the Anand Pattern in the NMGS below.) required expensive 
improvements in modem processing centres, and in hygienic transport infrastructure, 
carrying milk between producers in the hinterland, and urban consumers. Although 
rural producers would likely react to growing urban demand with increased production 
in the medium- and long-term, Doombos et al point out: 
Rather than as a strategy for increasing Indian millc production. Operation Flood has 
been designed as a programme for structuring the Indian milk market in a specific 
way... .dairy aid has functioned, and still flinctions, as a physical input into the emerging 
dairy industry. As such, dairy aid provided by the WFP and the EEC has first of all 
served to establish the NMGS. This is one of the reasons why the programme has been 
dependent on commodity aid for so long.^' 
The National Milk Grid System took years to develop, and as the maps show (Fig. 26 
and Fig. 27 above) major progress was still being made on the Madras-to-Calcutta milk 
transport route in the late 1980s, and improvements continue today. Certainly it was 
fortuitous that India's need for expensive capital investments, on a national scale, 
coincided with EEC dairy surpluses - as well as the political will and creativity, among 
GOI, EEC, WFP, FAO and OF officials, to seize the opportunities to advance Indian 
dairy development in a scenario fraught with peril to India's dairy autonomy. 
The uniqueness of milk 
P.J. Atkins argues that as a "valued perishable commodity" important to the nutritional 
and economic well-being of developing economies, "milk is a special case" that merits 
capital-intensive investment: 
where the long-term benefits which accrue to society outweigh the short-term benefits.^ ^ 
Milk is different from cereals - not to mention non-food commodities such as coal or 
stainless steel because: (1) it has a constant, relatively inelastic demand; (2) but has to 
be produced on a twice-daily basis; (3) must be processed almost inmiediately after 
production on a farm; and (4) can be stored only for limited periods, usually at high 
cost. Milk is a world away from coal, widgets - or even wheat, which is storable for 
Doombos etal (1990a) Dairy Aid & Development, pp 124, 135. The overall variation in procurement 
of milk is about 1:1.8 and Doombos says March is usually the relatively "flush" month. 
P.J. Atkins (1988) "Rejoinder: India's dairy development and OF" in Food Policy. 
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Tig. 2S Anand Pattern 
Final form of the Anahd Pattern 
in the National Milk Grid System (NMGS) incorporating 
"Mother Dairies" in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi & Madras 
Source: National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) 
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several years. Furthermore, although demand for milk is fairly inelastic 
(notwithstanding the high income-elasticity of demand for milk among the poor in 
India), the supply is naturally elastic, according to regular seasonal changes as well as 
unpredictable droughts, fodder shortages and cattle disease. Harold Alderman says: 
Like many field crops, milk production is seasonal but, unlike grains for example, it 
cannot be stored in its "raw" form. Hence, product transformation is necessary in order 
to utilise flush season production effectively. 
Milk production is a labour intensive industry, apt for the large rural pool of surplus 
labour of India. At the same time, streamlining Indian infrastructure on a national scale 
posed sobering logistical challenges, requiring high levels of appropriate modem 
technology. It is doubtful that such large-scale investments would have been spawned 
as quickly by a "bottom-up" approach that sought to achieve its means only by on-the-
ground approaches, e.g.: technical extension services, development of artificial 
insemination (AI), or even subsidised sales of fodder concentrates. Of course these 
methods would have increased milk supply in rural villages. But as the supply 
"trickled-up" to urban centres, too many of the gains (from what economists call 
expanding the "production possibilities frontier") would have been captured by 
middlemen, or simply lost as waste or spoilage due to poor transport or processing. 
Because of the National Milk Grid System (NMGS), it may be more accurate to 
describe OF as a "flood-up" rather than "trickle-up" programme. Certainly, it is hard to 
imagine that "bottom-up" efforts could have vaulted India into what John Empson calls 
"the dairy big leagues" as quickly as did OF, and he notes that in 1974 India: 
then ranked with France or Germany, the two largest European producers but trailed 
well behind the USSR and the US, numbers one and two in the international production 
league. With a population at that time of 375 milhon, 15% of the world total, India had 
barely 5% of the world's milk production.^ * 
27 Harold Alderman (1986) Karmtaka. p iii. 
John Empson (September 25, 1993) "India joins the dairy big leagues" in Hoard's Dairyman, p 692. 
With 55.1 billion pounds (ca. 25b kg.) at the beginning of OF, Indian production rose to 121.3 billion 
pounds (ca. 55b kg) in 1991. (N.B. Webster's notes I US long ton = 1.016 metric tonnes; 1 US pound = 
0.454 kilograms. 1 metric tonne=2.2046 US pounds.) Therefore, 1974 India production of 55.1b pounds 
= 24,993 thousand MT, correlating with Agrostat FAO figures of 24,500 thousand MT in that year. It 
should be remembered that FAO statistics fi-om countries not enjoying the generally good record-keeping 
systems of India will vary in their accuracy. 
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Table 11 
i^igttfMt shows milk growtb in Indians Operation Flood 
xlOOOMT 1970 1974 1991 
India 20.8 24.5 58.4 
France 22.8 24.6 26.4 
Germany 28.2 28.6 29.1 
USA 53.1 52.4 67.3 
USSR 83.0 91.8 101.3 
Source: Agrostat/1994/FAO/livestock/milk production 
Nor is it likely that, without investment in convenient and efficient mariceting 
technology such as vending machines^ ^ in urban centres, such reliable urban demand 
could have been generated. The efficiency of these machines helped hold urban milk 
price increases below general price rises, further strengthening the inelasticity of urban 
demand. This secure urban outlet for rural milk production gradually increased rural 
income security, as OF was weaned from dairy aid, and increased its reliance upon 
domestically produced milk. 
What a difference a decade (or two) makes. Empson writes that by 1990-91, India's 
share of world population had increased to 16%, but its milk share had more than 
doubled to 11% (121.3 billion pounds/ ca. 55b kg.), to outstrip the co/nZ>//je<j? production 
of France and Germany, threatening the number two status of the US, as well as the 
still-leading position of the ex-USSR. In two decades India's per capita availability of 
milk rose from 90.2 pounds a year (41 kg.) to 143 pounds (65 kg.) annually, according 
to Empson. With plans of 172 billion pounds by the year 2000, India may dislodge the 
US as the world's number two dairy producer, and perhaps threaten the production 
leadership of the ex-USSR countries in the next century. 
International Seminar on Dcurvits as an Instrument for Proeress: the Indian Experience: Proceeduifs 
1989: pp 127-128. PubUshed (1990) by NDDB (Anand 388 001 India) in association with International 
Dairy Federation (IDF). Brussels, Belgium. In a question and answer session, D. Tildoi, of the Delhi 
Mother Dairy, said vending machines dispense an average 1300-1400 litres per day. 
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This has been accomplished to a background cadence of unceasing criticism, from both 
within and without India. On the macroeconomic level, detractors saw the rationale for 
food aid in OF as a reexertion of control by former colonialist powers, to make India 
dependent on surpluses generated by Europe's wasteful, subsidised agriculture. Harold 
Alderman riposted that argument saying: 
The magnitude of this aid raises the usual controversial questions of dependency and 
disincentives to domestic producers. However, this aid is also presented as an example 
of how to creatively use conmiodity aid to promote agricultural development .^ " 
OF supporters reply that, on the macroeconomic level, India has gradually reduced 
imports of EU food aid, whilst increasing indigenous production. 
On the microeconomic level, detractors criticised the importation of European breeds to 
hot India, and of high-tech processing equipment to an economy with a labour surplus. 
OF supporters argue that, on the microeconomic level, India settled for a middle way, 
between inefficient low-tech and expensive, insupportable high-tech. For example, OF 
utilised the intermediate technology of efficiently-insulated train cars (instead of 
costlier refrigeration cars used in the US and Europe) to fransport homogenised milk to 
urban cenfres. This saved costs and functioned well enough for its purposes. Despite 
criticism by Claude Alvarez and Shanti George over OF's payments to a Swedish firm 
for setting up a Tetra Pak laminated paper plant, the tefrahedron-shaped milk cartons 
worked well in coin-operated dispensing machines, and Kurien claimed they used 20% 
less paper than brick-shaped designs.^ ' When evidence for independence from dairy 
aid, or raised milk consumption or production wore thin, apologists for OF maintained 
that profits from higher-tech processing plants funded construction of a National Milk 
Grid System (NMGS)^ ,^ which could stimulate economies of scale in transport 
infrastmcture, which in tum could stimulate rural milk production increases, eventually 
resulting in better nutrition and economic vitality in villages as well as urban centres. 
^"Harold Alderman (1986) Kamataka: p 11. 
^' M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien Style: p 340. Tetra Pak became a political football between 
nationalists and fi-ee traders. 
Doornbos and some others refer to the NMGS. P.J. Atkins uses the shorter acronym NMG. 
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The simplistic breakdown above is offered to give the general outlines of the OF 
debate, which all too often bore too little relation to reality. More details will be 
examined throughout this chapter. 
OF similarity to the MMB in the UK & cooperative structures in the US 
In fact, OF may be an example of a "top-down" dairy marketing stmcture that in some 
respects is transferable between differing geographical circumstances. OF resembles 
Britain's Milk Marketing Board (recently superseded by privatised stmctures such as 
Milk Marque), which was established in England, Wales, Scotland in 1933-34, and in 
Northern Ireland in 1955." The goals of OF scarcely differ from those of the MMB, 
which were to improve regular supply to the cities; to improve hygiene by policing 
adulteration, to fight diseases such as tuberculosis^* that had been endemic in British 
herds for many years, and to improve the welfare of farm families formerly at the mercy 
of laissez-faire price-cutting by commercial milk processors. 
It can also be argued that OF is simply a larger version of the local dairy coops such as 
Darigold in the Pacific Northwest of the US, that grew into large regional farmer-owned 
coops after the end of WW-I in 1918.^ ^^ ^ Their implementation, (owing much to 
Ben Fine a / O f / (1995) Consumption in the Age of Affluence: pp 262-263 
P.J. Atkins (September, 1996) "Mad Cows and Englishmen" in History Today. 
AJden C. Manchester (1983) Uie Public Role in the Dairy Economy: p 17. Manchester writes that, 
"Up until about 1880 [in the US], the competitive picture in fluid milk markets was largely one of 
atomistic competition. From then until World War I , large dealers dominated. Cooperatives became 
important in negotiating with dealers during and after the War." 
Darigold, Inc. (1993-1994) Publications, documents and personal communications fi-om Douglas C. 
Marshall (corporate counsel) and Roger D. Miller (sales manager for products incl. milk powder. In 1993, 
the Darigold cooperative comprised 1400 dairy farmers, 1600 employees and projected $900m in sales in 
fiscal year 1992/93. Mr. Marshall wrote me (April 21, 1993 letter) that, "Darigold is the largest US 
processor of skimmed milk powder (which we refer to as dry milk powder, or NFDM)." Darigold exports 
large quantities of milk powder under the US government's DEIP (Dairy Export Incentive programme). 
In 1992, Darigold exported about 48 thousand tonnes (based on a given figure of 94,802,107) to countries 
including Kuwait, Panama, Trinidad/Ghana, Algeria, Chile, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, St. Lucia, 
Columbia, Egypt and Mexico. 
In December 1992, Darigold DEIP sales of NFMP, WMP. butteroil (BO), butter, cheddar cheese and 
mozzarella cheese amounted to 155,486 MT, with a "total bonus value" of $140.3 million. In the 
documents I have seen (originating fi-om darigold, Inc. and the USD A) no exports to India were recorded, 
suggesting either/or Indian self-sufficiency in milk powder, or continued hegemony of EU exporters in the 
Indian market. Shipments to Egypt, Jordan and Russia recorded in Darigold documents suggest synergy 
between US foreign policy and food export goals - in a pattern that this thesis traces to, at least, the end of 
WW-n. In fact, Marshall wrote me that, "the [US] State department is quite influential" in determining 
exclusion or eligibility of countries for concessionary DEIP dairy sales. Marshall added that: 
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government encouragement) accomplished much the same goals as the MMB in Britain 
and OF in India, including increases in consumer welfare, farmer welfare, milk hygiene, 
milk demand, milk supply and reliability of that supply through better infi-astructure. 
Organisation of overall food aid in India 
In the decades after WW-II India was a proving ground for the three forms of food aid 
described in Chapter 2, and reprised here; 
(1) Emergency food aid: provided on bilateral, multilateral and NGO bases in 
emergencies, such as the famine in Rajasthan.in 1968. Since then, hidia has 
admirably improved its "self-help" abilities. The US contributed 400,000 tonnes of 
maize for emergency poultry feed during the historic drought of 1987, but Delhi's 
own response, utilising stored food stocks, distribution systems and Calamity Relief 
Funds, was a dramatic demonstration of India's improved response to food 
emergencies in all regions of the country." 
(2) Programme food aid: phased out of India by 1978. Before then, India absorbed 
nearly 60 million tonnes of bilateral programme food aid from the US and Canada, 
in the years 1956-76, most of which was wheat and cereals, worth $4.8 billion in 
1993 prices.^ * When the US government returned Rsl6.8 billion in payments (for 
DEEP sales for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1992 were "about 250 million pounds [ ca. 
114 thousand MT] most of it NFDM compared to 873 million pounds [ca. 397 thousand MT] of 
US NFDM production. And Darigold's powder was about 95 million pounds [ca. 43 thousand 
MT]ofthe total." 
Figures in [brackets] are my estimates fi-om US pounds to Metric Tonnes (MT), Additionally, Marshall 
wrote that he believes original PL 480 provisions subsidising US dairy exports were discontinued during 
the 1960s: 
in response to pressure fi^om certain allies, especially Australia and new Zealand. (I'm not sure 
why that policy changed, but understand that related to foreign policy considerations.) 
By 1985, that relationship had changed (especially with new Zealand), and congress was more 
interested in our dairy industry than theirs. The heavy EC subsidies had caused surpluses, and 
they had dumped their dairy products on the international market. The US realised that we would 
either have to follow suit or use the GATT mechanism to remove all subsidies so that all 
countries could compete on unsubsidised basis. That was the Reagan Administration approach to 
GATT, and DEIP was put into the 1985 Farm Bill at least in part to put pressure on other 
countries. 
I am grateful to Marshall, Miller and Darigold for their input. I believe this information supports a 
contention of this thesis, that post-WW-n US agricultural policy has always been tied to foreign policy. 
For instance, it can be hypothesised that US farm export policy became more aggressive vis-a-vis New 
Zealand, after that country banned US nuclear weapons fi-om its soil. 
" Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid: p 61-69 
Shaw & Clay (1993); p 59. 
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concessionary food grain sales) to the Indian government, after a 1974 agreement, 
some of the repatriated funds were reinvested in animal husbandry and dairy 
development, as well as irrigation, soil conservation and other projects benefiting 
agriculture in general. In the decade 1968/69 to 1976/77, Canada provided India 
with about $361 million (in 1993 prices) of programme food, comprising about 
three-quarters cereals, nearly one-quarter in rape seeds and oil, and the rest in 
skimmed milk powder. (India may have been a convenient outlet for surplus from 
Canada's milk quota system.) 
(3) Project food aid: is aimed at income transfer to the poor, scheduled castes, tribes, 
rural poor, women and pre-school children, school lunches, and food-for-work 
(FFW) projects, etc.. India utilises both domestic food and donations from the WFP 
and other donors for FFW projects. '^ The country has a tradition of such schemes, 
notably MEGS - the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme begun in 1972. 
Other major FFW projects were initiated in 1977,1980,1983 and 1989. 
Project food aid entirely phased out programme aid (in which wheat and rice were the 
chief commodities provided) in India after 1978. In some respects, this was recognition 
of (1) economic progress made by the recipient coimtry; (2) the benefits to both 
recipients and donors of food aid, and the mutual respect required in such 
relationships* ;^ and (3) evidence that properly targeted project food aid posed fewer 
disincentives to Indian farmers, while offering potential rises in output and welfare rises 
in Indian dairying. 
Food aid practitioners such as John Shaw and Edward Clay admit it is difficult to 
distinguish between programme aid and project aict^, but say that programme aid is 
always donated on a bilateral govemment-to-govemment relationship (offering balance-
of-payments support, etc.), while project aid effects income transfers to the poor i f it is 
carefully administered by multilateral organisations such as the WFP. Targeted project 
39 Shaw & Clay (1993) World Food Aid: pp 2, 68. Examples of successfiJ FFW projects include road 
building in Turkey. 
' "M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien-Stvle: p 162 The refiisal of OF's Dr. Kurien to accept 
"mouldy milk powder and rancid butter oil" donations fi-om Europe was a source of pride to his country-
men - and a reminder to the EEC that its wastefiil CAP subsidies were the primum movum of food "aid" 
Shaw & Clay (1993): p 2. 
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aid is also thought less vulnerable than mass programme food aid to illegal sales and 
other corruption. Shaw & Clay note the new trends in food aid: 
By 1992, vegetable oil and dairy aid to India comprised over 50% of food aid in terms of 
vahie - a remarkable change from the surplus disposal flows of 1950-70, when grain 
dominated aid flows.*^ 
Table 12 
, Agrostat FAO: India: commodity composition olf non-cereai food aid: 1977-88 | 
Year Dried skim milk 
(SMP) 
Other dairy 
products'' 
Vegetable oil Butter ofl (BO) 
1977 26.6 4.2 70.2 140 
1978 43.2 5.6 96.1 11.1 
1979 41.7 5.2 776 16.8 
•»l ' j S ^ . f . . . , ..,>... .J. ST.5 23.6' • • • • f 
1981 72.7 6.8 54.7 23.6 
1982 36.4 2.9 37.7 8.2 
1983 13.1 9.0 52.0 1.4 
1984 69,8 12.7 69.6 27.5 
10 2 •:'m\.- • -• Jiitia." =' V ' ' '"T^ T-'•V,'-'-
1986 4.1 no lOO.O 3.8 
1987 27.2 15.9 57.8 6.4 
1988 20.2 15.3 111.4 13.9 
'??3wfiifa( Mi'lfsaaiiftonmt of blended, foods (Table source: Shaw & Cl«y 1993: p 62)*^  
WFP gradually refined its methods of project aid in India. By the 1970s, there was 
widespread agreement in the aid commiuiity that the effectiveness of food and dairy aid 
could be multiplied if combined with technical expertise, and cash or loans v/ben 
ai^opriate. Like outmoded progranmie aid, project aid also can mitigate 
macroeconomic government fiscal and balance-of-payments problems (e.g. fi-om 
currency devaluations. World Bank-mandated SAPs, or price rises in oil or other 
necessary imports) by displacing commercial imports, while allowing more investment 
in domestic development.'" 
This describes precisely the rationale for Operation Flood. After partial success was 
achieved in the Green Revolution, the Indian government and EEC donors turned to the 
challenge of the White Revolution. Dairy aid was to fund streamlined infrastructure 
« Shaw & Clay (1993) WorldFoodm pp 2, 61-68. 
Table from Shaw & Clay (1993): p 62. Drawn from Agrostat FAO Rome, the same database used for 
maps and charts in this thesis. 
** Shaw & Clay (1993): pp 61-62. 
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that would integrate rural producers with urban consumers, to their mutual benefit. Let 
us now synopsise the three ambitious phases of Operation Flood, drawing from many 
sources. 
OF-I (1970-81); a top-down milk grid over India 
This thesis sees the first phase of OF as the "top-down" construction of a national milk 
grid over the Indian sub-continent. The selection of four geographically disparate 
metropolitan nodes, in a roughly diamond-shaped grid, established forward- and 
backward-linkages between the 18 chief rural dairy regions and the four biggest 
metropolitan centres of Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras. P.J. Akins writes that 
the grid: 
ensures the balancing of supply and demand across the boundaries of metropolitan 
milksheds by transferring milk fi-om areas of surplus to areas of deficit.*^ 
John Empson says OF-I began with SMP and BO from the WFP.*^  But, Doombos et al 
trace OF-I origins directly back to the EEC, explaining that OF-I was proposed by the 
National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) of India in 1968, when it realised that 
(quoting an FAO report by M. Halse): 
20,000 tonnes of table butter were to be presented (by the EEC) fi-ee to India... enough 
to wreck the Anand pattern cooperatives' market plan for some years to come. 
As described, this may have been a dramatic instance of indigenous managers taking 
control of forthcoming dairy aid in order to minimise disincentives to their own 
farmers, along with destruction of their organisational goals. It was probably cmcial to 
its success that the NDDB (founded in 1965; Dr. Verghese Kurien became chair'*^ ) and 
Indian Dairy Commission enjoyed strong patronage from the Government of India 
'•^  P.J. Akins (1989) "Operation Flood: dairy development in India" in Geography, pp 259-262. 
'** John Empson (September 25, 1993) "India joins the dairy big leagues" Hoard's Dairyman: p 692. 
Empson's account correlates with Doombos', as WFP dairy aid also had been utilised in India before OF-I 
was proposed. 
Martin Doombos et al (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: pp 77, 77-89. Doombos cites a 1977 
FAO report by M. Halse: p 51. 
M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien Style: p 177. Afl:er inaugurating Anand's new cattle feed 
compound plant in 1964, PM Shastri promoted the Anand model in India's Fourth Plan. Before Dr. 
Kurien become chair of the NDDB, he won GOI agreement that NDDB headquarters be located in Anand 
instead of Delhi and that he continue to be paid by the farmer-owned coops - not GOI. Kamath's profile 
of Kurien is that of an ambitious manager who revolutionised Indian dairying - even though he knew 
nothing about cows before leaving the steel industry to study dairying at university in Michigan, USA. 
(N.B.: The IDC was founded in 1970 and later merged with the NDDB.) 
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(GOI) - which had favoured the Amul/Anand model since the visit there by PM Shastri 
in 1964. That helps explain why in 1969, according to Doombos et al, the GOI 
accepted the NDDB's proposal of OF-I for reasons including: (1) balance-of-payments 
advantages when the dairy aid displaced commercial imports; (2) OF made it possible 
"to increase the meagre dairy development budget several fold and to give a big push 
for dairy development"; and (3) the GOI favoured replication in India of Anand-type 
coops, and thus Anand control of these EEC commodities dovetailed with official 
policy. 
There were other reasons why the GOI wished to spur dairy development. Not least of 
these was hygiene. Moving cattle from city bams to mral areas would simplify waste 
disposal and contribute to the rural fuel supply and crops fertilisation, while eradicating 
one source of urban sanitation problems. It was not to be so easy. 
OF-I was approved by the WFP in 1969. It was initially approved for five years, but 
"delays in the expansion of existing dairies, followed by the world crisis in dairy 
commodities which severely curtailed WFP's shipments to the projects"" ,^ as well as 
laggard shipments by the EEC, slowed implementation. A more positive reason to 
extend OF-I was probably a growing realisation by the NDDB of the multiple purposes 
to which EEC dairy aid could be put. In any event, OF-I was extended till 1981. 
Problems & summary of OF-I; 
Doombos et al (as well as Shanti George, 1985) point to a "bias" to Gujarat (which 
already enjoyed "extensive cooperative infrastracture" in five of its districts before OF-I 
formally began). Of a total of Rs 1248 million OF-I funds disbursed, Gujarat absorbed 
30% of OF-I funds - about five-times that alloted to less developed Bihar and Rajasthan. 
However, slowdowns in the implementation of OF-I due to a possible bias toward 
Gujarat, were supplemented by failings of a more prosaic, political nature. MV 
Kamath, a defender of OF and its director Dr. Kurien, cites long-standing cormption at 
Patna in Bihar (which was to supply metropolitan Calcutta to the Southeast), which 
Doombos et al (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: pp 82-83. Citing UN/FAO/WFP (Sept. 1981) 
Terminal Evaluation Report on Protect India 618 - "Milk Marketing and Dairy Development": p 17. 
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suggests that project authorities prudently held purse strings tight, when it came to 
Bihar.-'" 
Doombos et al cite a 1978 GOI report blaming: (1) underestimates of the "manpower, 
time and money needed" to help producers set up Anand-style coops - as well as 
political delays by state governments such as Kamataka and Kerala '^ resistant to the 
Anand model; (2) the new coops modelled on Anand were left "in the hands of local 
bureaucrats, while putting the responsibility for their performance on the project 
authority" - interests that did not, unfortunately, always coincide; (3) underestimates of 
the "capability" and political will of public dairy corporations to properly run their 
dairies.^ ^ Except at Delhi, the dairies were built without due regard for the complex, 
transnational requirements of the national milk grid. Additionally, some dairy 
managers (e.g. in Bihar) remunerated indigenous farmers too little for their milk, 
depressing output, and then substituted too much imported SMP and BO, further 
depressing indigenous prices - a cardinal sin of dairy aid misuse that was corrected after 
a rebuke in the 1984 Jha Committee Report. 
The organisational competence of the NDDB and OF project authorities like Dr. Kurien 
was bitteriy questioned by critics including Claude Alvarez^^ and Shanti George. 
Doombos et al note that, although the NDDB Annual Report 1980-81 claimed 10,423 
Anand pattern societies had been formed during OF-I, nearly half of these (connected to 
districts in Kaira, Baroda, Mehsana, Sabarkantha and Banaskantha) were actually 
formed before OF-I began.Apparently, claims of early membership were inflated. 
In hindsight, it is easy to criticise bureaucrats, politicians and plant managers for slow 
implementation of OF-I. But their performance seems no worse than the sporadic 
"^M,V. Kamath (1989) ManagementKurien-Style: pp 290-296. 
" M.V, Kamath (1989): p 287, 310 Kamath, a staunch defender of Dr. Kurien's management of OF, 
writes that, ironically, Kerala is Kurien's home state, "But the milk revolution there has yet to come." 
Concerning Karnataka (formerly Mysore), Kanrnth adds that it had no tradition of coops, but when its 
state dairy was subsumed under OF, it eventually prospered. Also, a recent PhD thesis by a faculty 
member at a university in Kamataka noted that the state had initiated its own dairy plans before OF-1, and 
was therefore resistant to the Anand model. 
Martin Doombos et al (1990) Dairy Aid and Development: p 83. They cite a 1978 GOI report, 
" Claude Alvarez (October 30, 1983) "The White Lie" in Illustrated Weekly of India. 
Cited by M.V, Kamath (1989: pp 337-340) who notes that a parhamentary row ensued, 
Martin Doombos et al (1990a): p 85. 
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performance of rich coimtries, and the WFP, in deliveries of promised commodities in 
decades beset by civil war, drought, and compared to today, less working knowledge of 
exactly which policies are best to address pressing problems such as milk shortages. 
Other disappointments plagued OF-I. The plan to transfer city-kept cattle to the country 
was according to Doorbos et al, "a virtual non-starter". This was probably due to 
transport problems and a reluctance of lu-ban farmers to move, which was eventually 
overcome when prices were raised for rural producers. Idealistic plans to extend milk 
programmes to pre-school children in 20 cities were launched in less than 10 cities and, 
embarrassingly, continued only in Delhi and Calcutta. 
The large urban processing plants that OF officials termed "Mother Dairies" in the four 
large metropolitan centres of Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras, have been 
castigated by Shanti George as white elephants of wasteful, inappropriate technology. 
Doombos et al agree, insofar as the capacity of dairies in four metropolitan towns 
tripled from 100,000 to 300,000 litres per day during OF-I, but that their throughput too 
often was lower than optimal. Nevertheless, despite their identification of anomalies 
and failures in the design and implementation of Operation Flood, Doombos et al do 
not seem to quibble with the need for capital investments in a national milk grid, per se. 
However, the under-utilised capacity contributed to increased dependence of urban 
dairies on imported SMP and BO for recombined milk. Dairy aid was estimated to 
comprise 22% of throughput around 1970, but Doombos, van Stuijvenberg & Terhal 
claimed that dependence on dairy aid rose to ca. 36% in 1981-82.^ ^ P.J. Atkins 
responded that their figure was misleading in the light of later data, which showed that 
dairy aid represented just 17.7% of throughput between 1982/83 and 1983/84, and that 
it was predicted to fall to 3% around 1990." Nevertheless, some of the figures on 
processing throughput available in the mid-1980s appeared to be harbingers of 
permanent Indian dependence on EEC dairy aid. The astounding amounts diverted 
" Doombos e/a/ (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: p 84. 
Doombos, van Stuijvenberg & Terhal (August, 1987) ""Operation Flood: impacts and issues" in Food 
Policy, Vol 12, No 4; pp 376-383. 
" P.J. Atkins (August, 1988) "Rejoinder: India's dairy development and Operation Flood" Food Policy 
pp 306, 305-312. 
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from the EEC's milk powder and butter mountains (ca. 127,000 MT of SMP and ca. 
36,000 MT of BO) during OF-I (1970-81) also seemed to echo portents of India's new 
thraldom to Europe. On the other hand, according to M. Jul, supporters argued that: 
making milk available cheaply to urban consumers. Operation Flood has made milk 
consumption feasible for those who do not belong to the highest income groups... .Some 
also claim that the price of milk has fallen relative to the price of most other food items 
and hence, milk is more accessible to lower income groups.,'* 
But, besides the supply and sanitation improvements welcomed by middle-class, and 
perhaps poorer urban consumers, other statistics reflected organisational progress in OF 
that, supporters argued, stabilised milk flows to urban markets, where a gradually rising 
demand could result in more income security for rural farmers located on the supply 
grid feeding those cities. Doombos et al acknowledge that rural farmers probably did 
get gains from the improved supply system, and note: 
indigenous procurement of milk rose from 70,000 litres per day (Ipd) in 1970 to 150,000 
Ipd in 1981-82,^ ' 
I f the urban processors could ever decrease their reliance on imported dairy aid, the 
entire OF development plan might start to look worthwhile to its many critics. 
OF-n (1978-87); consolidation; a membership drive; democracy? 
Needless to say, NDDB/OF authorities sought to tighten up accountability in OF-II, 
recommending that coop cluster federations (rather than local bureaucrats in public or 
state dairy corporations) become the implementing agencies at state level, and that 
some dairy aid be allocated to local feeder-balancing dairies that were tied to local 
towns. It may be that, by these reforms, OF-II brought stronger elements of democracy 
and direct farmer participation into Operation Flood - even though project authorities 
probably employed Delhi-based political clout to consolidate national pre-eminence of 
the IDC/NDDB/OF nexus. 
This consolidation of control undoubtedly helped spur completion of the national milk 
grid. It is also likely that, in Gujarat and the Western region, and possibly in other 
favoured areas, logistical efficiencies resulted in gains for niral farmers as well as urban 
M, Jul (May, 1979) "Unexpected benefits from a dairy project", Food Nutrition Bulletin. 1(3): pp 15-
19). Cited in H. Alderman (1987) Dairy Development in India. 
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consumers, and (more in dispute) rural consumers. It seems likely that increased farmer 
participation in decision making precluded some of the disincentives wrought during 
OF-I, when short-sighted processors employed too much dairy aid in a vicious circle, 
begun when the processors had set farmgate prices to low. But OF critics were difficult 
to please. Raymond Crotty complained that: 
the sale of reconstituted EEC milk enables the Indian dairy Corporation to pay a higher 
price than it would otherwise for milk in the village.^ 
According to Alderman et al, Crotty was at least "more consistent than [Shanti] 
George's view that Operation Flood does not raise real producer prices yet it induces 
producers to increase the supply of milk to the market." '^ 
Critics were not placated by announced reforms in OF-II. They saw most of them as 
subterfuges to further consolidate OF control of what was becoming the Third Worid's 
largest, most expensive dairy development scheme. Doombos et al say: 
Compared to OF-I, OF-n was planned as a much more ambitious undertaking.*^ 
The initial ambitious proposal for the first years (1979-85, not 1987, confusingly) of 
OF-II, a US$200 million credit from the Intemational Development Agency (IDA) was 
trimmed by the Worid Bank to US$150m. The Bank also trimmed projections of dairy 
aid to be donated by the EEC. The original budget outlay was to be Rs 4855 million, 
with 36% derived from a World Bank loan (via IDA), 15% from repayments of OF-I 
loans, and the largest portion, 49% to come from sales of recombined SMP and BO. 
Doombos notes a "striking" difference between initial "projections" and "the real 
resource flows" that OF authorities eventually controlled. Doombos et al identify two 
reasons for this: (1) EEC dairy commodities were sold at higher prices than originally 
61 
Martin Doombos etal (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: p 84. 
R. Crotty (April 2, 1983 ) "Operation Flood and the EEC" in Economic & Political Weekly: p 522. 
Harold Alderman et al (1987) Dairy Development in India: p 82. They cite Shanti George (1983) 
"Cooperatives and Indian Dairy Policy: More Anand than Pattem" in Cooperatives and Rural 
Development by D.W. Attwood and B.S.Baviskar (eds ), Delhi, OUP. 
Doombos etal (1990a): pp 90, 78, 89-95. 
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planned; and (2) EEC dairy aid was expanded beyond expectations through "large ad 
hoc gifts."" 
Originally, 186 thousand MT of SMP and 76 thousand MT of BO were planned for OF-
n (ca. 50% larger than during OF-I). But ad hoc EEC gifts amounted to an additional 
41 thousand MT of SMP and over six thousand MT of butter from EEC storage, in OF-
II (ca. 1978-87). This dairy avalanche totalled OF-II dairy aid of ca. 227 thousand MT 
of SMP and ca. 82 thousand MT of BO and butter - about 80% more milk powder and 
roughly twice the butter commodities received by OF-I. 
Whereas most OF-I commodities were received only by the four biggest metropolitan 
dairies (and a few feeder balancing plants), additional ad hoc EEC donations, in OF-II, 
made possible the channelling (from buffer stocks) of commodities to many rural 
dairies which, heretofore had received none. Critics charged that too much went to the 
state of Gujarat, and particularly, as much as 8% of SMP to the original Amul coop. 
The Indian minister of agriculture denied such favouritism, claiming that: 
Amul received about 3 .8% of SMP and 4.6% of BO donated under OF-I, and about 
2.6% of SMP and 1.6% of BO donated under OF-H (till 31'' March 1983) 
However, even i f Amul received only its fair share of commodities, in the same passage 
Doombos et al point to evidence of financial favouritism to Amul in both OF-I and OF-
H: out of a total estimated value of capital assets of Rs 130.7 million in 1983, the Amul 
coop accounted for Rs 31 million in grants and 53.4 million in assets. Amul was origin 
of the Anand model, and seat of OF project authorities like Dr. Kurien, who were 
frequently attacked in the popular press. 
OF-n also sought to spread the Anand model geographically by enrolling 10 million 
more farmer families, and establishing feeder balancing dairies to increase milk supply 
to 147 cities with populations over 100 thousand, according to Doombos et al^ About 
the second phase of Operation Flood, P.J. Atkins says: 
In summary this was the diflfusion and mass adoption phase of the 'package' oflFered by 
OF." 
" Doombos et al (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: pp 89, 128-133. 
^ Doombos et al (1990a): p 97 
" P.J. Atkins (1989) Geography, p 260. 
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To support this extension of Anand style coops around the country, OF managers also 
put in motion one of their most controversial initiatives. Their plan to improve input 
services included an artificial insemination (AI) scheme, and the establishment of a 
National Milch Herd of 10-15 million animals, in order to double India dairy production 
by the end of 1980s. OF-II planning was more explicit than that of OF-I and, perhaps in 
an attempt to mitigate fears that European pure-breds would totally replace indigenous 
buffaloes^ ,^ plans called for the 7-10 million cross-bred cows in the National Milch 
Herd to be supplemented by "improved buffaloes" for the rest. Integrating buffaloes 
into the supply system for the National Milk Grid System was not more than just 
recognition of their qualities as a breed. 
According to M.V. Kamath it was made possible by a far-reaching decision made by 
Dr. Kurien about 1953. Over UNICEF's recommendation of Dutch-made Volme 
powder-making plant (which scorched buffalo milk), Kurien insisted on a Danish-made 
Niro Atomizer, which became the first plant in the world to manufacture SMP fi-om 
high-fat buffalo milk. Kurien's insistence on the buffalo-fiiendly system is a significant 
sace of a recipient rejecting inappropriate technological aid, and insisting on technology 
appropriate to indigenous production, thus lessening Indian dependence on surplus from 
European cows.^ ^ 
OF-n also plarmed feeding plants to supply more concentrate nutrients for the higher-
producing cattle. More input services, i.e. extension work with farmers, other training, 
and research on cattle breeding, feed and health (e.g. foot and mouth disease, FMD, 
^ S. Baviskar & P.Terhal (1990) "Internal Constraints and External Dependence" in M. Doombos & 
K N.Nair (eds.). Resources. Institutions and Strategies: Operation Flood and Indian Dairying. Baviskar 
& Terhal cite All India Livestock Census reports for evidence that a 1965-75 trend toward bufifaloes was 
followed by a striking "upswing of cow milk production" from 1975-80. John Empson (1993) noted that 
45% of Indian milk is consumed as liquid; the rest is made into ghee, sweets. For non-liquid milk, high-fat 
buffalo milk is superior to cow milk. Therefore, today's predominence of buflFaloes in the nationa sales 
herd seems logical. 
M.V. Kamath (1989) Management Kurien Style: pp 96, 100-102. Kamath claims OF developed SMP 
from buffalo milk against the advice of a powder expert from New Zealand, whose country would lose 
sales if OF succeeded. Dr. Kurien said, "Then only I realised how the advice of Technical Experts is 
coloured by the economic interests of their respective countries." OF also forged ahead, first in 
manufacturing condensed milk after a Nestle's oflBcial said it was too delicate to be made by "natives" (p 
119), and then baby food from buffalo milk against the advice of Glaxo (p 120). Thence, success in baby 
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which critics claimed European strains were prone to) were to be funded also. 
Meanwhile (responding to a paradigm shift among development practitioners in favour 
of "basic needs" and of integrating rural sectors into national economies) some claims 
were made on behalf of OF's ability to reduce poverty in remote areas, even though 
Doombos et al concede that: 
The plans for Operation Flood I I and I I I do not mention this urgent priority.*^ 
Another topic in the debate over OF was milk consumption in rural villages, where 
critics claimed women and children were sacrificing milk consumption when the lactic 
cash crop was taken away to middle class, urban consumers.^ ^ OF was conceived to be 
"neutral" regarding the welfare of so-called vulnerable groups, and an entire sub-topic 
of research and literature developed on these questions. Martin Doombos and Manoshi 
Mitra question the effect of the flow of milk from the countryside on women and 
vulnerable groups. but acknowledge that payment for milk could be transformed into 
larger amounts of protein in the form of legumes, pulses or other substitutes. Writing 
from a later vantage point, Miriam Sharma and Urmila Vanjani used the phrase 
"nutritional apartheid" for situations where: 
neither the mral areas in general, nor women specifically, are likely to benefit fi-om 
increased milk production in terms of consumption.^ ' 
Although the phenomenon of nutritional apartheid may be exaggerated, Sharma & 
Vanjani are on firmer ground criticising "internal colonialism" in OF that they claim 
reinforces negative stereotypes in Indian gender relations. According to Sharma & 
Vanjani: 
...the modem dairy system represented by the male-controlled processing and marketing 
centres in the city depend upon the cheap labour-intensive work of females operating in 
the rural sector.^ ^ 
Sharma & Vanjani's resentment of male hegemony over most of the new high-tech jobs 
offered by OF is understandable. Women's status was threatened wherever OF divested 
food was termed "doing a Nestle on Glaxo", and Kurien said he had "beaten the muhinationals at their 
own game". India reportedly ceased commercial imports of SMP in the late 1970s. 
Doombos et al (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: p 315. 
Martin Doombos c/a-/ (1990a): p 91, 101-105. 
''^ Martin Doombos & Manoshi Mitra (November, 1985) "Politics of International Dairy Aid: 
International Interest and the White Revolution": p 27. 
Miriam Sharma & Urmila Vanjani (1993) "When More Means Less.. in rural Rajasthan", in Soc. Sci. 
Med: pp 1377-1389. 
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village women of their traditional responsibility for processing milk into ghee - turning 
some skilled cottage processors into glorified cowherds, while their male counterparts 
learned the intricacies of vacuum pumps in gleaming dairy temples of stainless steel. 
Defenders of Operation Flood would respond that the programme was designed to be 
neutral in its effects on gender roles, etc. 
Yet, OF officials would answer (quite rightly) that their primary responsibility was 
raising milk production and consumption - not social engineering for all contingencies. 
At any rate, the negative effects of shifting ghee manufacture from villages to local 
processors might have been exaggerated. As Shagufta found in her socio-economic 
study of ghee-making, generally, it is households of a higher socio-economic status, 
usually with more land that had enough surplus milk to make into ghee or khoa.^ ^ Such 
women might be able to turn profits from milk sold to coops into other remunerative 
activities with high status, perhaps by purchasing a sewing machine for cottage textile 
making. 
Judged by so many competing criteria, would OF-II be seen as any more effective than 
OF-I? Although gift dairy imports accounted for only about 1% of Indian milk 
production '^*, the physical quantities were nevertheless immense, and the fact that OF 
was the world's largest dairy development programme made it a magnet for critical 
study by the popular press and academia. Because concrete facts were difficult to 
obtain, pundits had relatively firee rein to cast OF according to their ideological 
expectations. Doombos et at say the "lack of adequate statistics" on some production 
and consumption trends makes it necessary to judge OF-II "indirectly." Assessing 
reports on OF-II by NDDB/OF, the Indian government, the EC Commission and the EC 
Court of Auditors, Doombos et al found the latter report of the EC Auditors much more 
critical than the others. They inferred that stagnancy in net Indian dairy production 
and/or consumption lay behind "discontinuities" in statistics; Doombos et al assessed 
"three main dimensions": 
•'^  Sharma& Vanjani (1993); p 1387. 
Shagufta Jamal (1991) Women in Dairy Deyelopment. pp 132, 169, 183, Households of higher socio-
econormc status are more likely to hold more land producing fodder - a chief constraint on milk yield. 
OF: A Progress Report (March, 1988) NDDB: p 12. 
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(1) Total number of milksheds covered, dairy cooperative societies established, total 
number of members of these societies, and total milk procurement. 
(2) Milk procurement at the village level and fanners' participation, regionally 
desegregated. 
(3) Coverage and quality of input services." 
Briefly, they found that (1) "was successful" but wamed that "a word of caution" was 
necessary, because of "discontinuities" in (2) specifically, that dairy "programmes in 
Kamataka, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan" were included in OF-II's optimistic 
statistics, even though they were financed by the IDA on a different basis. Doombos et 
al also noted that, while OF described its dismantling of existing dairy corporations 
(traditional fiefs of the states) "in terms of democratisation and fanner control", 
although its actions "had more to do" with incorporating them into the "centralised 
IDC/NDDB controlled stmcture" behind OF. 
As for dimension (3) Doombos et al concluded that the increase of input services for 
animal health, breeding and feeding (p 101) was below expectations, mostly because of 
slow disbursal of funds, and that regions outside Gujarat required expansion of inputs to 
increase performance.'^  They concluded that OF-II had: 
not caused a substantial intensification of milk production. The increase in procurement 
is basically due to the progressive extension of the catchment area rather than to any in-
creased productivity per society or member.^ ^ 
To employ a contemporary business metaphor. Operation Flood may have been acting 
to secure its future success by a Machiavellian seizure of market share - while it 
temporarily ignored bottom line profitability, or unit productivity. 
N.B. Doombos etal (1990) Dairy A id and Development: pp 97-100. Their diflSculty is shared by this 
thesis. However, the benefit of seven more years of statistical hindsight allow us to draw more compre-
hensive conclusions on India's dairy improvements fi^om the 1960s to the 1990s. 
The Jha Committeee report (GOI 1984) called OF "By any standard... a successfiil programme", but 
recommended more grants to inputs services. This the NDDB rejected, claiming that earlier success in 
Amul proved an "assured market" and a "fair price" were suflScient incentives for coops to build 
infi-astmcture on a loan, not grant, basis. Doombos et al were rightly sceptical that regions with poor soil, 
years behind Gujarat in dairying, could readily adopt the Anand pattern without help on input services. 
The Report of the EC Court of Auditors (1988) criticised a benign 1986 report on OF-II by the EC 
Commission for relying too much on "over-optimistic Indian documents". The EC auditors said OF had 
"achieved on a very piecemeal basis" any significant increase in per capita milk consumption, advantages 
to rural or urban poor, supply to cities or extension of the Anand model. 
''^  Doombos e/fl/ (1990) Dairy Aid and Development: p 100. 
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The Jha Report calls for OF price reform 
Although it judged OF "successful", the 1984 Jha Committee Report slapped the wrists 
of OF authorities for: 
lack of attention for production increase and input services, too low producer prices and 
over-investment in physical capital.^ * 
It is the view of this thesis that compliance by OF and state authorities to the wishes 
evident in this mild-sounding rebuke of the Jha Committee were cmcial to the long-
term success of Operation Flood. This is because the artificially-low urban sales prices, 
and too-low producer prices noted above, were the most detrimental aspect of the early 
management of OF. Evidence of such counter-productive pricing was foimd by M. 
Lipton.^^ It is important to note that part of the problem, i.e. urban prices that were 
pleasingly-low to consumers but problematic for the budgets of urban processors, was 
often beyond the control of OF authorities, and had to be corrected by state authorities. 
According to P.J. Atkins the Jha Report considered that (artificially) low prices set by 
state politicians on urban milk sales and: 
[low] farmgate prices 'offend against the principle of social justice' and are counter-
productive because they have a disincentive effect upon production.*" 
However, OF authorities could influence the relationship between urban processors and 
indigenous farmers, which they did. It is no exaggeration to say that if the price of EEC 
dairy commodity aid (set by NDDB/OF authorities for SMP and BO sold to the Mother 
Dairies, etc.) had not been properly raised to make the procurement of milk from 
indigenous Indian farmers economically attractive, dependence on dairy aid might have 
continued indefinitely. India's White Revolution would indeed have become what 
Claude Alvarez called a "White Lie." Fortunately, pricing policies were corrected in a 
matmer that stimulated milk production, and national dairy autonomy. 
Against the OF-II goal of doubling animal yield by the period 1978-86, Doombos' 
assessment shows little progress. Perhaps the targets were set too high - a laudable trait 
in practitioners, but an invitation to criticism by social researchers, as Doombos et al 
Jha Committee Report (1984 GOI), in Doombos et al (1990) Dairy Aid& Development: pp 106-107. 
M. Lipton (1985) "Operation Flood and other EC aid to India" in M. Caliewaert, ed., India and the 
EC. Centre for European Studies, Brussels: pp 106-108. 
P.J. Atkins (August, 1988) "Rejoinder: India's dairy development and Operation Flood" in Food 
Policy: p 306. 
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acknowledge.^ ' Dvuing the long-mnning furore over the export of oilseeds, etc. in the 
Economic & Political Weekly and other media in the 1980s, perhaps some OF 
personnel (or their supporters) responded with grandiose claims. But, (appropriate for a 
national dairy plan) OF authorities were not just increasing their control of machinery, 
property, membership lists and government budgets - they also were widening their 
control of the supply of the nation's milk. As P.J. Atkins notes: 
By late 1988... procurement was running at an annual average of 8 million litres per day. 
This represents a fifteen-fold increase in milk supply to OF since 1970.^ 
Although increases in procurement by OF-related cooperatives might mask dormancy in 
net national milk production, OF project authorities retained government support. 
Despite its missed targets of doubling production, and exaggerated claims on extending 
the Anand model, the government was still betting that (after a period of consolidation 
and steady infrastmcture building) its investment in OF would pay off Meanwhile, OF 
authorities released official reports showing improvements in dairy performance. The 
chart (Table 18) titled India's positive trends coincide with the Operation Flood era, 
compiled from Agrostat/FAO data available ca. 1994, shows there was much tmth in 
optimistic reports: compared to Bangladesh and Pakistan, India's production and 
consumption of the (FAO-designated) dairy food groups "butter & ghee" and "milk 
excluding butter" increased remarkably after the beginning of OF-I in 1970. 
But continued reliance on EEC powder and oil enflamed the OF debate. Indians had 
witnessed unmet expectations before, in industries such as steel, and in the Green 
Revolution. But what led critics (including some farmers, opposition politicians, 
religious zealots and nationalists of all stripes) to suspect irregular - even criminal -
activities in Operation Flood was their perception of a "smoking gun" in the 
continuation of aid imports longer than expected. The outcry against OF grew, not just 
in India, but also in Europe - especially from the European Parliament, as well as from 
scholars cenfred in The Hague. Critics doubted the ability of Bmssels to dissipate its 
milk lake and butter mountain - even after the imposition of EEC milk quotas in April 
1984. They also doubted a consensus of political will by the EC to cut out dairy aid. 
Until 1974, surplus disposal was the main impetus for EEC dairy aid, but after that, it 
^' Doorabos etal (1990) Dairy Aid and Development: p 313. 
^ P.J. Atkins (1989) Geography: p 260. 
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became a more formal instrument of foreign policy - just as (this thesis argues) food aid 
had always been used by the US. As Doombos et al saw it: 
In sum, by giving support to Operation Flood-II the EEC could gain a lot.*^ 
In general, OF was perfect to achieve these EEC goals: (1) the EC Commission could 
gain intemational prestige in the first World by (emulating the US role as a dispenser of 
cereals aid) utilising its dairy aid for development in India, (not to mention raising the 
status of the Commission among European national governments - no small 
consideration EEC leaders like Commissioner Jacques Delors); (2) success in OF would 
enhance the image of Europe to the Third Worid and serve as a model for other dairy 
projects; and (3) diverting embarrassing milk mountains to India would dampen 
criticism of the CAP in Europe. Doombos also notes that for the limited personnel in 
the EEC's aid bureaucracy, administering huge quantities of dairy aid to one country 
(India, which had demonstrated its ability to process them) was far easier than dividing 
those quantities between several smaller aid requests. Another attraction of extending 
aid to India was that it was a leading non-ACP country, and the EEC had (until OF) 
received no kudos for ignoring non-ACP countries. 
Practical considerations are seldom neglected by policy makers for long.^ In the wake 
of the recessions induced by OPEC oil embargoes begun ca. 1973 and 1980, the non-oil 
producing countries of Europe anxiously sought potential markets for farm products, in 
order to maintain healthy farm sectors, as well as to ease national trade deficits. 
Additionally, the EC Commission and the Dutch Dairy Board^^  stated that building 
recombination milk plants in LDCs stimulated future commercial markets, and that 
stimulating LDC demand could solve the EC milk surplus. Such bald public statements 
were evidence for Shanti George's comparison of EC dairy aid to a "Trojan Horse" 
designed to lull India into dairy dependence.^ ^ 
T>oomho%etal (1990) Dairy Aid & Development: pp 59, 60, 70-71. 
^ This thesis is unaware of any evidence that Great Britain supported OF purely out of loyalty to India, a 
fellow member in the Commonwealth, but the fact that OF-I began shortly before Britain's entry into the 
EEC in 1973 invites speculation. 
Zuivelzicht (1979) No. 15: p 346; also Produktschap voor Zuivel {1984). Citedby Doombos 1990a: 
pp 65-66. 
^ Shanti George (1985) Operation Flood. 
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Original plans made in 1978 expected OF-II to commence with a 15% use of imported 
commodities in urban dairies until mid-1982, after which the expected surge of 
indigenous production would allow imported dairy aid to shrink to 2% in 1985.^ ' So 
when OF authorities applied to the WFP and the EC for even larger amounts of 
commodity and financial aid for OF-III, they were surrounded by a storm of accusation. 
According to Doombos et al: 
The question which arises in this context is: how indispensable are these donations to 
sustain the programme? This question has become one of the focal points in the debate 
on Operation Flood ever since the proclaimed target to reach self-sufficiency was not 
reached by the end of 1985.** 
OF III (1987-1994); more dairy aid; more debate; better performance? 
Phase-in was quite simply an extension of OF-II, to accomplish unfulfilled goals of the 
programme, consolidate progress already made and, according to Atkins extend the 
cooperative sector: 
to 70,000 dairy societies, with 15 million milk animals. By 1994 it is hoped to cover 176 
milksheds and to supply 13 million litres per day to about 450 towns and cities. ^ 
John Empson says that with renewed emphasis on animal health and extension services, 
improving cross-breeds through Al, and raising cattle feed production to 11.9 billion 
pounds annually, OF-III was: 
spearheading the way towards the national target for the year 2000 of production of 
172.0 billion pounds.*" 
Relatively recent, 1994 estimates from Agrostat FAO show Indian milk production in 
OF-m rose from 46.7 million MT in 1987, to 63.2 million MT in 1993. Thus the target 
alluded to by Empson for the year 2000 (172 billion pounds is about 78 million MT) 
may well be attainable. This is especially likely i f existing cattle can be better fed, for 
it has been documented by innumerable observers, including Harold Alderman (1987 
Dairy Development in India IFPRI for the World Bank), that feed is the single biggest 
Doombos a/ (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: p 97 
Doombos era/(1990a): p 110-111. 
89 \ / r 
P.J.Atkins (1989a) "Operation Flood: dairy development in India" in Geography: pp 260, 259-262. 
Out of 247m bovines, OF might then utilise 6%. 
'° John Empson (1993) "India joins the dairy big leagues" in Hoard's Dairyman: p 692. 
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91 factor in higher milk yield.^' Of course, all the favourable figures (Table 13) presented 
here were not available to (or acknowledged by) pessimists at the begitming of OF-IH in 
the late 1980s. 
As noted before, there was an uproar of discontent when, upon failing to phase out EEC 
food aid in 1985, and failing to disburse large sums held in OF accounts towards mral 
dairy development, OF and EEC officials actually set about increasing the commodity 
and financial commitments in OF-III. Added to this was the revelation that the US 
(anxious to divest itself of surplus stocks resulting from price supports and a strong 
dollar) subsidised a massive sale of 56,510 tonnes of SMP to India in 1984. (Doombos 
et al 1990: p 127) Pessimists believed the stage was set for permanent dependence 
upon EEC dairy aid. 
In explaining the continued reliance of OF upon extemal dairy aid, Doombos et al point 
to the fact that, behind the confusing claims made by special interests claiming 
orientation of this massive dairy development programme for the benefit of rural 
development, women and children, lower castes, tribals and others who conceivably 
could benefit from dairy development in India, the programme was not designed with 
such specific "bottom-up" goals in mind. Doombos et al say: 
OF has been designed as a programme for structuring the Indian milk market in a 
specific way.'^  
Additionally, they say that as a major source of finance for the National Milk Grid 
System (NMGS) and physical food stocks, dairy aid provided by the WFP and the EEC: 
served to stabilise the NMGS. This is one of the reasons why the programme has been 
dependent on Community aid for such a long time. 
Doombos et al add that the bulk of funds in OF control were "directed towards building 
this marketing infrastmcture."^^ (See Figs. 26-28) In brief, OF sought to improve 
national Indian dairy performance by increasing efficiencies in the linkages between 
172 billion pounds = ca. 78 billion kilograms = ca. 78 million metric tonnes. Agrostat/FAO shows Indian 
milk production rising from 46.7 million MT in 1987 to 63.2 million MT in 1993, a target of 78 million 
MT looks attainable around the year 2000. 
" Harold Alderman et al (1987) Dairy Development in India. IFPRI, for the World Bank. See also 
Doombos et al (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: p 54. 
Doorabos et al (1990a): pp 124-125. 
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Table 13 
e trends c era 
L'^ i- L - • • : • 
PAKISTJ ' 
ProdExGr 
1961-93 
1.8% 4.1% 3.1% 
ProdExGr 1961-71 1.5% 1.0% 2.3% 
ProdExGr 1972-93 1.9% 5.2% 3.9% 
ProdExGr 1980-91 3.4% 5.4% 5.4% 
'cap ConEx.Gr. 
P'cj^onsumptn 
Exp'lGr 1961-92 
G L A D E S H 
0.4% 
I N 
1.9% 0.1% 0.2% 
ConsExGr 1%1-71 -0.8% negative •1.2% neg -0,4% -0.4% o 
ConsExGr 1972-92 0.6% 3.1% 0.7% 0.4% 
ConsExGr 1980-91 
BUTTER&GHEE 
ProdExGr 1961-93 
1.8% 3.4% 1.7% 0.2% 
B A N G L A D E S H 
1.2% 
I N D I A 
3.1% 
P A K I S T A N 
3.2% 
W O R L D 
1.2% 
ProdExGr 1961-71 1.8% 0 1% poor 2.2% 0.9% 
ProdExGr 1972-93 0.6% 4 J % 4.2% 0.9% 
ProdExGr 1980-91 I -0.8% 
P'capita Conspt'n. 
4.1% 5.7% 
I N D I A i P A K I S T A N 
0.7% 
P'capConsumptnEx-
p'l Growth 1961-92 
-2.4% negative 0.7% 0.2% •1.1% neg 
ConsExGr 1961-71 -0.0% poor •1.7% poor -0.6% neg •1.2% 
ConsExGr 1972-92 -4.6% worse 1.9% better 0.7% -1.1% n 
ConsExGr 1980-91 -8.1% wo: 
I N C O M E ( Y ) 
US Dollars in 1991 i S220 
B A N G L A D E S * 
2.0% good 
I N D I A * 
$330 
2.0% 
P A K I S 
$400 
. %n 
Chma $370 
LIE.S$350M' 
1980-91 ave. annual 
growth rate* 
1.9% 
GNP 
per capita 3.2% 3.2% US aid 
Afghan War? 
China 7.8% 
LIEs:3.9%M' 
LITERACY 
in 1990 
78% female 
65% total 
66% female 
52% total 
79% female 
65% total 
China 38%/: 
27%/ 
P O P U L A T I O N B A N G L A D E S H 
PopExpGr l%l-93 2.7% 2.2% 2.9% 1.9% 
PopExpGr 1961-71 2.7% 2.3% 2.8% 2.1% 
PopExpGr 1972-93 2.7% 2.1% 3.1% 1.8% 
PopExpGr 1980-91 2.5% 2.1% 3.3% 1.8% 
Source: Aerostat FAO. except * = World Development Report 1993 
Key abbreviations:/=females; ^otal ; n^eighted average; (1991 $US). 
93 Doorabos a/ (1990a): p 125. 
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rural producers and urban markets. The gamble was that even though OF disbursals 
were often disappointing in the amounts given to input services for breeding, feeding 
and maintaining mral cattle, eventually the improved national infrastmcture would 
begin to repay its investment. Then more attention could be paid to input services. 
More discussion of the NMGS 
Like other huge marketing initiatives, OF aimed at muhiple demand-supply targets, all 
moving at different rates.'"^  As predicted, the incentive of larger markets and fairer 
prices (after implementation of the Jha Committee admonishment on pricing) did 
stimulate greater supply from some milksheds. Meanwhile, demand among urban 
consumers rose (as many of them enjoyed higher incomes), making it diflficdt for the 
nascent national milk grid (NMGS) to balance supply with demand. (No wonder many 
processor managers had preferred meeting urban demand from available food aid, 
rather than negotiating price and supply with area farmers.) 
It is worth noting once more that the GOI valued the balance-of-payments support that 
dairy aid offered. Furthermore (and perhaps the most important point) it was apparent 
to anyone who understood the tremendous transport problems of India, not just 
immense distances, but also formidable climatic problems posed by summer heat (for 
hygiene and preservation) and monsoons (which regularly washed out mral roads), that 
completion of the national milk grid was a cmcial piece of infrastmcture, which (more 
than AI or even cattle feeding programmes) could unify India's dairy industry and put it 
on the road to modemity. 
Summary on Doornbos & colleagues 
Although Doombos et al are not quite so keen as OF officials (or this thesis) on the 
National Milk Grid System (NMGS) in particular and the programme as a whole, the 
reader is left with the impression of a barely suppressed conflict between their 
professional obligations as researchers, and some underlying enthusiasm for dairy 
development. Martin Doombos et al, who at times have characterised OF as a failure, 
admit that the "position as social researcher" forces them to "criticise the practitioner 
Doombos et al (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: India's Operation Flood: pp 97, 111-112. 
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for unrealistic planning, or for defective implementation."^^ Perhaps reluctantly, 
surmises the reader. Doombos et al wind down their analysis of the use of EEC dairy 
aid in India thus: 
The present discussion as to why India has been dependent on EEC aid for such a long 
time cannot be extended beyond 1985 due to lack of exact information.'* 
While appreciative of the comprehensive study of OF done by Doombos et al, we have 
examined more recent data that rejects many of the doubts entertained by Doombos et 
al on OF, and supports OF officials' claims to improving India's dairy output and 
consumption. Further, this thesis has explained the significance of the building up of 
the NMGS, which already seems to be paying off in accelerated production rises, the 
early 1990s. Nevertheless, Doombos et al sum up the ironies of Operation Flood very 
neatly: 
is it feasible that European dairy surplus can be donated to raise funds to stimulate milk 
production in India, while at the same time India sells commercial exports of oil seeds to 
feed Dutch and other European cows - even though oil seeds, a fraditional ingredient of 
the Indian fodder mix, are not in surplus? 
From 1960 to 1979, dependence on EEC produced cattle grains declined, compared to 
tapioca and especially oil cake imported from India. From 169,000 tonnes of oil cake 
imported to the EEC in 1969, this amount had risen to 929,000 tonnes in 1982 - "an 
amount far more than necessary to produce the quantity of milk that could be derived 
from the recombination of EEC donated dairy commodities to India in that year (van 
Ree[1984])"" 
Although an educated guess expects that imposition of the 1984 milk quotas dampened 
demand for imported inputs such as oil cake from India, it is easy to understand why 
observers were alarmed by such paradoxical trade flows prior to 1984 - particularly 
those who clove to development themes of "self-sufficiency" and "basic needs" that 
have been shown to be outdated, by the success of agricultural liberalisation in China, 
etc. Although this thesis argues than many such fears were misplaced, it is probable 
that thoughtful, analytical critiques such as that of Doombos and his colleagues from 
IDPAD hastened the end ofmassive shipments ofEU dairy product aid to India. Such 
perceptive observers are invaluable for ensuring that public initiatives such as 
Operation Flood do not go awry. 
95 Doorabos et al (1990) Dairy Aid and Development: pp 313-314. They deplore the extent to which 
discussion of OF has focused on the replicability of the Anand model to farmers outside Gujarat 
^ Doombos era/(1990): p 135. 
Doombos a/ (1990): pp preface, 13, 54-55. 
The Indo-Dutch Programme on Alternatives in Development (IDPAD) had these stages 1981-83 1984-
89 and 1990-93. 
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Conclusions on Shanti George's benchmark critique of OF 
In the first, and one of the most important book-length critiques of Operation Flood 
(which aroused much tabloid "yellow joumalism" focused on the strong personalities 
coimected to OF), Shanti George chose to focus on the suitability of OF policy decisions 
in the context of India. Her analysis, a benchmark in the opposition to OF, amounted in 
toto to a blistering attack on OF as a Westemised "Trojan Horse" of great danger to 
Indian agriculture, social culture and agri-economic self-sufficiency. George entertains 
all of the doubts aired by Doombos et al - and more. At times George's attack on OF is 
overweening in its intensity - even at times contradictory - so zealous is she (despite 
self-professed intentions to concentrate on policies rather than personalities (e.g. Dr. 
Verghese Kurien) in her deconstmction of the programme. 
In retrospect, George's 1985 book may perhaps be forgiven, for what this thesis 
believes is its over-pessimistic assessment of OF. This is because (1) at the time it was 
written, statistics showing aggregate improvements in India's dairy performance were 
unavailable or in dispute and; (2) EEC dairy aid to OF was increasing in 1985, when 
dairy aid was scheduled to be phased out. Some suspicion of continued aid flows was 
understandable. There was corollary evidence to suggest that India might be seduced 
by dairy aid; writing two years before George's book, Anne M. Thomson noted: 
.. .attempts to increase food prices significantly have, in the past few years, led to riots. 
Cheap bread is now regarded as a basic human right in Egypt.'' 
Just as cereals aid had made priced Egyptian wheat farmers out of the domestic market, 
and made the Egyptian govermnent dependent on food aid (and perhaps vulnerable to 
donor-influence on policy), Shanti (jeorge feared that EEC dairy aid would similarly 
harm India's dairy self-sufficiency, and subject Delhi to foreign policy blackmail. This 
thesis agrees that the OF saga very well could have turned out this badly, but due to 
firm control of EEC dairy aid taken by OF, the final picture is much more optimistic. 
Anne M. Thomson (August 1983) "Egypt: Food security and food aid" in Food Policy: pp 178-186, 
182. Thomson notes Egypt has much food security with food aid. But she also notes that Cairo is now 
bound into a cheap food policy dependent on it. This thesis also notes that US PL 480 shipments ceased 
after the "6-Day War" of 1967, and increased before and after the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace agreement. It 
is likely that Egypt's status as "one of the largest recipients of cereal food aid" from the US influenced its 
foreign policy. 
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Taken as a whole, George's book expresses her view that (1) OF should not have 
invited use of EEC dairy aid, and (2) certainly not insisted on textbook replication of 
the Anand model in all parts of India. George wrote: 
A study of the literature on India's agricultural economy, on rural India and on Indian 
dairy policy has convinced me that present trends should be reversed if we are to benefit 
from a dairy policy that recognises the authentic roots and nature of India's dairy 
problems.... Such a policy would endeavour to build on what already exists, rather than 
to tear down indigenous stmctures to be replaced with imports of dubious relevance."" 
This thesis concedes that George was probably right to reject (2) wholesale replication 
of the Anand model (displacing previous workable stmctures). But as to point (1) on 
use of EEC dairy aid, we have already seen evidence (from Doombos et al 1990, and 
other sources) of the implicit threat that EEC dairy aid posed to India's dairy autonomy, 
and that, most likely, the wisest policy response India could make to the EEC offer of 
aid was to utilise the aid for the long-term augmentation of India's dairy autonomy. 
George's book is nevertheless helpful in pointing out shortcomings in some of the 
extravagant claims made for OF. As B.S.Baviskar pointed out, when institutions like 
the IMF and Worid bank were swept by fervour for "integrated rural development", OF 
"cashed in" by suggesting that benefits could accme to the rural poor from extension of 
the NMGS.Such claims were specious, since OF was primarily designed to stabilise 
the national milk marketing system, and dingenuous when not met. In response to such 
embarrassments, OF director Dr. Kurien could only reiterate that the primary goal of OF 
was to stabilise milk flow throughout the country. 
When George defends the petty dairy marketeer (cast as a villain by OF plaimers 
seeking to remove this middleman, who too often was responsible for price-gouging 
from rural producers and adulterating the milk supply) the reader wonders i f George's 
defence is not just an automatic negative response to every facet of the OF 
programme.George can certainly find instances where these colourful petty 
marketeers fulfil valuable functions in the community, such as in giving credit to 
George (1985) Operation Flood: pp xi-xii. 
B.S.Baviskar (July 2, 1983) Economic & Political Weekly: p 219. Baviskar also edited a volume 
containing work by Shanti George. 
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housewives. However, the gains to the community from increased efficiencies from the 
NMGS (not to mention release of the petty traders to more productive labour) probably 
outweighs the utility of petty milk marketeers. 
Gender, minoritv & poverty-alleviation effects of OF 
Some of Shanti George's other criticisms of OF are more illuminating. She disputes 
claims by some OF advocates, and by researchers Somjee & Somjee (1978)'°^, that 
"Anand...is a powerful weapon against caste" when "Brahmans mingle with Harijans" 
in milk queues. George says: 
Unfortunately there is more to life in rural India than standing in these queues. We are 
informed that such mingling has not weakened caste barriers in other arenas of 
interaction... and that the mingling itself is largely symbolic. 
George also charges that the Patidar caste, which dominates dairying in Anand and the 
state of Gujarat, extends solidarity to equivalent groups in Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra, perhaps not always to the advantage of other groups. She may well be 
correct. But in defence of OF, it should come as no surprise that caste barriers which 
have grown over centuries have not been totally eradicated in the brief OF era. 
(Although "mingling" in milk queues is conceivable a step toward social integration). 
More importantly, it bears repeating that OF was not designed as a cure-all for India's 
social ills, but as a structural reorganisation of national milk markets. 
Some idealists were due for disappointment. In a study in South Gujarat, relatively 
close to OF headquarters at Anand, Franco & Chand found that while there seemed to 
be no general bias against tribals entering dairying, "a final reckoning" as to the 
question of whether "OF is in itself a beneficial development for the tribals?" was "in 
the negative." This was because of the preoccupation of "OF on processing and 
marketing", making OF more oblivious even to the need for extension work on feeding 
102 Shanti George (1985) Operation Flood: pp 209-227. George's Chapter 10 is titled "A man nobody 
wants but everybody needs: the petty dairy marketeer". 
A.H. Somjee & G. Somjee (1978) "Cooperative Dairying and the Profiles of Social Change in India" 
in Economic Development and Cultural Change, (26:3): pp 577-97. 
'"^ George (1985) Operation Flood: pp 170-171. George cites S. Sambrani (1980) Transforming the 
Rural Poor: The Big Push in Action (The Experience of Operation Flood) Institute of Rural Management, 
Anand. 
Doombos a/ (1990a): p 124. 
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and breeding of cattle, etc., than op t ima l .Fa i lu re of OF to disburse funds for such 
extension activities was the object of scrutiny by GOI and the EC, but little corruption 
was revealed, and some examiners inferred that rivalry between state governments and 
Anand was behind some delays in extension services to farmers. 
I f tribals in the vicinity of Anand received little attention from OF policy, it is unlikely 
that minorities in states far from Gujarat received much either. In fact much of the 
dairy progress (and investment) made in OF was in the western state of Gujarat. John 
Empson notes that: 
Regionally, production varies considerably. The main production area is the northern 
region, with about 45% of the total, centred on Delhi; followed by the western and 
central regions (21%) based on Bombay; and the southern region (21%) based on 
Madras. 
Like any large business enterprise, OF sought to build the profitability of its home base, 
and avoided over-extending beyond its capabilities. Like other infrastructure, such as 
paved roads, OF processing plants, storage facilities for pooled buffer stocks, or 
insulated road and rail milk t a n k e r s O F Phase IH did not directly benefit many of 
India's citizens. However, it seems eminently reasonable that, i f this infrastucture 
investment in the NMGS raised dairy output, in tandem with expanding markets in the 
cities, more social groups (e.g. women, tribals, rural small-holders) could gradually 
come to benefit therefrom. 
Some studies (e.g. Sharma & Vanjani 1993) question the benefit of OF, when cross-
bred cows, bought on loans through OF programmes, add to the already onerous 
workload of women and children responsible for feeding and milking the animals. But 
Shanti George is on firmer ground when she questions the gender role implications of 
modem OF technology. George points out that in the past women made ghee at home, 
and controlled the income from its sale. Although the lost income for ghee might be 
made up by income received from exchange in the village milk queues, OF 
F. Franco, Fand P.G. Vijaya Sherry Chand (1991) OF and the Voluntary Sector, p 225. 
John Empson 1993 "India Joins the dairy Big Leagues" in Hoard's Dairyman, p 692. 
'"^ OF Phase III (1985) NDDB. This 60+ page proposal states that expanded infrastructure in the 
"Project will enable the State Cooperative Federations/unions to build up the basic and supporting 
infrastructures required to procure, process and market some 18.3 millions litres of milk per day." In 
comparison, John Empson (Hoard's 1993) predicted that by the year 2000, OF processing would double 
to "68.4 million pounds a day." 
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modernisations resulted in a net loss of women's status when only men were employed 
in the new high-tech i n f r a s t ruc tu r e . In feminist terms, OF unwittingly may have 
skewed dairy development toward male dominance - a critique that has been made 
against much of the mechanisation of agriculture over the last century.' 
no 
Nowadays (a quarter century after OF began) development practitioners are more aware 
that some plans are less "gender-neutral" than others. They try to avoid the sort of 
"internal colonialism" in gender roles, that Sharma & Vanjani identified in OF.'" For 
example, a UK-based NGO called Riders for Health, working with the cooperation of 
WHO and the British ODA, trains women as over 70% of its motorcycle riders, for the 
health ministries of Lesotho, Ghana and Zimbabwe."^ This is done not just because 
women constitute the bulk of nurse-practitioners riding to remote villages, but also so 
that women as well as men (who comprise most of the mechanics in the "zero-
breakdovras" programme) benefit from the knowledge and status that come with the 
introduction of new technology. Likewise, Shanti George is probably right to call for 
more "gender-neutral" policies in Operation Flood; at any rate, it is likely that as the 
rural economy prospers, women will have more employment opportunities in the 
mechanised dairy system. 
Echoing Susan George warnings of IC cooptation of LDC farming; Shanti George and 
Ben Fine would call, say Zeneca or Ciba-Geigy's supply of Green and White 
Revolution inputs "appropriationism" - of dubious benefit to the farmers in the field. 
This thesis recognises the dangers inherent in the modernisation of India's agriculture, 
but also recognises the potential benefits. For example, it is possible that the extension 
of irrigation (where appropriate) in crops production could result in generally cheaper 
fodder for dairy production in India. 
Shanti George 1985 Operation Flood, pp 196-197. George cites N. Singh, D. Jain & M. Chand 1979 
"Milkmaids of Kaira District: Some Notes", Institute of Social Studies, New Delhi. 
"° Personal comment. I would disagree. Although some urban dwellers joked about "stout Olga, the 
tractor driver in the USSR", it is a fact of the US family farm that women and girls share mechanical 
chores. This enhances their social status - and financial power in their roles as consumers in town. 
Sharma & Vanjani (1993). 
Reaching Out (1996) Published by Riders for Health (RFH), Norton, Daventry, Northamptonshire 
NNl 1 5ND UK. Established in the late-1980s, RFH often cooperates with Save the Children Fund (SCF) 
in health-delivery projects in Afiica. RFH fiinding comes from motorcycle race events in the UK and EU. 
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Final discussion of breeding & feeding 
On some grotmds, Shanti George has been proved absolutely correct in her criticism of 
OF. Such is the case in regard to cattle breeding. She is backed up by Clay and Stokke 
(1991) who claim: 
The considerable research and extension effort to increase milk yields through cross-bred 
animals has been a failure.'" 
However, in the long-term that statement may prove extreme, since sources including 
John Empson see some success in crossing European breeds with Zebu cattle in India. 
And as India develops its fodder base, including oilseeds, cross-breds may play a more 
productive role in Indian dairying. Prospects are good. John W. Mellor has long been 
optimistic about the ability of India to meet the demand of higher-yield dairying for 
more fodder: 
There is every indication that India's agricultural and marketing systems could respond 
to ... an increase in demand.' 
Mellor's assertion, made in the 1970s, is coming true in the 1990s: in what K.N. Ninan 
calls "a dramatic turnaround", India's oilseeds production has been rising at 6% a year, 
comfortably ahead of demand rising at 4% a year."^ Back in a 1989 review of Ninan's 
book of that year titled Oilseeds: Is Higher Price the Answer?, Ashok Gulati noted that 
the NDDB had been given a GOI assigiunent to "restructure the edible oil economy on 
the 'Anand p a t t e r n ' . . . T h e r e are signs that the assignment was carried out, again (as 
in the case of OF) with a reliance upon realistic pricing policy, not just technology. A 
recent article by Janairus Banaji details how the post-Gulf War liberalisation of India's 
economy is bringing in billions of rupees of investment by MNCs into the oilseeds 
industry. For instance, ITC, (an affiliate of BAT) which is diversifying from tobacco 
into food production is setting up one of India's largest plants for processing of rape 
seed and mustard at Alwar in Rajasthan. Other plants owned by firms like Glaxo, 
Edward Clay and Olav Stokke (1991) "Food Aid: The State of the Art" in their edited book Food Aid 
Reconsidered: Assessing the Impact on Third World Countries, p 15. 
John W. Mellor (1976) The New Economics of Growth, p 48. Humans and animals alike eat oilseeds. 
K.N. Ninan (1995) "Oilseeds Development and Policy: A Review" in Economic and Political Weekly. 
India, March 25: pp A14 - A27. 
Ashok Gulati (1989) "Oilseeds: Is Higher price the Answer?" in E&PW. September 2-9: pp 2007-
2008. Review of K.N. Ninan (1989) Edible Oilseeds: Growth. Area Responses and Prospects in India. 
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Nestle and Zeneca are also making large investments in Indian agriculture that could 
help increase the supply of fodder and concentrated feed inputs for dairying.' 
. 117 
However, Clay and Stokke buttress George's basic assertion that Holstein-Friesian 
breeds from temperate Europe could not replace cows and buffaloes that are resistant 
India's indigenous diseases, pests and climatic extremes. George was also 
fimdamentally right in pointing out misconceptions held by European technical 
advisors, as to the actual role of Indian dairy cows, which is primarily as breeders of 
bullocks for traction power, and only secondarily for milk production. V. M. Rao 
points out that, while the annual milk yield of cows in the US and northern Europe 
produced over twenty-times more milk than the cows (157 kg.), and over seven times 
more milk than the buffaloes (504 kg.) in India: 
about two-thirds of the power requirements of Indian villages are met by 80 million work 
animals.''^ 
Furthermore, as George notes, although Indian cows are poor milk producers compared 
to the vaimted Friesians of the North, their upkeep (fed on traditional crop wastes) is 
minimal, and their manure is efficiently, and ecologically used for crop growing. In 
time Western dairy advisors agreed with George and other critics that, for milk 
production: 
(1) purebred European cows were unsuitable for India; 
(2) Indo-Euro half breeds might be suitable in some regions; 
(3) but indigenous buffaloes may be best for India. 
John Empson notes that in 1990, "just over h a l f (55% or 63.9 billion pounds) of milk 
is now produced by buffaloes, and 45% (52.9 billion pounds) by cows."^ Recognition 
of the superior disease-resistance of indigenous buffaloes to inappropriate European 
pure-breds, was a significant reversal of, shortsighted policies. It is evidence that OF 
officials were amenable to sensible criticism (from village farmers, as well as Shanti 
George) and eventually adapted their dairy development model to real worid conditions. 
Janairus Bansyi (October, 1996/January, 1997) "Globalisation and Restmcturing in the Indian Food 
Industry" in Journal of Peasant Studies, pp 191-210. 
V, M. Rao (1991) Dairy Farming: : Socio-economic Analysis of Milk Production: pp 1-3. Rao 
(whose book is based on Ph D. research in Andhra Pradesh) draws from Vinod & Achaya (1980), Nair & 
Vidyanadhan (1978), and Singh, et al (1970). 
' " John Empson (September 25, 1993) "India joins the dairy big leagues" in Hoard's Dairyman: p 692. 
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Additionally, a mix of cows and buffaloes, which P.J. Atkins notes "have different 
seasonal yield patterns"'^" could help stabilise seasonal milk supply in India. 
Prognoses for O F 
Increasingly, reports on dairy development in India are optimistic, in terms of fodder 
production, milk production and milk consumption. It will be at least the year 2000 
before present optimistic trends are fully assured. Much, of course depends upon 
climate. An increase in global warming - or even return of drought as severe as that of 
1987-88'^', would retard Indian dairy production, but likely not stop it in its tracks, for 
we have already seen improvements in the food distribution responses by Delhi, in 
concert with other governments, to address such emergencies. As India's economy 
continues to improve, urban demand is likely to support maintenance and the extension 
to more remote areas of the National Milk Grid System, and will likely raise the 
incomes of an increasing number of rural producers and infrastructure. 
Operation Flood met John Mellor's Rx for food aid 
A concern of this thesis has been the inter-relationship between dairy product trade -
and aid. Sceptics of EEC dairy aid in India warned that food aid can lead to 
dependence, such as the "wheat trap" of Nigeria's indigenous cereals market decried by 
Andras & Beckmann. So was Operation Flood the "Trojan Horse" set to erode India's 
dairy independence that Shanti George warned about? 
This thesis has asserted that where food aid has been unsuccessful (or counter-
productive), one or more of the conditions John W. Mellor outlined for successful 
programmes were violated. Mellor advocated food aid but cautioned, "three demands 
must be met by the food donor and two by the food aid recipient. "'^^ Let us now 
compare the list of Mellor's demands to performance in Operation Flood: 
• Donor must (1) "provide reliable amoimts": 
™ P.J. Atkins (1989) "The Geographical Structure of Operation Flood": p 5. Atkins writes that, "This 
species asymmetry has implications for plant capacity, as does the extraordinary difference between lean 
and flush season procurement." It follows that the right cattle mix could reduce processing costs. 
OF: A Progress Report (1988) NDDB: p 12. This report dates the drought as 1988, rather than 1987 
given by other accounts. 
John W. Mellor (1987) in Clay & Shaw Poverty. Development and Food: pp 187-88. 
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The EEC passed this test with flying colours, by maintaining shipments of milk powder 
and butter oil to India, even when opponents in the European Parliament, and a measure 
of public opinion, made it politically uncomfortable to do so.'^ ^ 
• Donor must (2) "provide large amounts" raising the net supplies of food in the 
recipient cotmtry: 
By all accounts, dairy aid to Operation Flood was on a massive scale, more than 
meeting Mellor's demand that aid must boost the net assets in a recipient country. 
• Donor must (3) "recognise the conditions of effective food aid", meaning that 
effectiveness of food aid can be magnified by linked aid in cash and/or technical 
assistance: 
Donors' technical assistance was occasionally counter-productive. Some early 
technical assistance to India from rich countries was at best unrealistic (e.g. advising 
Holstein-Friesians for hot India), and at worst deceptive (e.g. foreign countries and 
MNCs reportedly tried to dissuade India from making powder from buffalo milk, or 
from manufacturing its own baby food, back in the 1950s). As for cash - the World 
Bank's International Development Association (IDA) and other international lenders 
augmented EEC dairy product aid with large loans on concessionary terms.'^ ^ Along 
with urban sales of recombined milk, these loans financed the National Milk Grid 
System linking Bombay (now Mumbai), Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras - helping to 
stabilise India's milk supply, and building urban markets for increased shipments from 
rural areas. 
Recipient must (1) "give priority to agricultural development... to minimise the 
disincentive effects of food aid": 
Debates of the European Parliament No 2-360/325 (January 22, 1988): pp 325, 320-325. In 
explaining a vote in favour of accepting Mr. Telkamper's December 12, 1987 Report on EEC-India 
cooperation with particular reference to Operation Flood (Doc. A 2-247/87), a member (Habsburg (PPE)) 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation said: "I will vote in favour of the report, but I feel 
very uneasy about doing so. I know something about India. We are always helping India, but public 
opinion is constantly stirred against us. So if we do help India I would ask that the Commission's first 
concern be to make it known that the Community has guaranteed that aid, so that Community aid is not 
used time and again to set public opinion against us." 
OfficialJournal of the European Communities. No.C31, February (1988) "Court of Auditors of the 
European Communities, Special Report No.6/87 on Food Aid Supphed to India between 1978-1985 
(Operation Flood II)": p 2. 
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Here is where India's dairy leadership excelled. As detailed in Chapter 3 above, 
Doombos et al noted that in the late 1960s the NDDB preempted a possible threat to 
national dairy autonomy, by winning GOI approval of a programme to sell an imminent 
flow of dairy aid from the EEC in a maimer that would fund infrastructure, rather than 
be a disincentive to indigenous farmers. M.V. Kamath presents persuasive hearsay 
evidence of this threat to make India dependent on European milk surpluses. Although 
this thesis is unaware of any "smoking gun", establishing a rich country conspiracy to 
subvert Indian dairy self-sufficiency, it is a fact (see Chapter 3) that some EEC leaders 
pondered the possibility that EEC dairy surpluses could flow to hidia ad infinitum. 
Thus, it was prudent of Indian dairy planners to construct the National Milk Grid 
System, so that the economic effects of drought in one region (or a surfeit of dairy 
product aid in another) could be stabilised over a wider geographical space. 
• Recipient must (2) "pursue policies that spread capital supplies as evenly as possible 
over the labour force": 
In this respect, OF disappointed some observers. Claims made in the late 1980s, that 
OF could benefit marginal and landless farmers (even widows) hurt OF credibility -
despite disclaimers by Dr. Verghese Kurien and other OF officials that dairy 
development - not rural development per se - was OF's mission. Reporting on OF-II 
and prospects for OF-III, Telkamper told the European Parliament that: 
The infrastructures introduced under Operation Flood will primarily benefit medium-sized 
and large agricultural holdings.'^ ^ 
Mellor's demand that recipients "pursue policies that spread capital supplies as evenly 
as possible over the labour force" is technically met i f it is true that OF benefited as 
many of India's rural poor as possible. Meanwhile, although Mellor's demands upon 
donors and recipients were generally met, rural poverty remains widespread. Some 
critics claimed a bottom-up approach, emphasising inputs to individual farmers, would 
have increased Indian milk production faster. However, as Wilfried Telkamper told the 
EC Parliament: 
The new dairy infrastructures require a capital investment which this programme aims to 
provide. The capital needed for breeding cattle and fodder cannot be raised by landless 
peasants and small landholders.'^ * 
Wilfiied Telkamper (1988) Debates of the European Parliament No 2-360/325 January 22: p 321. 
Wilfiied Telkamper (1988): p 321. 
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The EC Court of Auditors found that by the mid-1980s, EEC dairy aid had helped ease 
milk rationing - "solvent demand", i.e. demand for milk "by persons who can afford to 
pay" was met - one of the original goals of supplying dairy aid. They noted: 
The truth is that, due to the agronomical, climatic and demographic conditions of India, 
it was - and is - not possible for milk to be anything but expensive.'^' 
But more of India's citizens could gain fiiture benefits by investments in processing and 
marketing facilities, made possible by continued sales of EEC donations. The EC 
Court of Auditors (p 14) concluded: 
It is only because Community aid provided [Operation] Flood. . . with a considerable 
amount of finance for the implementation of its investment programme, that the Indian 
authorities have recently expressed the desire for this aid to continue. '^ ^ 
As the maps and charts showed in Chapter 3, consumption and production gains have 
been made since the advent of OF in 1970. Future gains will likely come to rely 
increasingly on the infrastructure that was financed by dairy aid. Gradually, more and 
more rural farmers will share in the commercial benefits of dairy development in India. 
The Summing Up of Chapter 4 
As population growth ebbed, and the dairy markets of rich coimtries matured in the 
1970s, EEC dairy aid flooded into an India was beset by milk rationing due to 
insufficient supply for urban demand. The empirical evidence shows that in the 1970-
1990 era, from OF-I through OF-III, Indian per capita consumption of milk (ex. butter) 
and butter & ghee increased significantly, compared to other poor countries like 
Bangladesh. It is difficult to ascribe the precise reasons for India's relative dairy 
success (interrelated as it is with India's status as "an emerging economy"), but it seems 
likely that Operation Flood was a prime force in its ascent toward status as the world's 
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Official Journal of the European Communities. No.C31, February (1988) "Court of Auditors of the 
European Communities, Special Report No.6/87 on Food Aid Supplied to India between 1978-1985 
(Operation Flood II)": p 14. In light of this meeting of effective demand, it is understandable that OF 
begain switching surplus Indian milk production into "luxury" products like sweets and baby food, OF's 
detractors were right to deplore continued nutritional deficits among India's poor, but often overiooked 
the long-term food security to be gained by improvements to dairy infrastructure. 
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Official Journal of the European Communities. No.C31. February (1988) "Court of Auditors of the 
European Communities, Special Report No.6/87 on Food Aid Supplied to India between 1978-1985 
(Operation Flood H)": also p 14. Finance toward India's dairy investment also testifies to E E C and WFP 
compliance wth Mellor's third demand on donors - that donors should supplement food aid with cash, 
when appropriate. 
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leading dairy producer. It is doubtful that India's present dairy situation would be as 
auspicious, had OF not been initiated. 
Mistakes have been made and learned from. It is difficult to be sure i f there ever was a 
real danger that dairy aid could trap India into lactic dependence upon affluent 
countries. India's dairy leaders deserve credit for resolute determination, and prescient 
decisions, in enhancing the country's ability to produce, process and distribute milk in 
response to the demands of lean and flush seasons, as well as climatic changes from 
year to year. In a 1988 report OF officials claimed: 
Commercial imports of dairy products ceased in 1976 except for limited imports of milk 
powder to overcome the severe drought of 1988. The gift imports account for less than 
1% of India's milk production. In addition all the dairy products now available in India 
are of Indian manufacture, without the use of any imported milk powder.'^' 
The exact dates that all dairy aid to India ceased are in dispute. According to 
Agrostat/FAO/1994, there was a marked decrease in SMP donations to India as the 
effects of the 1987-88 drought were mitigated. Donations from the EEC were down 
even more than from North America. However, from a low of 1740 MT of milk 
powder in 1990, and 3005 MT in 1991, SMP donations from the EEC to India shot up 
to 13,110 MT in 1992 - the most recent year recorded by Agrostat. (EEC SMP 
donations accounted for nearly 100% of SMP received by India in 1992, with only 30 
MT recorded from the Netherlands alone. (Indeed, WFP donations of milk powder to 
India ceased after 1977, according to Agrostat/FAO/1994."") Generally, donations 
from other sources such as the US, the EEC, Finland and Switzerland have dwindled, 
except for unusual circumstances such as after the Gulf War of 1991 (see Fig. 14). 
Rather than an indication of dairy dependence, 1992 powder donations from the EEC 
were probably a temporary aberration, in a temporary utilisation by the Indian 
government (adjusting the structure of its economy, due to an acute balance of 
payments crisis induced by oil price rises in the Gulf War) of monetised food aid. 
Corollary evidence for this view is that 1992 saw more than a doubling (compared to 
1991) of "non-cereals" food aid accepted by India, probably in order to help alleviate 
the budget crisis, rather than because of shortages of indigenous dairy products. 
'^^ OF: A Progress Report (March, 1988) NDDB; p 12. 
"° Agrostat/FAO/1994/Food Aid I/By Recipient/India. 
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Table/Figure 14 
1989 1990 1991 
SMP 15,000 1740 3005 13,140 
1655 0 1000 4253 
other dairy 14,048 ' 196 94 110 
Dairy aid to india dwindles (MT from ail Donors).. 
• S M P 
• B O 
•oltMr 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
...but resumes temorarily after Gulf War oil price rises. 
Overall, it now appeared evident that years like 1984, when India accepted marly 70 
thousand MT of milk powder from all donors (including nearly 50 thousand MT from 
the EEC - which only then was imposing milk quotas in order to flatten its milk 
mountains) were far behind. Agrostat data show that donations of butter oil from the 
EEC decreased in a pattern very similar to that of milk powder. Donations of "other 
dairy products" also fell similarly, distinguished only by a few hundred tonnes of 
products from Switzerland. Certainly the credibility of OF rose as EEC dairy aid ebbed, 
and virtually stopped in the early-1990s. Perhaps the critics of Operation Flood deserve 
some credit for ensuring that India weaned itself, in good time, from surrogate milk. 
Replication of the Operation Flood model? 
Could other countries replicate the "OF model"? I believe the answer is a qualified yes. 
But fostering proper price structures within developing countries is generally a more 
direct path toward economic progress than importing dairy aid. Even where dairy aid 
could be utilised (either to increase food security, or to alleviate structural adjustment), 
the liberalisation of world agriculture under the GATT-1994 agreement (wdiich reduces 
rich country subsidies to dairy farmers and outlaws export subsidies), means, 
realistically, that stocks available for donation are falling. Milk lakes and butter 
mountains are diminishing. There is historic precedent for this; when US dairy policy 
changed in the mid-1970s, dairy aid previously available under PL 480 dried up. Now, 
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rich country stocks of milk powder and butter oil will fall, just as cereals stocks 
available for cereals aid have fallen in response to reforms mandated by GATT-1994. 
Secondly, the overall failiu^e of OF plaimers to replicate the original "Anand model" in 
other areas of India, outside its home state of Gujarat'^', admonishes us that flexibility 
and sensitivity to indigenous conditions are crucial to development. Furthermore, it 
must be said that dairy aid can be corrupted - a sad fact that led to cessation of dairy aid 
to Afghanistan, and for a time threatened the reputation of OF in India, due to isolated 
cases of illegal sales. Monetised dairy product aid can, as we have seen, relieve 
recipient government debt payment burdens. But the threat is ever present that "aid" 
can be counter-productive, i f it is used merely as a tool of bureaucratic empire building. 
More optimistically, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that as long as 
proper pricing policies are followed, sales of donated dairy aid can (when combined 
with other appropriate aid, cash or technical support) help fund infrastructure that 
benefits recipient country farmers and consumers. But early problems in OF (before 
pricing policy was changed, to make Indian production competitive with EEC dairy aid 
in processing for recombined milk sales) underiined the principle that food aid does not 
aid development when it prices indigenous farmers out of the market. 
Operation Flood taught Northern dairists that their prescriptions, in breeding and 
feeding, were not automatically suitable for the South. But the economic lessons of OF 
franscend geographical boundaries. Put plainly: get the prices right or risk market 
failure. Don't stand in the way of indigenous farmers to supply consumers. 
Fortunately, the facts that milk production in India has tripled (see Agrostat data in Fig. 
11) since 1970, and that per capita consumption has risen, are evidence that Operation 
Flood, which played such a leading role in India's White Revolution, eventually got its 
prices right. On balance, it is a legacy to be proud of It could have been much worse. 
Doombos et al (1990a) Dairy Aid and Development: p 135. According to Doombos, after decades 
of Operation Flood: (1) Gujarat still dominates milk procurement and product manufacturing; the 
difference in liquid milk consumption between West and the North and South is less pronounced than in 
fresh procurement or in manufacturing; (2) the North and South market a relatively larger portion of their 
fresh milk in liquid form; (3) more than half of (dry stuff equivalent) of milk procured is utilised for the 
manufacturing (66% in Gujarat) of products, e.g. baby food. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS ON DAIRY AD) & TRADE 
Introduction 
In response to India's "milk famines" of the 1960s, the goverrmient of India and 
organisations such as the World Food Programme established Operation Flood, which 
for a quarter century (1970-96) was the world's greatest stage for the interplay of dairy 
aid and dairy trade. OF outperformed the predictions of critics who called it a Trojan 
Horse, even i f it did not meet every social goal of its protagonists. India has been 
weaned from EU (aka EEC, EC) dairy aid in the 1990s, and continues development into 
the WTO era of liberalised, commercial trade. Preceding chapters ended with conclu-
sions on their individual contents, but it is useful to reflect on this thesis in toto. Before 
final remarks, ideas for further study may highlight what has been shown already. 
Suggestions for further research 
Thanks to the Agrostat/FAO/1990/1994 databases this thesis has presented empirical 
evidence of dramatic improvements in India's aggregate dairy performance. But Indian 
dairying remains a trove of information on more topics than could be covered here. 
Additional topics include: agricultural questions on which fodder mixes are suitable for 
cattle in the various climatic regions of India; sociological questions on gender roles in 
dairying; microeconomic questions of when and where farms of certain sizes are viable 
(i.e. economies of scale); and to what extent dairying stimulates ancillary commercial 
activities and economic prosperity, reflected in lower infant mortality, higher literacy 
and other quality-of-life indicators. Geographic knowledge gained in India might be 
applied to dairy development in Africa and vice-versa. Certainly, research such as 
Shanti George initiated on the Dairy Development Programme in Zimbabwe should 
continue, with results compared periodically to work in Asia and other continents. 
Maps and data in the thesis text and Appendix (Figs. 14-25) could be the basis of more 
elaborate statistical analysis on production and consumption. Weighting Pacific Rim 
countries once indifferent to drinking milk (e.g. Japan, South Korea) according to their 
degree of "lactose-indifference" in 1950, and comparing them to consumption (of ice 
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cream, pizza cheese, fluid milk) in 1990 could reveal correlations between dairy aid, 
concessionary sales, marketing, advertising and cultural acceptance of milk products. 
Insights on health and nutrition could be gained by comparing consumption rates with 
disease (e.g. heart disease, osteoporosis) and morbidity. Political scientists may find 
documents elucidating decisions on OF in Europe and India, and resistance to OF's 
"Anand Pattern" cooperative in states like Kamataka which had previously established 
dairy development programmes. 
Chapters and Conclusions 
Chapter 1 traced the evolution of trade theory from the dire "zero-sum" international 
competition of mercantilism, to the present day consensus on free trade and Ricardo's 
theory of comparative advantage, expressed in the GATTAVTO-1994 agreement. 
Chapter 2 noted the post-WW-II origins of food aid, epitomised by the United States' 
PL 480. Various development paradigms were noted, from Walt Rostow's "stages of 
growth", through "integrated rural developmenf to 1990s' calls by the Worid Bank and 
IMF for free markets and "good governance". Susan George, John Cathie and others 
warned that aid in general and "tied aid" in particular can be corrupted by commercial 
interests, and that food aid was sometimes co-opted as a geopolitical tool in the Cold 
War. Aid protagonists hit their apogee in the Club of Rome demand that rich countries 
contribute 0.7% of output to poor country development. But the anti-aid camps, long 
led in virtual exile by iconoclast Peter Bauer on the Right, and recently vocalised by the 
post-modem critique of Arturo Escobar on the Left, have agreed on some facets of 
failure in earlier "modernist" aid paradigms. P.J. Atkins' calls this consensus "a 
postmodern renunciatiation of top-down Western corporatist bureaucracy in favour of 
bottom-up development based on consuhation" with farmers and other supposed bene-
ficiaries of development. Regarding Operation Flood, my thesis agrees with critics that 
plans to cross-breed Indian cows and buffaloes with European breeds were flawed. 
Myopic also was Delhi's top-down plan to replicate the Anand coop (successful in Guj-
arat years before OF began) in areas geographically unlike its origin. However, to the 
extent that OF met the prescriptions of John Mellor and Hans Singer for food aid it met 
success: OF posed no net disincentive to Indian farmers, and investment in the National 
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Milk Grid System increased prodiictivity. OF'^ stands in bright contrast to aid 
programmes in Nigeria, described in Andrae & Beckman's 1985 book The Wheat Trap. 
Chapter 3 moves from theory and argument to an examination of the empirical 
evidence on Operation Flood using AgrostafeT'AO data expressed in charts, maps and 
tables. These data, released about 1994, are the core of this thesis because they refute 
earlier pessimistic evaluations of India's aggregate dairy performance. Perhaps Shanti 
George was marginally less brutal than Claude Alvarez, who in 1983 called India's 
White Revolution a "White Lie", but George's 1985 book Operation Flood gave the 
quintessential warning of possible disaster: 
It is in the context of food aid as trap that India has been warned to look E E C gift 
horses long and hard in the mouth, as they may well turn out to be Trojan horses...EEC 
donations, accepted with cries of gratitude and euphoria, can destroy India's ah-eady 
precarious dairy economy from within and render it forever dependent on imports.^  
Indeed, commercial interests in Europe lobbied for export of dairy aid to India ad 
infinitum.^ The danger that OF was an enticement to neo-colonial dependence was 
4 
widely recognised. Martin Doombos and researchers at The Hague called OF a failure 
in which EEC daiiy aid was a third of throughput in OF processing plants. But, P.J. 
Atkins rejoined that OF performance was better than its critics said^ - a conclusion 
buttressed in my thesis by more recent data than was available to these critics. It is 
worth stating that a review of the often pessimistic literature on Operation Flood was 
insufficient to convince me of the merits of OF. But Agrostat reveals a striking reversal 
of India's dairy decline of the 1960s. As comparable countries suffered declines, Indian 
per capita intake of butter & ghee rose 20% from 1.0 kg. in 1961 to 1.2 kg. in 1992; per 
capita intake of milk-excluding-butter rose 40% from 38.7 kg. in 1961 to 54.1 kg. in 
1989.6 These rises look even better against India's "milk famines" of the mid-1960s. 
Chapter 4 relates how, despite mistakes. Operation Flood strengthened Indian dairy 
autonomy. P.J. Atkins showed that claims by Doombos, van Stuijvenberg & Terhal that 
dependence on dairy aid rose to ca. 36% in 1981-82 were misleading, in light of data 
1 Personal connmunication with P.J. Atkins. The lesson is "Horses for courses", and farmers often know 
the course better than development planners. Marshall Plan strategies did not always transfer to India. 
2 Shanti George (1985) Operation Flood: p 249. George cites Kroese et al (1979) on "Trojan horses". 
^ Dutch Milk Bureau, etc. 
Doorabos, van Stuijvenberg & Terhal (Nov. 1987) "OF: impacts and issues". Food Policy: pp 376-383. 
5 P. J. Atkins (Aug. 1988) "Rejoinder; India's dairy development and OF"^ Food Policy: pp 305-312 
6 See Maps/Figs. 14, 16, 18 (butter & ghee) aoA 20, 22 and 24 (milk ex. butter), etc. 
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showing that aid represented just 17.7% of throughput between 1982/83 and 
1983/84, and that it was predicted to fall to 3% around 1990. Agrostat shows that 
despite a small rise (in 1992 dairy aid, to just a fraction of the peak in 1984, in order to 
ease budget crises caused by oil price rises in the Gulf War) in the downward trajectory 
of dairy aid, India continues on the path of dairy self-sufficiency. Operation Flood 
began two decades before the world-wide dismantling of centrally-plarmed-economies 
and the trend toward free market policies. But 10 months before the fall of the Beriin 
Wall, WFP policy analyst Bruce Crawshaw warned of the danger of ignoring market 
signals, at an international seminar in Anand, India, where Operation Flood began; 
Experience with WFP-assisted dairy development projects has clearly shown that 
without sound pricing and import policies, dairy development is fi-aught with problems. 
An import policy preventing plants fi-om obtaining cheap imported or donated dairy 
commodities, together with a pricing policy that includes incentive prices and economic 
consumer prices, are major requirements for successful dairy development. ^ 
The 1984 Jha Report had identified deleterious pricing that allowed EEC dairy aid to 
price Indian farmers out of the market. Without subsequent correction, OF would have 
deserved the scorn of its critics. Fortunately, realistic pricing helped ensure success. 
Epilogue 
After independence in 1947, India combined democratic institutions with the USSR 
model of top-down industrial development. Democracy has persisted, but India is now 
discarding "import substitution" and other aspects of "Nehruvian socialism"^, while 
opening itself to international trade under GATT/WTO-1994 rules. P.R. Gupta says; 
India's dairy scenario has undergone a sea-change since 1992. So has Operation Flood 
on which the curtains have come down last year.^  
These sea-changes include openness to foreign direct investment, joint ventures and 
opportunities for MNCs to use India as a source of food exports. Such inroads by 
MNCs are being criticised by Verghese Kurien'° who was fighting European MNCs 
over control of milk powder manufacture in India in the 1950s - years before he became 
director of OF. Whatever the outcome of Indian liberalisation of its dairy sector in the 
^ Bruce Crawshaw (1989) "Pre-Requisites for the Use of Food Aid as an Instrument of Progress" in 
Proceedings: International Seminar on Dairying as an Instrument for Progress: the Indian Experience 
(1990) NDDB pp 184-194. 
^ Clive Crook (Pebruary 22, 1997) "A Survey of India: Time to Let Go" in Economist: p 3. 
^ Personal Emml fi-om P.R. Gupta, Editor, (Sept. 16, 1997) Dairy India 1997. Internet website. 
http://www.infozech.com/dairyind 
Verghese Kurien (March 19, 1996) "MNCs Are Np Good in Dairy Business," says NDDCorp. Chair. 
Dr. V. Kurien, inaugurating a cattle feed plant in Hassan. Website: http://www.indiaserver.com/news^Iine 
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WTO era, it wil l surely be judged in terms of people's entitlements to dairy products 
and improvements to their quality of life. Few would quibble with Kurien's demand: 
Before we look to the future, we should acknowledge the contributions of those who 
have made possible today's self-suflBciency in milk production.'' 
Today, India remains relatively poor, but it is increasingly seen as an emerging 
economy. India's entry into the WTO era would surely be more fraught without the 
improved food security achieved in White Revolution efforts like Operation Flood. 
Synopsising the main themes of this thesis 
This thesis has illustrated the evolution of intemational dairy product aid and trade from 
WW -n to the end of the Cold War by focusing on India. India epitomises the efforts of 
developing countries to prosper in a world where rich countries dominate frade in not 
just high-value-added products such as jefliners and computers, but also basic 
commodities such as grain, milk powder and butter oil. 
As well as noting the often overlooked symbiosis between farm and foreign policies of 
the EU in Operation Flood (similar to the US with PL 480), this thesis has sought to 
show, first how the long-time exemption of food trade from the GATT negotiations 
weakened the export sfrength of many Third World coimtries, and second how the liber-
alisation of food frade in the GATTAVTO-1994 agreement cowW benefit poor countries 
in future. In analysis of a parade of post-WW-II development paradigms, this thesis has 
argued from a free frade stance, but also in favour of aid in present stmctural 
adjustment programmes when certain conditions are met - as they were in OF when 
appropriate technology and realistic pricing ensured dairy aid was not wasted, but its 
monetised proceeds invested in infrastmcture such as the National Milk Grid System. 
From the vantage point of the mid-1990s, Operation Flood appears to be a qualified 
success. It is one nexus where intemational dairy product trade flows, aid and 
development regimes - and the daily efforts of millions of dairists both within and 
without India - can be regarded with altogether more satisfaction than regret. 
THE END 
Verghese Kurien (1997) "Coming of the Second Miracle" in Dairy India yearbook. 
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APPENDIX 
Additional Charts, Maps & Illustrations 
on following pages. See also Table of Contents. 
N.B.: Map data for India, Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and Zimbabwe central to 
this thesis have been carefully checked for accuracy. Data for about 100 other countries 
were scrutinised less rigorously, but are included because readily identifiable patterns 
(e.g. a steep drop in butter consumption in rich countries) suggest additional studies.' 
' Midway through my research, the 1994 version of the Agrostat computer database superseded the 1990 
version. Thus, any anomalies detected in Appendix maps may (if not simply my own errors) be due to 
inaccuracies in the 1990 version of Agrostat that were corrected by the FAO in the 1994 version. Future 
versions of Agrostat will yield yet more accurate data. Below are notes on Figs. 21, 23, 25: 
• For Spain, updated Agrostat/1994 gives 1961 milk ex, butter consumption/intake at 80.7 kg. per capita 
in 1961, and 153.6kg in 1989, i.e. lower than the 156.9 kg. given in Agrostat/1990. And 1961-89 
exponential growth in consumption is 2.5%, i.e. higher than the 1.1% given. 
• For Portugal, Agrostat/1994 gives 1961 milk ex. butter consumption/intake at 64.5 kg. per capita 
in 1961 and 161.1 kg. in 1989, i.e. slightly higher than the 156.8 kg. given in Agrostat/1990. And 1961-89 
exponential growth in consumption is 3.0%, i.e. lower than the 3.3% of the 1961-92 period, which 
includes the six year period of growth, following the 1986 admission of Portugal to the European 
Community (aka EEC, presently the EU), when consumption soared 54%. 
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ROTARY F I L L E R 
Photo 2: One operator fills eight 25 kg. skimmed milk powder (SMP) bags per minute with the Sapac 
(NZ) rotary filler, at the Darigold farmers' cooperative plant in Lynden, Washington, USA (all photos). 
Photo 3: Dairy equipment from New Zealand (pictured) has been internationally popular for decades, 
France, Scandinavia, India and the US are also leading manufacturers of dairy processing equipment. 
Investment in similar plant and transport infrastructure by Indian cooperatives was criticised as wasteful, 
but it has helped to stabilise national milk supply over flush and lean months and during regional droughts. 
Photos 4 & 5 
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Photo 4: US cooperatives rely more on refiigerated trucks than cooperatives do in India, but dairy 
systems in both countries rely on railways for bulk shipments. Instead of expensive refiigerated tankers 
and railcars, India's Operation Flood uses medium-tech, well-insulated railcars for lower-cost distribution. 
Photo 5: Warehouse workers at the Darigold plant, which can process over 4,5 milhon lbs. (2 million kg.) 
milk into 400,000 lbs. (182,000 kg.) SMP per day. Much is exported to Afiica, parts of Asia, Oceania and 
South America. After 1985, the Dairy Export Incentive Programme (DEIP) and favourable exchange 
rates helped increase US sales in markets it once conceded to the EEC, Australia and New Zealand. 
